Researchers are increasingly reliant on online, opt-in surveys. But prior benchmarking exercises employ national samples, making it unclear whether such surveys can effectively represent Black respondents and other minorities nationwide. This paper presents the results of uncompensated online and in-person surveys administered chiefly in one racially diverse American city—Philadelphia—during its 2023 mayoral primary. The participation rate for online surveys promoted via Facebook and Instagram was .4%, with White residents and those with college degrees more likely to respond. Such biases help explain why neither our surveys nor public polls correctly identified the Democratic primary’s winner, an establishment-backed Black Democrat. Even weighted, geographically stratified online surveys typically underestimate the winner’s support, although an in-person exit poll does not. We identify some similar patterns in Chicago. These results indicate important gaps in the populations represented in contemporary opt-in surveys and suggest that alternative survey modes help reduce them.

Recent election cycles show a reluctance among Black millennials to support the Democratic Party, which suggests that they are not captured by the party like their predecessors. While we know that African Americans have historically remained a loyal voting bloc, it is important to analyze whether there are generational differences with respect to Black Democratic Party loyalty. In this study, I analyze Black millennial partisanship identification and compare it to Black non-millennials (Baby Boomers and Gen X’ers). To test this, I employ a multi-method approach. My results show that while Black millennials continue to identify with the Democratic Party, they are not as loyal to the Democratic Party when compared to Black non-millennials. Further, I find that Black millennials are not changing loyalties to the Republican or a third party. Instead, Black millennials are willing to withhold their vote altogether if they are not satisfied with any Democratic candidates. My work has critical implications in how we understand Black politics and reveals that Democratic candidates will have to earn Black millennials vote going forward.

Most states acknowledge the significance of Indigenous rights to rectify past injustices. Yet, on the domestic level, the realization of these rights depends on national policies. For democratic societies, questions about public opinion toward Indigenous policies are thus of great interest but remain largely unstudied. To what extent does the ethnic majority support policies conducive to Indigenous rights realization? And how different are the Indigenous population’s policy preferences? I use original experimental data from a vignette study to investigate these questions in the case of the Sámi people in Norway and Sweden. I hypothesize that groups’ attitudes are shaped by policies’ potential to alter the social status hierarchy between the majority and Indigenous populations. The results provide a nuanced picture. The ethnic majority shows significantly less support for policies facilitating Sámi linguistic, self-governance, and territorial rights. While the Sámi have, in general, more positive attitudes toward such policies, their support seems to be less pronounced than the majority’s resistance. Moreover, as attitudes are surprisingly similar when compared between Norway and Sweden, a country’s existing policy context does not appear to be crucial in the formation of these preferences.

This study examined the effect of perceived ethnic marginalization, perception towards Nigerian democracy, and socioeconomic condition on support for secession among members of the Igbo ethnic group. Perceived ethnic marginalization and negative perceptions toward Nigerian democracy were found to positively correlate with support for secession. Socioeconomic condition was measured at the household and communal levels. The household measure had no effect on support for secession, but the communal measure did: socioeconomic condition at the communal level positively correlated with support for secession. Igbo ethnicity increased the likelihood of supporting secession, while belonging to the Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba ethnic groups reduced the likelihood of supporting secession.

The majority of protests in support of racial justice are peaceful. However, since the racial reckoning of 2020, there has been debate about when and how exposure to violent or disruptive protest activities can shift public opinion towards a social movement. Using the Black Lives Matter Movement as a lens, we design a survey experiment to test the causal effects of different protest tactics on support for protesters and the movement itself among Black and white Americans. We include a control condition with no protest and manipulate the level of disruption in each treatment condition, ranging from a simple march in response to the police killing of an unarmed Black man to a protest in which participants set fire to an empty police headquarters. We use OLS regressions to estimate average treatment effects. Overall, we find that both Blacks and whites react negatively to more disruptive protests but whites tend to react more negatively than Blacks. Conversely, we also find that whites overall report more confidence in the ability of Black Lives Matter to facilitate racial equality after exposure to a protest, even when that protest employs disruptive tactics. We also test for the moderating effects of racial identity and racial resentment. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for the broader literature on social movements and public opinion.

