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Stop me if you've heard this one before: The Chomskyan hammer and the Skinnerian nail
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 September 2023
Abstract
The target article signal boosts important ongoing work across the cognitive sciences. However, its theoretical claims, generative value, and purported contributions are – where not simply restatements of arguments extensively explored elsewhere – imprecise, noncommittal, and underdeveloped to a degree that makes them difficult to evaluate. The article's apparent force results from engaging with straw rather than steel opponents.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
The best game in town: The reemergence of the language-of-thought hypothesis across the cognitive sciences
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Author response
The language-of-thought hypothesis as a working hypothesis in cognitive science