The first stage of De Neys's model, the processing of intuitions, requires elaboration. We here respond to two of the author's key assumptions. The first assumption is that “the uncertainty parameter might focus on the absolute difference” (target article, sect. 4.4, para. 1) between the strongest competing intuitions. The second assumption is that decision-making scenarios with more than two intuitions are “a-typical cases” (target article, sect. 4.4, para. 1). As to the former assumption, we show, by example, that there are several different ways in which decision makers might process more than two competing intuitions. As to the latter assumption, we argue that having multiple intuitions can be considered the norm rather than an anomaly.
For simplicity, we will only consider decisions with two choice options. Extending the author's (target article, sect. 3.2, para. 4) example, suppose John has to choose between a cupcake and an apple for dessert. Although John's first intuition (I1) favors the cupcake for its sweet taste, two other intuitions come to mind. The second intuition (I2) is the realization that an apple is tasty too, and the third intuition (I3) is that the apple is healthier than the cupcake. Like De Neys, we assume that these intuitions differ in strength. Although the cupcake is tastier (with a weight of 0.80) than the apple (0.60), the apple's healthiness is also noteworthy (0.50). We can now imagine two pathways for the intuitive response. In one pathway, the strongest intuition, I1 wins, and John decides to eat the cupcake. This is the outcome De Neys's model predicts from the monitoring of the absolute difference between the strongest competing intuitions. In the other pathway, the combined strengths of intuitions I2 and I3 override the strength of I1; John eats the apple because its acceptable tastiness and evident health benefit together trump the allure of the cupcake's sweetness (Anderson, Reference Anderson1981; Juslin, Karlsson, & Olsson, Reference Juslin, Karlsson and Olsson2008).
Limited comparisons between the strengths of the strongest intuitions become less compelling as the number of intuitions favoring consumption of the apple grows, even if each additional intuition is weak. De Neys's process assumption neglects the possibility that separate but weak intuitions may amount to a strong incentive for choice. Here, the absolute difference between the two strongest intuitions has not changed as medium tastiness remains the primary intuition favoring the apple. By contrast, it is even conceivable that the absolute difference between cupcake and apple increases because the average intuition strength in favor of the apple decreases with each weak additional intuition in favor of it. Table 1 shows both possibilities of absolute difference and also the simple additive processing.
Table 1. Different processing styles of multiple intuitions in competing options
This multiple-intuitions example is one of many non-trivial cases where individuals process multiple intuitions for competing options. At this early stage of model building, purely theoretical exploration and thought experiments are a productive beginning. Yet experiments and empirical research are needed to determine the conditions allowing the rise of multiple intuitions and to understand how people process them. A first step could be to test competing hypotheses about how decision makers consolidate multiple intuitions (e.g., absolute difference vs. addition) by presenting them with combinations of intuitions that lead to different decisions depending on the assumed processing.
We recognize De Neys's call for research on cases with more than two competing intuitions, but we disagree with his emphasis. Research on cue usage and information integration (e.g., Candolin, Reference Candolin2003; Grüning, Alves, Mata, & Fiedler, Reference Grüning, Alves, Mata and Fiedlerin press; Gunes, Piccardi, & Pantic, Reference Gunes, Piccardi, Pantic and Or2008; Plessner, Schweizer, Brand, & O'Hare, Reference Plessner, Schweizer, Brand and O'Hare2009) shows that multiple intuitions are the norm in decision making. Although novel situations may end in deliberation because intuitions are missing, familiar situations offer a rich range of different cues (e.g., color, availability, smell, and nutrition value) supporting the rise of multiple intuitions in the decision maker's mind. Accordingly, we regard the question of how decision makers process multiple competing intuitions to be pressing, especially for cases where individuals have learned new features of choice objects (e.g., that an apple also provides more energy than a cupcake and it requires less energy to be produced). Naturally, many familiar decision-making situations will be dominated by a few very strong intuitions per option. However, for these situations, too, our example above necessitates thinking about how more than two competing intuitions are consolidated. At the limit, we argue, the presence of many weak intuitions in favor of option B can overcome a single strong intuition favoring the alternative option A.
Conceptualizing decision makers' multiple-intuitions processing as an act of addition instead of monitoring absolute differences changes the predictions about whether thoughtful reflection will occur. The view that individuals compare their strongest intuitions by assessing the absolute difference yields a clear prediction regarding the onset of deliberation: If the two strongest competing intuitions are close enough, the resulting feeling of indifference triggers the need for deliberate thinking. Adding a large number of weak intuitions to one option (i.e., the apple) should not change the outcome. Assuming additive processing, however, decision makers with added weak intuitions in favor of the apple should come to a point of indifference about choosing the apple or the cupcake; exactly when the strong intuition about the cupcake's tastiness is matched by the composite of the apple's lower tastiness and the additional intuitions favoring it. Again, our main argument is not that addition is the more probable basic element behind intuition processing. This has to be tested. We suggest that thinking about how multiple intuitions are processed is central to predicting not only which intuitive decisions are made but also when deliberation occurs. How decision makers process their multiple intuitions is the fundamental predictive mechanism of De Neys's model and understanding it is a key challenge for his theory.
In conclusion, we welcome De Neys presenting an intriguing and novel model of decision making. Nevertheless, we think that one central aspect of the model, namely how decision makers process multiple intuitions, requires more attention. Theoretical and empirical advancements in understanding this process are possible and would move De Neys's model closer to a general theory of decision making.
