I study the consequences of interest group campaign contributions for administrative oversight. Unlike the few previous studies in this area, however, I study the influence in state bureaucracies and at the level of individual groups. Specifically, I test whether campaign contributions to state elected officials influence the outcomes of annual inspections of skilled nursing facilities in 16 states, leveraging the context of state politics in two important ways. First, I consider the differing effects of contributions to the legislative and executive branches. Second, I argue that legislative capacity for oversight influences the efficacy of contributions Regression analysis of inspection results with controls for facility characteristics provides evidence that contributing facilities have better overall inspection results, with a large reduction in citations for severe problems. Furthermore, contributions to legislators reduce overall problems, particularly in less professionalized legislatures, while those to the governor reduce severe ones.

According to reformers, legislative term limits should increase voter turnout by enhancing electoral competitiveness for legislative seats. However, this claim has been largely untested. The only existing study of the effect of legislative term limits on voter turnout, to date, finds that turnout in California did not increase after the imposition of term limits and may have decreased turnout. Yet, it is unclear whether this result generalizes to other states. This study employs a comparative state analysis of both aggregate turnout and district-level turnout rates in state legislative elections. We find that term limits significantly increase voting rates in state legislative elections.

Charter schools enjoy support among Republican and Democratic lawmakers in states and Congress, but little research has examined their support among the electorate. We take advantage of Washington's 2012 charter school ballot initiative—the first voter-approved charter initiative in the United States—to shed light on the politics of school choice at the mass level. Because in-depth, individual-level voter data are often unavailable in state-level elections, we leverage extensive precinct- and district-level data to examine patterns of support and opposition toward the charter school initiative, focusing on how partisanship, ideology, and demographic factors serve to unify or divide voters. Our analysis reveals that the coalition of supporters cut across usual partisan and demographic cleavages, producing somewhat strange bedfellows. This finding has important implications for the strategies advocacy groups may consider as they seek to expand or limit school choice programs via ballot initiatives as opposed to the statehouse, and provides suggestive evidence regarding the evolving shapers of voter support for school choice and ballot initiatives more generally.

Can minority representation influence policy outputs when decisions are largely governed by formal and informal rules? This article addresses this question using detailed data on school district representation and budgetary allotments in Texas, assessing the link between Hispanic school board representation and budgetary support for bilingual education. My findings suggest that descriptive representation does affect the budgetary process. My analyses also suggest that modeling representation as a role rather than as an input provides greater insight into the representational process.

Political scientists have largely come to a consensus that “most citizens are politically uninformed” (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997), but even with increased attention to state-level representation and electoral behavior, political scientists know surprisingly little themselves regarding what Americans know about state politics. Past studies of state political knowledge examine narrow domains of knowledge and make few comparisons between individuals’ understanding of national and state politics. To provide a more comprehensive account of Americans’ state political knowledge, I conducted a novel national survey that included over 30 political knowledge questions. In a descriptive and exploratory analysis, I show Americans demonstrated more knowledge about who their Governor is but less knowledge about who represents them in the state legislature, state government institutions, and the state economy, particularly compared to their knowledge of federal politics. The different levels of political knowledge across different domains and levels of government raise concerns for statehouse democracy and should be considered before testing theories at the state level. To guide future research and surveys, I identify political knowledge questions that discriminate well between those who know little, some, and a lot about state politics across different domains of political knowledge.

What explains state agency resistance to actions taken by their federal counterparts? And do sectional tensions make state bureaucratic nonacquiescence particularly likely in the U.S. South? We theorize that state resistance to federal administrative policy is more likely among Southern state bureaus due to administrative sectionalism. We argue that state agencies can and do resist federal administrative orders independent of other political constraints. This study is among the first to consider the policy consequences of sectionalism in state bureaucracies. We test our claims by employing a mixed methods approach that analyzes each instance of litigation and intervention by state bureaucrats in opposition to actions and orders by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) from 2010 to 2017. We find that, all else equal, state agency resistance to federal utility policy is about 3.75 times as likely among Southern utility regulators. This research has important normative implications for administrative politics as it suggests agencies with putatively apolitical policy jurisdiction have political preferences driven by sectional tension.

The parties as networks approach has become a critical component of understanding American political parties. Research on it has so far mainly focused on variation in the placement of candidates within a network at the national level. This is in part due to a lack of data on state-level party networks. In this article, I fill that gap by developing state party networks for 47 states from 2000 to 2016 using candidate donation data. To do this, I introduce a backboning network analysis method not yet used in political science to infer relationships among donors at the state level. Finally, I validate these state networks and then show how parties have varied across states and over time. The networks developed here will be made publicly available for future research. Being able to quantify variation in party network structure will be important for understanding variation in party-policy linkages at the state level.

