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You are not your data

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 July 2018

Gordon Pennycook
Gordon Pennycook*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8205. [email protected]
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Abstract

Scientists should, above all else, value the truth. To do this effectively, scientists should separate their identities from the data they produce. It will be easier to make replications mainstream if scientists are rewarded based on their stance toward the truth – such as when a scientist reacts positively to a failure to replicate – as opposed to a particular finding.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e145
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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