What is the student of politics to make of the revival of protectionism and the new mood of economic nationalism of which it is widely held to be a symptom? It is reasonably clear why nationalism raises problems for economists: for orthodox Marxists it entrenches false consciousness and delays the final crisis of capitalism; for liberals it frustrates the optimal allocation of resources by substituting group sentiment for the rational pursuit of individual self-interest and by endowing political frontiers with an economic significance to which their economic theory is opposed. But it is not self-evident that the assumptions on which the great neo-classical systems are built are the most helpful for understanding the phenomenon of economic nationalism or for evaluating the nature of the problem which it poses for international society. Since Marx himself was profoundly uninterested in the great debate between free trade and protection, while contemporary Marxist-Leninist governments all pursue economic policies which are unambiguously nationalist, I shall confine myself to the debate within the liberal tradition.

In the short space allotted mes I, shall address the major issues raised by Brace Bueno de Mesquita's response to my review of The War Trap. His five most important points are as follows:

Anglo-American relations have always been complicated by mythology. On the American side are the legends spawned by the revolt of the thirteen colonies against the tyranny of George III and Lord North and the resulting legacy of anti-imperialism and an enduring suspicion of the British. On the British side, the myth of the 'special relationship' has often led British statesmen to expect more co-operation and gratitude from the Americans than from mere foreigners such as the French or the Germans. It has been the British, on the whole, who have failed to remember that a core of common interests does not necessarily produce a core of common approach.

These two books should be welcomed enthusiastically by the international relations community. They describe economically the work done in two important and related fields with which scholars of international relations, no matter what their speciality, should be acquainted. This judgement may not, of course, be accepted by everyone, but I hope this review article will provide reasons in support of it. For even if one concludes (as I do not) that the approaches of these books are wrong, they are interestingly wrong.

In a recent issue of the Review John Baylis discussed wartime thinking in Great Britain about a post-war European security group. Baylis's contribution is of great importance to the historiography of wartime and post-war British foreign and security policy, filling a void in our knowledge of these crucial years. However, we would like to make some critical comments on his treatment of the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff report ‘Security in Western Europe and the North Atlantic’, which is such a central feature in his contribution. According to Baylis this particular study by the PHPS (an interdepartmental study group created by the British War Cabinet) laid down ‘a reasonably coherent set of attitudes’ regarding post-war European co-operation. The PHPS, collecting together much of the current thinking in both Foreign Office and military circles, advocated the formation of a Western European-Group as a kind of insurance against a rearmed Germany ors if the world organization failed to materialize, against a potentially hostile USSR. The report marked the formation of a ‘consensus’ among Foreign Office and military officials involved in post-war planning.

In his recent Review article, ‘Do general rules of international law exist?’, Lowe states that there are at least two interpretations of the nature of customary international law.1 In the following, I shall attempt to clarify what these two interpretations are, examine the implications which Lowe attaches to the interpretation which he favours, and discuss his assertions about truly general rules of international law.

Professor Krasner's article ‘Third World vulnerabilities and global negotiations’ in the October issue of the Review (Vol. 9, no. 4) is an attempt to provide an alternative way of thinking about the North-South dialogue. The central thesis is that Third World states are concerned with power rather than wealth; that politics and not economics is the overriding determinant of their motivation in seeking changes in the international economic order, Krasner therefore urges Northern states to approach global negotiations with caution and to begin discussions only in those limited areas seen as capable of satisfying mutual economic interests. Indeed Krasner's article reads like a policy document; a paper prepared to catch the eye of the Reagan administration perhaps? Underpinning his analysis is the notion of Third World vulnerability. It is the internal and external vulnerability of these regimes, we are told, which best explains their policy positions.

Marc Williams' ‘The Third World and global reform’ raises several fundamental questions about my analysis of the Third World's quest for a New International Economic Order. His most serious criticisms are that I (1) misunderstood the relationship between politics and economics; (2) covertly endorse an orthodox liberal policy prescription for the North; and (3) mis-state the implications that can be drawn from data on the economic situation of developing countries. I will address each of these issues.

Hidemi Suganami's thoughtful criticisms of my recent article in the Review1 throw valuable light on some of the key elements of the argument which I tried to outline there. None the less, those criticisms do not seem to undermine my central argument, which is that there is a difference between the conception of customary international law as a set of laws which in principle bind all states and the conception of customary international law as a set of obligations which in principle bind only those states which have consented to be bound by them. By ‘law’ here, I mean a rule which purports to apply to all entities which fall within the open-ended set (i.e., ‘states’) which constitutes its sphere of application rationae personae. An ‘obligation’, on the other hand, claims no such general applicability, but—in the case of consensual obligations, with which we are here concerned—is only binding upon the closed set of states which have consented to be bound by it. There is, in my view, no good reason why the orthodox conception of customary international law as a set of laws should be preferred to the conception of customary international law as a set of obligations.

I am greatly obliged to Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman for their illuminating comments on my treatment of the Post-Hostilities Report ‘Security in Western Europe and the North Atlantic’. Although my assessment of the report was not, as they suggest, ‘a central feature of my article’ (two out of fifteen pages) the points they make are nevertheless very valuable.