Previous work suggests that African American and Latino voters lack political cohesiveness. Recently, these findings have been cited by opponents of “minority aggregation,” which is the idea that African Americans and Latinos can be thought of as constituting a single “class of citizens” when filing claims under the Voting Rights Act. I replicate one influential study, Rocha (2007), with updated data and greater attentiveness to moderating conditions that are meaningful in voting rights law. My findings suggest African Americans and Latinos are more cohesive than previously thought, especially in majority–minority jurisdictions. Furthermore, cohesion cannot be explained solely by shared partisanship.

As demographic groups’ heterogeneity increases, questions emerge about how elected and unelected political representatives respond to such diversity. Representative bureaucracy scholarship suggests that representatives will rely on shared values and interests with clients of their demographic group to make decisions or implement policies that improve the group’s status. However, differences in immigration histories, demographic characteristics, language, and discrimination experiences within racial and ethnic groups are points of diversion that could affect representation. We explore the relationship between race and ethnicity to understand how within-group differences may disrupt the traditional assumptions of representation. Centering on the experiences of Afro-Latinx students, we ask, What effect do within-group differences have on bureaucrat-client representation?” Afro-Latinx students share a racial identity with Black education bureaucrats and an ethnic identity with Latinx education bureaucrats but may also differ from both groups in their language acquisition, culture, norms, and interests. We find that Black representatives offer Afro-Latinx students substantive representation, while Latinx representatives do not when we consider their racial identity. The research holds implications for understanding the boundaries of representation and may offer insight into the importance of disaggregating groups in representation studies.

Political wrangling over Critical Race Theory (CRT) in the United States has produced policies banning its teaching in jurisdictions across the country. However, laws touted as “anti-CRT” have little in common with the original, academic origins of the phrase. In this study, we use a Qualtrics-based survey experiment to assess how participants’ support for a ban will change depending on whether the ban reflects core tenets of academic researchers’ use of CRT, the phrase itself, or elements common to many of the laws intended to ban it. We find that these three different frames do indeed change support for such policies, and the effects are dependent upon partisanship. We interpret our results to be empirical evidence of the phrase “Critical Race Theory” complicating political discourse.

How do legislators respond to coethnic and cominority constituents? We conduct an audit study of all state legislators to explore white legislators’ responsiveness to different minority groups and minority group legislators’ responsiveness to each other. Black and Latino Americans currently make up about one-third of the overall U.S. population and an even larger share of some state populations. In light of this growing diversification of the American electorate, legislators may have incentives to appeal to a broad racial constituency. In our experiment, state legislators are randomly assigned to receive an email from a white, Black, or Latino constituent. Our findings suggest a lack of legislators’ discrimination, on average, against Black relative to white constituents. Instead, we find that all legislators, on average, respond more to both white and Black constituents relative to Latinos. The evidence suggests that Black legislators do not exhibit coethnic solidarity toward their Black constituents or cominority solidarity toward their Latino constituents; however, Latinos do exhibit coethnic and cominority solidarity (though there are too few Latino legislators to definitively establish this claim). We also estimate effects among white legislators by party and racial composition of districts in order to provide suggestive evidence for white legislators’ intrinsic vs. strategic motivations.

What is the effect of personal discrimination on the political engagement of ethnic and racial minorities? Existing research theorizes increased engagement, but evidence is mixed. The discrimination and political engagement link is tested across six countries: Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Interest in politics and political actions (e.g. protest and donations) show constant relationships: people who have experienced discrimination have more interest in politics and take more political actions. There is no clear evidence of different effects of political vs social discrimination. However, the link between turnout and discrimination varies systematically across countries: a positive correlation in three separate American datasets, but mixed and null in other countries. This may be the result of the distinctive American conflict over voting rights for racial minorities. The conclusion discusses priorities for future research, including a focus on establishing causal relationships and testing mechanisms.

Although there is increasing academic attention for the rise of Animal Advocacy Parties (AAPs), existing accounts overlook their emergence in the context of the politicization of race and religion. This contribution deploys Rancière’s political thought combined with a critical race theoretical lens to analyze the project of the leading AAP after which most international sister parties are modeled: the Dutch Party for the Animals. We find that the party on the one hand disrupts the anthropocentrism characteristic for the Dutch social and political order but on the other hand affirms and contributes to the policing and racialization of Muslims. This became most apparent in their proposal to ban unstunned religious slaughter. We demonstrate that this proposal was part of the party’s general inability to recognize the contemporaneous logics of race and religion. This leads us to conceptualize the party’s project as a colorblind, or in non-ableist terms, color-evasive animal politics.

Thousands of Latin Americans migrate to the United States every year. This article seeks to understand how immigrants’ premigration political experiences influence the acquisition of party identification upon arrival in the United States. This research proposes that premigration political experiences influence the acquisition of party identification among Latino immigrants in the United States. Utilizing data from the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) and Proyecto Élites Parlamentarias Latinoamericanas (Latin American Parliamentary Elites Project), this paper analyzes how the ideology of the government in power in the immigrants’ country of origin influences party identification among Latino immigrants in the United States. Employing multinomial regression analysis, I demonstrate that the ideology of governments in power in Latin American countries when Latinos migrate influences the party identification of those immigrants in the United States. The results of this study contribute to the conversations on premigration experiences and challenge the applicability of classical theories of party identification for immigrants.

How do Asian Americans think about their ethnic origin? How do ethnic identities affect political preferences? Drawing on interviews with a diverse group of Asian Americans, I provide a nuanced understanding of how they think about their ethnic origin and pan-ethnic identities. The findings reveal that ethnicity plays a significant role in shaping electoral preferences, as Asian Americans exhibit coethnicity preferences, conditional on partisanship. Moreover, I uncover several factors that have been underexplored in the existing literature, including transnational ties, news consumption, and political preferences on foreign policies related to their home country. This article provides a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of Asian American identities by showing that the ethnic origin roots of Asian Americans can have significant influence on their political interests and candidate preferences.

This study examines racial discrimination faced by Black immigrants in the US, focusing on its impacts on well-being, social integration, and intergroup relations. It highlights a gap in understanding African immigrants' discrimination experiences despite documented hate crimes. The research aims to understand how Nigerian immigrants are affected by integration into US society. Using a mixed methodology with surveys and interviews, the study reveals varied correlations between integration factors and discrimination experiences. It provides nuanced insights into how integration, national identity, and social networks influence Nigerian immigrants' relationships and encounters with discrimination in the US, contributing valuable perspectives on integration-discrimination dynamics.

Do locals discriminate against themselves by favoring foreigners with higher expected purchasing power? Drawing on theories of prejudice, discrimination, and colonialism, I argue that in colonized and post-colonial countries, local home sellers discriminate against local potential homebuyers while favoring foreigners with expected higher purchasing power, anticipating a more profitable transaction. I support this argument with evidence from a preregistered online audit study targeting discriminatory attitudes toward local home buyers. In the study, fictitious home buyers with distinctive language and ethnic names emailed 1,512 home sellers (realtors and homeowners) across all municipalities in Puerto Rico. Home sellers reported more houses available to Americans and invited them to more house showings than Puerto Ricans. My estimates indicate that ethnic discrimination exists in the Puerto Rican housing market. These findings provide new insights into ethnic dynamics in colonized and post-colonial societies and underscore concerns about recent legislation that turned Puerto Rico into a tax haven.

How does context influence individuals’ misinformation about socially marginalized groups? Scholarship has long found that one’s geographical and social environment are important determinants for one’s political attitudes. But how these contexts shape individuals’ levels of misinformation about stigmatized groups remains an open and pressing question, especially given the swift rise of misinformation in recent years. Using three original surveys, we find that individuals who report more contact with a diverse group of individuals were significantly less likely to be misinformed. These findings are particularly pronounced among white Americans. Moreover, contrary to the popular belief that where one lives is a strong determinant of racial attitudes, we also find that partisan and racial context did not meaningfully shape misinformation. These findings shed light on the factors that helps us to understand the misinformation that exists about this sizable share of U.S. society.