Using survey data in the states from 1981 to 2000, we explore the nature of public sentiment toward members of the U.S. Senate, compare aggregate senator approval to congressional approval, and examine the impact of several factors that may influence approval of both senators and their legislative institution. We hypothesize that presidential approval, partisanship, consumer expectations, inter-branch discord, national scandals, and rally-around-the-flag events will influence both senator and congressional approval. We find evidence that supports the conventional argument that constituents “love” their senators but “hate” Congress. Senators appear to be relatively insulated from factors that sway presidential and congressional approval.

Social services in the United States are supplied by both the public and private sectors. Previous political science research has focused on public transfers or Medicaid; I study “Other Public Welfare” programs that include contracts and grants to private social services providers, focusing on the relationship between the two sectors. My results imply that an increase in either Other Public Welfare spending or private individual and family services employees leads to an increase in the other sector. I find weaker evidence of similar relationships involving private residential care or day care services, and private social services employment is generally independent of public spending on transfers and Medicaid. My results have implications for the full effects of changes in public welfare spending, including the effects on the private sector, as well as the effects of organized interests on public welfare spending.

State policies shape firms’ incentives to lobby in the United States, but the existing lobbying literature mostly ignores these incentives. Using lobbying records for all electric utilities in the United States from 1998 to 2012, we examine how state policies affect federal lobbying by both proponents and opponents of federal support for the renewable energy policy. Our theory predicts that supportive state policies reduce the returns to lobbying by both proponents and opponents. Empirically, we show that when the federal production tax credit for renewable energy is about to expire, electric utilities from states without renewable portfolio standards become more likely to lobby than those from states with these policies. Because the timing of the expiration of the production tax credit is quasi-random, these findings carry a causal interpretation. Using text analysis techniques, we also show that the lobbying efforts are focused on energy and environmental issues while lobbying on unrelated topics remains unaffected.

Political scientists and policy scholars have traditionally looked at the role of welfare and tax policies in shaping income inequality. Less attention has been paid to the key policy area of economic development. But states spend billions on economic development incentives each year to encourage firms to locate in their state. The few studies that have examined the impact of economic development policy on inequality have found mixed results, and have not considered who shapes and benefits from economic development policy when identifying possible causal mechanisms. I argue that increased incentive spending leads to increased inequality through either a market conditioning effect (incentives disproportionately boost the incomes of top earners prior to taxes) or a redistributive effect (incentives allow wealthy firms, investors, and employees to keep income that would otherwise be taxed and transferred). These mechanisms are tested using data on incentive spending and inequality across the 50 states from 1999 to 2014. The findings demonstrate that incentives increase income inequality via a redistributive effect only. This effect, though, is relatively large, long-lasting, and robust to different measures of incentive spending. Despite using economic development incentives to try to generate greater prosperity, state governments may be inadvertently exacerbating inequality.

our initial article challenged three of Brace et al.'s (2004) claims: (1) state citizen ideology is stable over time; (2) the Berry et al. (1998) measure of state citizen ideology is invalid; and (3) assessing the effect of state citizen ideology on state policy requires analysts to first parse out national or across-the-board changes in ideology. By stating that “the authors of the preceding article reinforce most of our substantive points,” Brace et al. (2007, 000) leave the impression that we agree with these claims. We do not. In fact, we see no evidence in this exchange to support any of these claims or to rebut our criticisms of them. To substantiate their first claim Brace et al. (2004) report that residuals from fixed-effects regression models of two measures of state ideological self-identification display few significant time trends. In this issue, we show that the results of the residual analysis are almost certainly artifacts of low statistical power and high measurement error and, hence, cannot support their claim. Brace et al. defend their second claim by showing that Berry et al.'s measure of citizen ideology both produces far more statistically significant time trends than do the two measures of ideological self-identification and is weakly correlated with these two measures. In response, we once again point to the artifactual nature of their regression residual results and note that Brace et al. (2001) report incorrect correlations. These empirical criticisms are independent of the distinction we draw between policy mood and self-identification; were we to abandon this distinction completely, which we recommend against on theoretical grounds, these criticisms of Brace et al. (2004) would still apply. We reject Brace et al.'s third claim that changes in state citizen ideology associated with national trends cannot meaningfully influence state public policyon logical grounds, noting that across-the-board changes in state ideology may very well produce changes in state public policy.

Since the Civil War, the president's party has lost seats in the U.S. House of Representatives in all but three midterm election cycles. Many attribute this pattern to “balancing” by moderate voters who prefer a Democratic Congress when Republicans control the White House, and vice versa. Although a number of scholars have tested the balancing hypothesis, the debate remains unsettled. We argue that the U.S. states provide an excellent way to analyze the issue further. Similar to the national government, states feature an executive and (in most cases) a bicameral legislature whose members come up for election in both gubernatorial and state midterm years. If voters balance, one should observe such behavior in state elections when an executive's partisanship is known and a legislative choice is necessary. We examine state legislative elections from 1978 to 2009 and find evidence consistent with the balancing hypothesis.

