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On the hazards of relating representations and inductive biases
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 September 2023
Abstract
The success of models of human behavior based on Bayesian inference over logical formulas or programs is taken as evidence that people employ a “language-of-thought” that has similarly discrete and compositional structure. We argue that this conclusion problematically crosses levels of analysis, identifying representations at the algorithmic level based on inductive biases at the computational level.
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Author response
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