Do Indigenous peoples in present-day Canada display lower levels of diffuse support than non-Indigenous settlers? Given settler colonial relations (both historic and contemporary) and Indigenous peoples’ own political thought, we can expect that Indigenous peoples would have even lower perceptions of state legitimacy than non-Indigenous peoples. However, there are conflicting expectations regarding whether the descriptive representation of Indigenous peoples in settler institutions is likely to make a difference: on one hand, Indigenous people may see themselves reflected in these institutions and consequently feel better represented; on the other hand, these forms of representation do not challenge the underlying colonial nature of these institutions. Using data from the 2019 and 2021 Canadian Election Studies, our statistical analysis demonstrates that: (1) diffuse support is significantly lower among Indigenous peoples than non-Indigenous peoples, including people of color; (2) Indigenous respondents across multiple peoples have similarly low levels of diffuse support, and (3) being represented by an Indigenous Member of Parliament does not change the levels of diffuse support among Indigenous peoples. Overall, our research highlights the outstanding challenges to achieving reconciliation through the Canadian state and points to ways large-N analyses may be made more robust.

Since 2014, the #BlackLivesMatter movement has worked to initiate police reforms designed to increase accountability and reduce the extrajudicial killing of Black and brown people. However, policy designs are typically congruent—meaning the allocation of benefits and burdens is generally aligned with how the target group is perceived by society. How could the movement motivate policy noncongruent action that would likely burden police—a group privileged by their position within a congruent, punitive, and racialized criminal justice policy culture? An examination of the innovation and diffusion of 12 noncongruent police reforms from 2014 to 2020 suggests the movement’s demands (1) reoriented the political and social contexts that fueled past diffusion processes, (2) activated key institutional actors—Black lawmakers—who served as entrepreneurs in state institutions, and (3) reactivated innovative states to serve as “leaders” in a new wave of noncongruent reform. This analysis provides a useful framework to understand how marginalized communities and their allies can exact real policy change in a political environment known for its unresponsiveness to the demands of marginalized groups.

The United States is in a time of reckoning with whiteness. Despite white people benefiting from a disproportionate amount of power at every level of government, a significant racial wealth gap, preferential treatment in the legal system, and a rise in white supremacy, “colorblind” critics continue to argue against the relevance of race in a purportedly post-racial society. We assert that parents’ ethnic-racial socialization (ERS) of their children shapes how children view their racial identity and thus influence important political attitudes. ERS is a process by which individuals are taught values, beliefs, and attitudes about ethnicity and race. Most existing research among families of color suggests ERS is strongly linked to a variety of adult political attitudes. However, less is known about the impact of ERS on political attitudes for white young adults. Drawing on survey data from a national U.S. sample of 944 white, young adults (18–25 years old), we find that white ERS is linked with political attitudes. Specifically, we find that increased cultural socialization, preparation for bias, and egalitarianism are positively related to politically conservative ideology, while anti-racism is positively related to politically liberal ideology. Preparation for bias and egalitarianism are positively related to Republican party identification. Promotion of mistrust, silent racial socialization, and anti-racism are positively related to Democratic party affiliation. We suggest ERS impacts the way a person conceptualizes ethnicity and race and is inextricably linked to political outcomes.

Using a national audit of mayors in the United States, this paper examines responsiveness to Latine lesbian and gay constituents who request that their city issue an LGBTQ pride proclamation. Drawing on theories of intersectionality, descriptive representation, and political institutions, we articulate the conditions under which mayors are responsive to public-facing constituency service requests to issue LGBTQ pride proclamations. We find that mayors are more responsive to requests from lesbian couples than gay couples. In addition, baseline responsiveness to our inquiry was influenced by mayors’ identity characteristics. LGBTQ mayors were more likely to respond than non-LGBTQ mayors, but Latine mayors were less likely to respond than non-Latine mayors. In addition, mayors who represent cities where nondiscrimination ordinances protect LGBT people from discrimination were more responsive than mayors who represent cities where LGBT people are not protected from discrimination. These findings demonstrate how intersectional frameworks can advance audit experiments and that shared descriptive characteristics do not inevitably translate into responsiveness, a common assumption in single-axis studies of representation.