The immediate causes of the current crisis in socialism are the highly authoritarian and extremely hierarchical political and economic structures created by Leninism. Yet the collapse of state socialism also appears to be part of a more general crisis of socialism, a crisis that includes even its potentially more democratic variants. At the core of this broader crisis lies the diminishing appeal of the publicly owned enterprise, an institution that has always been central to the very definition of socialism, but whose economic advantages are called into question by the recent and rapid development of global markets in factors of production and especially in assets. Consequently, communism's demise by no means signifies a victory for either democratic socialism or even social democracy.

What leverage does international organization offer on problems of interdependence? At what system level can actors cooperate to what effect? And is their cooperation more the product of the “objective facts” of interdependence or of “subjective” political considerations? Insights into these problems are obtained by examining the operational network of relationships that developed between the UN and selected regional organizations in the field of collective security. The organizations' operational jurisdictions and capabilities are examined in light of 146 cases of interstate security conflicts that were submitted to them. The operational network that developed is found to be in accordance with the prescriptions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, suggesting that short-term bargaining considerations are the primary determinants of the effectiveness of international organization. But although such considerations have made these organizations quite useful, they have also produced a movement away from organizational conflict management during the past decade.

Five years ago the Comintern loomed once again as a spectre on the European horizon with the founding in Poland, September 1947, of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties of the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia (expelled June 1948), France, and Italy. It has since become both fashionable and convenient to identify the “Cominform” with all aspects of international Communist activity, ranging from the most general of policy directives to an isolated Communist-led strike. The indiscriminate identification of “Cominform” with international Communist activity provides the layman with a convenient stereotype which spares him the trouble of further inquiry. For the student of Communism, however, this lack of precision merely results in obscuring the actual role of the Cominform, as it is known to us, and more particularly, its function within the configuration of various covert and overt instrumentalities of the international Communist movement. To speak, for example, of a “Cominform” policy of collectivization or of a “Cominform” purge trial in the Balkans, or to suggest by “Cominform” the whole web of controls of national Communist parties maintained by the USSR is to ascribe a role and importance to the Cominform that it simply does not have. For without minimizing the importance of the function the Cominform has come to discharge, it may be said that its role is essentially that of a central, but by no means the most important, propaganda instrument of the international Communist movement, designed primarily to provide public guidance and information to the leadership of various national Communist parties. Thus Pravda and the USSR radio broadcasts furnish daily guidance to the international Communist movement, and the World Federation of Trade Unions is continuously engaged in attempting to bring trade union activity in line with Communist policy.

While engineers, economists, and doctors can often prescribe a remedy for an undesirable situation by inference from a general theoretical construct, the architects of foreign policies rarely, if ever, have had such an advantage. Yet, the availability of a general theoretical construct could yield numerous benefits. To the degree that the theory were reliable and general, the foreign-policy maker would be able to deal with a wide range of concerns with confidence, at a minimum cost. For such a theory would allow him to know precisely what information would be needed to analyze the situation and how the information could be used to infer a prescription which would, with a high probability, get the desired results.

There is disagreement among analysts about political development in Africa. Debate over the meaning of political development is not confined to those concerned with Africa, of course. Once the question, What does political development mean? is reformulated as, What do we mean by political development? there is no dearth of people willing to provide definitions and to free us from value-laden concepts.1 The lack of consensus on definitions is neither more nor less profound among those who study African politics than among those who concentrate their inquiry elsewhere, and the major ingredients of dispute are present in both groups in approximately the same mixture.

As a legal officer in the Department of State in the 1920's, Frederick S. Dunn developed a curiosity about the decision-making process of which he was a part. The dissatisfaction which he felt with prevailing explanations of state behavior, and particularly with single-factor explanations, was the spur to a lifetime of scholarly activity. His quest for greater knowledge relevant to the ordering and control of foreign affairs was to lead him successively to Johns Hopkins, Yale, and Princeton Universities and far afield from the methods and subjects of interest to his colleagues in international law; but there was a forty-year continuity of interest in a set of questions whose answers would lead to improved decision-making.

The modern state is a theoretical concept and a historical phenomenon which can be examined as force, power, and authority. The foundations of the modern state in China were laid by the Nationalist regime in Nankin after 1927. The Kuomintang's efforts in unification and treaty renegotiation greatly facilitated the labors of the Communists when they came to power. State development since 1949 reflects Nationalist influence in constitutionalism, party role, status of the army, and even world outlook. If the Nationalist and Communist periods are viewed as a continuum, state evolution in modern China appears as a rough recapitulation of the European state's development.

Publication of Politics Among Nations is another important milestone in the development of systematic studies of international political phenomena into an established and recognized branch of higher learning.

