In the literature, predicativism is connected not only with the Vicious Circle Principle but also with the idea that certain totalities are inherently potential. To explain the connection between these two aspects of predicativism, we explore some approaches to predicativity within the modal framework for potentiality developed in Linnebo (2013) and Linnebo and Shapiro (2019). This puts predicativism into a more general framework and helps to sharpen some of its key theses.

In “Some Remarks on Extending and Interpreting Theories with a Partial Truth Predicate”, Reinhardt [21] famously proposed an instrumentalist interpretation of the truth theory Kripke–Feferman ( $\mathrm {KF}$ ) in analogy to Hilbert’s program. Reinhardt suggested to view $\mathrm {KF}$ as a tool for generating “the significant part of $\mathrm {KF}$ ”, that is, as a tool for deriving sentences of the form $\mathrm{Tr}\ulcorner {\varphi }\urcorner $ . The constitutive question of Reinhardt’s program was whether it was possible “to justify the use of nonsignificant sentences entirely within the framework of significant sentences”. This question was answered negatively by Halbach & Horsten [10] but we argue that under a more careful interpretation the question may receive a positive answer. To this end, we propose to shift attention from $\mathrm {KF}$ -provably true sentences to $\mathrm {KF}$ -provably true inferences, that is, we shall identify the significant part of $\mathrm {KF}$ with the set of pairs $\langle {\Gamma , \Delta }\rangle $ , such that $\mathrm {KF}$ proves that if all members of $\Gamma $ are true, at least one member of $\Delta $ is true. In way of addressing Reinhardt’s question we show that the provably true inferences of suitable $\mathrm {KF}$ -like theories coincide with the provable sequents of matching versions of the theory Partial Kripke–Feferman ( $\mathrm {PKF}$ ).

Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848) is commonly thought to have attempted to develop a theory of size for infinite collections that follows the so-called part–whole principle, according to which the whole is always greater than any of its proper parts. In this paper, we develop a novel interpretation of Bolzano’s mature theory of the infinite and show that, contrary to mainstream interpretations, it is best understood as a theory of infinite sums. Our formal results show that Bolzano’s infinite sums can be equipped with the rich and original structure of a non-commutative ordered ring, and that Bolzano’s views on the mathematical infinite are, after all, consistent.

We study the lattice of extensions of four-valued Belnap–Dunn logic, called super-Belnap logics by analogy with superintuitionistic logics. We describe the global structure of this lattice by splitting it into several subintervals, and prove some new completeness theorems for super-Belnap logics. The crucial technical tool for this purpose will be the so-called antiaxiomatic (or explosive) part operator. The antiaxiomatic (or explosive) extensions of Belnap–Dunn logic turn out to be of particular interest owing to their connection to graph theory: the lattice of finitary antiaxiomatic extensions of Belnap–Dunn logic is isomorphic to the lattice of upsets in the homomorphism order on finite graphs (with loops allowed). In particular, there is a continuum of finitary super-Belnap logics. Moreover, a non-finitary super-Belnap logic can be constructed with the help of this isomorphism. As algebraic corollaries we obtain the existence of a continuum of antivarieties of De Morgan algebras and the existence of a prevariety of De Morgan algebras which is not a quasivariety.

We show that monadic intuitionistic quantifiers admit the following temporal interpretation: “always in the future” (for $\forall $ ) and “sometime in the past” (for $\exists $ ). It is well known that Prior’s intuitionistic modal logic ${\sf MIPC}$ axiomatizes the monadic fragment of the intuitionistic predicate logic, and that ${\sf MIPC}$ is translated fully and faithfully into the monadic fragment ${\sf MS4}$ of the predicate ${\sf S4}$ via the Gödel translation. To realize the temporal interpretation mentioned above, we introduce a new tense extension ${\sf TS4}$ of ${\sf S4}$ and provide a full and faithful translation of ${\sf MIPC}$ into ${\sf TS4}$ . We compare this new translation of ${\sf MIPC}$ with the Gödel translation by showing that both ${\sf TS4}$ and ${\sf MS4}$ can be translated fully and faithfully into a tense extension of ${\sf MS4}$ , which we denote by ${\sf MS4.t}$ . This is done by utilizing the relational semantics for these logics. As a result, we arrive at the diagram of full and faithful translations shown in Figure 1 which is commutative up to logical equivalence. We prove the finite model property (fmp) for ${\sf MS4.t}$ using algebraic semantics, and show that the fmp for the other logics involved can be derived as a consequence of the fullness and faithfulness of the translations considered.

