Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-8bhkd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-02T18:52:18.078Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

What's the predicted outcome? Explanatory and predictive properties of the quantum probability framework

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 May 2013

Timothy J. Pleskac ,
Peter D. Kvam  and
Shuli Yu
Timothy J. Pleskac
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824. [email protected], www.msu.edu/[email protected], [email protected]
Peter D. Kvam
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824. [email protected], www.msu.edu/[email protected], [email protected]
Shuli Yu
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824. [email protected], www.msu.edu/[email protected], [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Quantum probability (QP) provides a new perspective for cognitive science. However, one must be clear about the outcome the QP model is predicting. We discuss this concern in reference to modeling the subjective probabilities given by people as opposed to modeling the choice proportions of people. These two models would appear to have different cognitive assumptions.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , June 2013 , pp. 303 - 304
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Busemeyer, J. R., Pothos, E. M., Franco, R. & Trueblood, J. S. (2011) A quantum theoretical explanation for probability judgment errors. Psychological Review 118(2):193–218.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hughes, G. (1989) The structure and interpretation of quantum mechanics. Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kahneman, D. (2003) A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality. American Psychologist 58(9):697–720.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Mellers, B., Hertwig, R. & Kahneman, D. (2001) Do frequency representations eliminate conjunction effects? An exercise in adversarial collaboration. Psychological Science 12:269–75.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Shepard, R. N. (1987) Toward a universal law of generalization for psychological science. Science 237(4820):1317–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tversky, A. (1977) Features of similarity. Psychological Review 84(4):327–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1983) Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review 90(4): 293–315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar