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The cognitive economy: The probabilistic turn in psychology and human cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 May 2013

Petko Kusev  and
Paul van Schaik
Petko Kusev
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Kingston University London, London KT1 2EE, United Kingdom. [email protected]://kusev.co.uk City University, London EC1V OHB, United Kingdom
Paul van Schaik
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Teesside University, Middlesbrough TS1 3BA, United Kingdom. [email protected]://sss-studnet.tees.ac.uk/psychology/staff/Paul_vs/index.htm
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Abstract

According to the foundations of economic theory, agents have stable and coherent “global” preferences that guide their choices among alternatives. However, people are constrained by information-processing and memory limitations and hence have a propensity to avoid cognitive load. We propose that this in turn will encourage them to respond to “local” preferences and goals influenced by context and memory representations.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , June 2013 , pp. 294 - 295
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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