Can conjunctive propositions be identical without their conjuncts being identical? Can universally quantified propositions be identical without their instances being identical? On a common conception of propositions, on which they inherit the logical structure of the sentences which express them, the answer is negative both times. Here, it will be shown that such a negative answer to both questions is inconsistent, assuming a standard type-theoretic formalization of theorizing about propositions. The result is not specific to conjunction and universal quantification, but applies to any binary operator and propositional quantifier. It is also shown that the result essentially arises out of giving a negative answer to both questions, as each negative answer is consistent by itself.

Here, I combine the semantics of Mares and Goldblatt [20] and Seki [29, 30] to develop a semantics for quantified modal relevant logics extending ${\bf B}$ . The combination requires demonstrating that the Mares–Goldblatt approach is apt for quantified extensions of ${\bf B}$ and other relevant logics, but no significant bridging principles are needed. The result is a single semantic approach for quantified modal relevant logics. Within this framework, I discuss the requirements a quantified modal relevant logic must satisfy to be “sufficiently classical” in its modal fragment, where frame conditions are given that work for positive fragments of logics. The roles of the Barcan formula and its converse are also investigated.

Inquisitive first-order logic, InqBQ, is a system which extends classical first-order logic with formulas expressing questions. From a mathematical point of view, formulas in this logic express properties of sets of relational structures. This paper makes two contributions to the study of this logic. First, we describe an Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé game for InqBQ and show that it characterizes the distinguishing power of the logic. Second, we use the game to study cardinality quantifiers in the inquisitive setting. That is, we study what statements and questions can be expressed in InqBQ about the number of individuals satisfying a given predicate. As special cases, we show that several variants of the question how many individuals satisfy $\alpha (x)$ are not expressible in InqBQ, both in the general case and in restriction to finite models.

A thriving literature has developed over logical and mathematical pluralism – i.e. the views that several rival logical and mathematical theories can be equally correct. These have unfortunately grown separate; instead, they both could gain a great deal by a closer interaction. Our aim is thus to present some novel forms of abstractionist mathematical pluralism which can be modeled on parallel ways of substantiating logical pluralism (also in connection with logical anti-exceptionalism). To do this, we start by discussing the Good Company Problem for neo-logicists recently raised by Paolo Mancosu (2016), concerning the existence of rival abstractive definitions of cardinal number which are nonetheless equally able to reconstruct Peano Arithmetic. We survey Mancosu’s envisaged possible replies to this predicament, and suggest as a further path the adoption of some form of mathematical pluralism concerning abstraction principles. We then explore three possible ways of substantiating such pluralism—Conceptual Pluralism, Domain Pluralism, Pluralism about Criteria—showing how each of them can be related to analogous proposals in the philosophy of logic. We conclude by considering advantages, concerns, and theoretical ramifications for these varieties of mathematical pluralism.

Supra-Bayesianism is the Bayesian response to learning the opinions of others. Probability pooling constitutes an alternative response. One natural question is whether there are cases where probability pooling gives the supra-Bayesian result. This has been called the problem of Bayes-compatibility for pooling functions. It is known that in a common prior setting, under standard assumptions, linear pooling cannot be nontrivially Bayes-compatible. We show by contrast that geometric pooling can be nontrivially Bayes-compatible. Indeed, we show that, under certain assumptions, geometric and Bayes-compatible pooling are equivalent. Granting supra-Bayesianism its usual normative status, one upshot of our study is thus that, in a certain class of epistemic contexts, geometric pooling enjoys a normative advantage over linear pooling as a social learning mechanism. We discuss the philosophical ramifications of this advantage, which we show to be robust to variations in our statement of the Bayes-compatibility problem.