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The first stage of De Neys's model, the processing of intuitions, requires elaboration. We here respond to two of the author's key assumptions. The first assumption is that “the uncertainty parameter might focus on the absolute difference” (target article, sect. 4.4, para. 1) between the strongest competing intuitions. The second assumption is that decision-making scenarios with more than two intuitions are “a-typical cases” (target article, sect. 4.4, para. 1). As to the former assumption, we show, by example, that there are several different ways in which decision makers might process more than two competing intuitions. As to the latter assumption, we argue that having multiple intuitions can be considered the norm rather than an anomaly.
For simplicity, we will only consider decisions with two choice options. Extending the author's (target article, sect. 3.2, para. 4) example, suppose John has to choose between a cupcake and an apple for dessert. Although John's first intuition (I1) favors the cupcake for its sweet taste, two other intuitions come to mind. The second intuition (I2) is the realization that an apple is tasty too, and the third intuition (I3) is that the apple is healthier than the cupcake. Like De Neys, we assume that these intuitions differ in strength. Although the cupcake is tastier (with a weight of 0.80) than the apple (0.60), the apple's healthiness is also noteworthy (0.50). We can now imagine two pathways for the intuitive response. In one pathway, the strongest intuition, I1 wins, and John decides to eat the cupcake. This is the outcome De Neys's model predicts from the monitoring of the absolute difference between the strongest competing intuitions. In the other pathway, the combined strengths of intuitions I2 and I3 override the strength of I1; John eats the apple because its acceptable tastiness and evident health benefit together trump the allure of the cupcake's sweetness (Anderson, Reference Anderson1981; Juslin, Karlsson, & Olsson, Reference Juslin, Karlsson and Olsson2008).
Limited comparisons between the strengths of the strongest intuitions become less compelling as the number of intuitions favoring consumption of the apple grows, even if each additional intuition is weak. De Neys's process assumption neglects the possibility that separate but weak intuitions may amount to a strong incentive for choice. Here, the absolute difference between the two strongest intuitions has not changed as medium tastiness remains the primary intuition favoring the apple. By contrast, it is even conceivable that the absolute difference between cupcake and apple increases because the average intuition strength in favor of the apple decreases with each weak additional intuition in favor of it. Table 1 shows both possibilities of absolute difference and also the simple additive processing.
Table 1. Different processing styles of multiple intuitions in competing options
This multiple-intuitions example is one of many non-trivial cases where individuals process multiple intuitions for competing options. At this early stage of model building, purely theoretical exploration and thought experiments are a productive beginning. Yet experiments and empirical research are needed to determine the conditions allowing the rise of multiple intuitions and to understand how people process them. A first step could be to test competing hypotheses about how decision makers consolidate multiple intuitions (e.g., absolute difference vs. addition) by presenting them with combinations of intuitions that lead to different decisions depending on the assumed processing.
We recognize De Neys's call for research on cases with more than two competing intuitions, but we disagree with his emphasis. Research on cue usage and information integration (e.g., Candolin, Reference Candolin2003; Grüning, Alves, Mata, & Fiedler, Reference Grüning, Alves, Mata and Fiedlerin press; Gunes, Piccardi, & Pantic, Reference Gunes, Piccardi, Pantic and Or2008; Plessner, Schweizer, Brand, & O'Hare, Reference Plessner, Schweizer, Brand and O'Hare2009) shows that multiple intuitions are the norm in decision making. Although novel situations may end in deliberation because intuitions are missing, familiar situations offer a rich range of different cues (e.g., color, availability, smell, and nutrition value) supporting the rise of multiple intuitions in the decision maker's mind. Accordingly, we regard the question of how decision makers process multiple competing intuitions to be pressing, especially for cases where individuals have learned new features of choice objects (e.g., that an apple also provides more energy than a cupcake and it requires less energy to be produced). Naturally, many familiar decision-making situations will be dominated by a few very strong intuitions per option. However, for these situations, too, our example above necessitates thinking about how more than two competing intuitions are consolidated. At the limit, we argue, the presence of many weak intuitions in favor of option B can overcome a single strong intuition favoring the alternative option A.
Conceptualizing decision makers' multiple-intuitions processing as an act of addition instead of monitoring absolute differences changes the predictions about whether thoughtful reflection will occur. The view that individuals compare their strongest intuitions by assessing the absolute difference yields a clear prediction regarding the onset of deliberation: If the two strongest competing intuitions are close enough, the resulting feeling of indifference triggers the need for deliberate thinking. Adding a large number of weak intuitions to one option (i.e., the apple) should not change the outcome. Assuming additive processing, however, decision makers with added weak intuitions in favor of the apple should come to a point of indifference about choosing the apple or the cupcake; exactly when the strong intuition about the cupcake's tastiness is matched by the composite of the apple's lower tastiness and the additional intuitions favoring it. Again, our main argument is not that addition is the more probable basic element behind intuition processing. This has to be tested. We suggest that thinking about how multiple intuitions are processed is central to predicting not only which intuitive decisions are made but also when deliberation occurs. How decision makers process their multiple intuitions is the fundamental predictive mechanism of De Neys's model and understanding it is a key challenge for his theory.
In conclusion, we welcome De Neys presenting an intriguing and novel model of decision making. Nevertheless, we think that one central aspect of the model, namely how decision makers process multiple intuitions, requires more attention. Theoretical and empirical advancements in understanding this process are possible and would move De Neys's model closer to a general theory of decision making.
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