In the United States, people are asked to vote on a myriad of candidates, offices, and ballot questions. The result is lengthy ballots that are time intensive and complicated to fill out. In this paper, we utilize a new analytical technique harnessing ballot scanner data from a statewide midterm election to estimate the effects of ballot complexity on voting errors. We find that increases in ballot length, increases in the number of local ballot questions, and increases in the number of candidates listed for single offices significantly increase the odds of encountering ballot marking and scanning errors. Our findings indicate that ballots’ characteristics can help election administrators make Election Day planning and resource allocation decisions that decrease ballot errors and associated wait times to vote while increasing the reliability of election results and voter confidence in the electoral process.

Party competition is foundational to the study of modern politics, affecting outcomes as varied as policy choices, political participation, and the quality of representation. Scholars have long argued that increased levels of party competition are associated with more liberal policy making. By this logic, parties in close competition with one another try to expand their bases of support by catering to the desires of those who tend to abstain from the political process—the “have-nots.” We extend this classic hypothesis by examining the relationship between competition and policy liberalism over several decades, articulating and testing a theory that suggests that party competition relates differently to social and economic policy liberalism. We find robust evidence that increased competition has a positive relationship with economic policy liberalism, weaker evidence for a negative relationship between competition and social policy liberalism, and suggestive evidence that the direction and magnitudes of these relationships have changed over time.

The prospect of a full complement of regularly-conducted, publicly-released state-level polls has both excited and eluded scholars of state politics and public opinion for decades. Here, we examine the current status of state-level polling in the U.S. Specifically, we rely on interviews with 51 state poll directors to investigate the location, frequency, scope, budget, purpose, content, and perceived policy impact of such projects. We also explore the still challenging prospect of greater state-to-state collaboration. We conclude that while current state polling is a robust industry, calls for greater collaboration remain unheeded largely because of limited resources and the incompatible reward structures of project directors. Still, improved data-archiving together with regional polling projects on hot-button topics would serve to diminish such challenges.

The term limits movement of the 1990s was largely driven by Republican-led groups as part of a larger strategy to unseat entrenched Democratic incumbents in Congress and state legislatures. Likewise, many political scientists predicted that, as the traditional minority party, Republicans would benefit from term limits by eliminating the Democrats' incumbency advantage. However, other studies provided reasons to be skeptical of these predicted gains. No empirical study has yet examined the accuracy of these predictions. This study seeks to fill this void by utilizing multivariate data analysis to study the impact of term limits on the partisan composition of state legislatures from 1990 to 2004. The findings suggest that, holding other factors constant, Republicans have not gained representation at the state legislative level under term limits as was predicted.

When social movement activists achieve an institutional position at the policymaking table, does their political behavior moderate with the norms of that institution? We explore this question by examining the behavior and attitudes of Christian Right activists appointed to serve on the 1997-98 Florida Constitutional Revision Commission (CRC). This commission was marked by an unusually high degree of conflict between three factions—Democrats, business-oriented Republicans, and socially conservative Republicans associated with the Christian Right. We found that by maintaining an outsider, purist political style, the commissioners with Christian Right ties were ineffective, isolated, and estranged from the mainstream Republicans on the CRC. The former remained true to their outsider status, behaving more like purist social movement activists than public officials with professional orientations. While these Christian Right elites adapted outwardly to some institutional norms for strategic purposes, they did not assimilate wholly to the demands of conventional political interchange.

We investigate the relationship between electoral institutions and committee autonomy in the context of U.S. state legislatures. The distributive theories of legislative organization suggest that electoral rules that make personal reputations more important motivate legislators to decentralize power and enhance committee autonomy to be able to target particularistic goods to their local constituencies. We argue that the distributive theories have direct implications for the relationship between candidate selection procedures and committee autonomy. The need to reach out to a large number of voters and to amass significant financial resources in states with more inclusive candidate selection procedures such as the open primary makes representatives more dependent on special interests, which is conducive to legislative particularism and committee autonomy. We take advantage of the great variation across the American states to investigate the effects of candidate selection procedures, a factor neglected in the previous literature. Examining 24 state legislatures from 1955 to 1995, we find that the inclusiveness of the selectorate, or the body electing candidates, has a significant effect on committee autonomy with more inclusive primary elections leading to more autonomous committee systems. By contrast, however, term limits were not a significant predictor of committee autonomy. This contributes to our understanding of how legislators amend institutional arrangements to achieve their electoral goals.

This article examines the role of wealth in the redistricting process in state legislative contests. I argue that the decision by state redistricting mapmakers to pursue a “seatswing” or “protection” strategy involves more than just a choice between where to move partisan voters. Redistricting may also allow parties to consider wealth as an additional resource to be concentrated or dispersed across legislative districts. To test this wealth-based hypothesis, I examine state redistricting plans in California and North Carolina. Logistic regression analyses of census block group exchanges between state legislative districts reveal that income plays a significant role in redistricting decisions.