Comparison of this impressive treatise with any work published before 1914 reveals in dramatic fashion how much ground has already been covered. Before World War I, as Grayson Kirk has described, the study of international relations was largely carried on in the sterile atmosphere of international law and conventionalized diplomatic history. The crusade for the League of Nations opened up a new field and gave great impetus to the study of world organization. This newcomer practically stole the show during the 1920's. But the course of world events did not fulfill the bright hopes fostered by schemes for disarmament, outlawry of war, collective security, judicial settlement of disputes, and codification of international law. Teachers and writers, however, continued to play the same old records, which sounded more and more unconvincing as the dictators prepared the stage for another world war.

In recent years tremendous concern has been expressed about the problems of what had first been identified as “backward,” then euphemistically “underdeveloped” or “undeveloped,” and now more positively “developing” or “emerging” areas. A wealth of factual and theoretical studies has been produced, attempting to view the problems of underdevelopment broadly and to construct a conceptual framework by which we might comprehend the apparently complex phenomena occurring in those regions. In spite of this growing scholarly interest, and without attempting to minimize the contribution of those who are laboring in this as yet untapped field, it is this writer's contention that too few studies have been undertaken which examine and analyze the views of those individuals most influential in shaping the future of the emerging states—the national political leaders.

In seeking a rational solution to policy problems, we select and approach the relevant facts in the light of underlying assumptions. Both knowledge of the object and rational certainty about the course to be taken can be attained only by proceeding from assumptions concerning values as well as causal relations. Our thinking is scientific (or, if one prefers another term, rationally disciplined rather than merely emotional) insofar as these indispensable assumptions are made deliberately, methodically, and critically. In applying thought to the problem of international organization, we have not done as well in this respect as we ought. It may be worthwhile, therefore, to call attention to the task of critically examining the assumptions on which the study of problems of international organization actually proceeds.

In the general picture of Eastern European developments the Hungarian scene has some peculiar features. Hungary did not succeed in changing sides effectively during the recent war and at the close of hostilities was probably in the worst political position among the former Axis satellites. She did not enjoy much sympathy in the West, and was positively disliked by the Russians. In point of time Hungary was the last of the Axis satellites to conclude an armistice treaty with the three major Allies (January 20, 1945).

The Second World War is often regarded as a virtually total conflict, with few mutual restraints to bind the belligerents to less than maximum use of their destructive capabilities. While it is generally remembered that poison gas and bacteriological weapons were not used, these limits are usually cited as great exceptions to the rule. Relatively little notice has been taken of the restraints in Europe on the use of conventional high-explosive and incendiary bombs in aerial bombardment, restraints which remained in effect for an unexpectedly long time after the start of the war.

The scale and intensity of the fighting in Korea have been such as Americans have, before 1950, associated only with full-fledged war. How such a conflict could fail to develop into World War III they only dimly understand. They had assumed that in the twentieth century war, or at least wars involving great powers, had to be total.

To the extent that this assumption is incorporated in the expectations of the ruling elite of either of two or more contending powers, it is likely to be true; to the extent that war is made an end in itself, is conceptually divorced from the political ends it in fact seeks to achieve, the organized violence of warring great powers must be not only totally organized, but totally applied, while the consequences go hang. The weapons and techniques of the last war when handled non-politically produced, therefore, as might have been anticipated, conditions singularly unpropitious to the realization of what were professed to have been the aims for which the war was fought.

During the past decade policy makers and academic observers have become increasingly aware of the political importance of economic relations, especially among the advanced industrialized states. Some of this awareness came precipitously when monetary crises threatened not only individual currencies such as sterling, the franc, or the dollar, but also the basic structure of the international monetary system. Some of this awareness was more incremental, as with the growing fear that neomercantilist trade policies might result in a reversal of the postwar policies of trade liberalization pursued by the Western industrialized states.

The strategic relations between the two superpowers have for a long time been influenced by the strategically superior position of the United States. This strategic imbalance has recently been rectified through a massive Soviet program of developing weapons systems that in effect created superpower parity. However, the concepts of strategic superiority and parity in the nuclear context are rather ambiguous. It is the purpose of this study to examine the influence of strategic parity as well as several related factors that have in the past shaped Soviet strategic doctrine and policy, and that are likely to continue to do so in the future.

Two American debates on foreign policy and national security. The Reagan administration and those who share its ideology see today's Soviet Union as not much different from yesterday's, and yesterday's Soviet Union as not much different from Nazi Germany. Like its progenitors in the 1930s, the modern Soviet Union is a “totalitarian” state, and therefore by nature expansionist, armed to the teeth, disposed to violence, fond of diplomatic tests of political will, and—as a consequence of all these factors —hard to deter and harder to beat. A different view prevails among most of the arms control community, the NATO allies, and some American academics. In its foreign policy, the Soviet Union is seen as a fairly typical great power whose behavior in international politics can be explained by the mixture of fear, greed, and stupidity that has characterized most great powers in the past as they have tried to secure their borders and pursue their interests in a world without law. It does not like to take great risks, it fears war, and it is, at worst, opportunistically expansionist. In sharp contrast to Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union is more conservative than reckless; if anything, nuclear weapons have reinforced this conservatism.