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Using the sender–receiver framework to understand the evolution of languages-of-thought
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 September 2023
Abstract
This commentary seeks to supplement the case Quilty-Dunn et al. make for the psychological reality of languages-of-thought (LoTs) in two ways. First, it focuses on the reduced physical demands which LoT architectures often make compared to alternative architectures. Second, it embeds LoT research within a broader framework that can be leveraged to understand the evolution of LoTs.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
The best game in town: The reemergence of the language-of-thought hypothesis across the cognitive sciences
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Author response
The language-of-thought hypothesis as a working hypothesis in cognitive science