The academic imprint of Susan Strange, long considered a pioneer in the field of IPE, no longer resonates with contemporary debates about the organization and structure of the global political economy. We argue that her analytical framework continues to be a productive way to think about important current developments, most importantly in relation to what can now be called the digital age and its emergent form of capitalism. We therefore modify and update Strange’s framework to highlight its unique analytical potential, and to set out the operational principles of what we want to call a ‘neo-Strangean’ framework of authority. We then apply it to what Strange identifies as the finance or credit structure. By focusing on a core domain of political-economic power, we demonstrate our principal claim that a neo-Strangean framework of authority points towards an understanding of how new actors and imperatives are reshaping the global political economy. We close by outlining the analytical benefits that a neo-Strangean research agenda promises for the field of IPE, which for us centre on emphasizing the dynamics and disruptive consequences of a knowledge-infused global political economy in a way that pays sufficient attention to ideational and material factors.

A desire to preserve its ontological security was crucial in France’s decision to leave Algeria. France neither militarily lost the Algerian War (1954–62), nor were the financial costs of war too burdensome to bear. Instead, the contradictions between two narrative strands of France’s sense of self – liberal-democratic universalism and white European ethnonationalism – came unravelled, sparking a crisis of ontological security. These two narrative strands were rewoven together around the decision to leave Algeria, which saved France from facing a true reckoning about its sense of self and the dynamics of colonialism that had pushed France to create a racial hierarchy that contradicted French republican values. Algeria shows that ontological security can be preserved by using narrative strands to create the impression of stability amid profound changes. Additionally, in critical situations during periods of great global political change, shedding certain role-identities (such as being a colonial power) can help states recover ontological security. France’s pivot away from its colonial empire under President Charles de Gaulle is an example of such a transition away from a specific role-identity that was narrated in such a way that it actually – and paradoxically – projected stability.

Normative conflict is at the centre of many current discussions about order and change in world politics. In this article, we argue that studying normativity in practice is necessary when analysing processes of global ordering, such as negotiating, cooperating, or protesting. Practices are imbued with normativity. This key aspect, however, remains often overlooked in current International Relations (IR) practice research due to a conservative bias that treats practices mainly as patterned. Focusing on normativity reveals the inherent contestation of practices, providing a conceptual avenue for understanding how international practices oscillate between social order and change. Normativity can be defined as evaluating criteria experienced in practice and used for the contextualised moral judgement of public performances. This perspective is relevant for IR scholars interested in how relational, contested, and learning processes relate to order and ordering in world politics. We propose taking a comprehensive approach hereto based on three key dimensions: how normativity is enacted and disputed in practice; how it must be learnt as practical knowledge in communities; and, how ambiguity remains due to the multiplicity of rules applied in everyday situations. We illustrate our approach by examining global protests in different fields (sports, the environment, and peace).

In International Relations (IR) scholarship, there is a growing body of research on the connections between emotions, stigma, and norm violations. It is often presumed that for stigma imposition to be successful, norm violators should feel shame. We argue instead that the emotional dynamics that inform the management of stigma are more complex and involve overlooked emotions such as anxiety, sadness, and hopelessness. We substantiate this by analysing the successful stigmatisation of anti-war voices in Azerbaijan during the 2020 Karabakh war. While the vast majority of the Azerbaijani population supported the war, a small minority contested its legitimacy and the related emotional obligation to express hatred against Armenians. However, these anti-war voices became stigmatised as ‘traitors to the homeland’, and were ultimately pushed to self-silence. We contribute to the growing IR scholarship on emotions and stigma in two ways. First, we show how successful stigmatisation of norm violators may involve emotional dynamics that go beyond shame. Second, we discuss the power of emotion norms of hatred, which, especially in times of war, can push ‘ordinary people’ to pro-actively and vehemently stigmatise norm-violators. In conclusion, we elaborate on the potential future implications of stigma on peacebuilding activities between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

How did conflicting legitimation narratives in early modern East Asia coexist despite the tensions their mutually exclusive claims generated? Prevailing accounts understand authority to be legitimised through narratives emphasising hierarchical delegation or autonomous production. In practice, both existed simultaneously. Existing accounts in International Relations (IR) suggest conflicting legitimation narratives should produce instability at best and hostilities at worst. Yet conflicting narratives endured over the long term in this period. I argue conflicting legitimation narratives were performed by actors in early modern East Asia within separate locations, allowing contradictory claims around the nature of their authority to coexist. This is seen through the contemporaneous phrase wài wáng nèi dì or ‘emperor at home, king abroad’. To demonstrate this, I introduce the segmentation of space as a concept. Producing an inside/outside dynamic, East Asian actors performed their authority through autonomously produced legitimation narratives inside while acknowledging hierarchically delegated narratives as the basis for authority outside. I identify this process of segmentation operating at both the state and the region level. Both early modern Japan and Vietnam demonstrate how East Asian thinking and practices on spatial organisation were adapted across all levels of the system. Thus, conflicting legitimation narratives could endure without converging on shared understandings.

Cartographic representations of Kashmir and Taiwan act as sites upon which Indian and Chinese state power is exercised to govern the logics of visibility and legibility for these two regions. Despite the differences in regime type, these major non-Western powers represent Kashmir and Taiwan respectively as internal and integral parts of their sovereign territorial form. In this article, we consider two cases that have not hitherto been studied together in International Relations (IR), putting forward ‘cartographic imaginaries’ as a framework to reveal systematic analytical dynamics in relation to representation, nationalism, and diaspora. Cartographic imaginaries are sites of productive power that evoke certain emotions and carry a set of ideas relating to territory that can be naturalised through repeated exposure. We present in-depth investigations providing a range of examples to trace Indian and Chinese states’ efforts, both domestic and international, involved in constructing and controlling cartographic imaginaries of Kashmir and Taiwan. Our analysis relates to significant current concerns in IR about critiques of imperial cartography, impact of rising powers on global order dynamics, and transnational governance of diaspora. Our framework thus demonstrates the connexions between affect, visuality, and state power and offers empirical insights into non-Western projections of imperialism on a global scale.

The dominant understandings of space that inform International Relations (IR) theories struggle to account for the material dynamism of the natural environment. From neo-realism through to constructivism and post-structuralist IR perspectives, the natural environment is relegated to the background of analysis as the seemingly stable backdrop against which humans do global politics. