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A single cognitive heuristic process meets the complexity of domain-specific moral heuristics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2014

Veljko Dubljević
Affiliation:
Neuroethics Research Unit, Institut de recherches cliniques de Montréal (IRCM), Montréal, QC H2W lR7, Canada. [email protected]@ircm.qc.cahttp://www.ircm.qc.ca/neuroethics/en
Eric Racine
Affiliation:
Neuroethics Research Unit, Institut de recherches cliniques de Montréal (IRCM), Montréal, QC H2W lR7, Canada. [email protected]@ircm.qc.cahttp://www.ircm.qc.ca/neuroethics/en

Abstract

The inherence heuristic (a) offers modest insights into the complex nature of both the is–ought tension in moral reasoning and moral reasoning per se, and (b) does not reflect the complexity of domain-specific moral heuristics. Formal and general in nature, we contextualize the process described as “inherence heuristic” in a web of domain-specific heuristics (e.g., agent specific; action specific; consequences specific).

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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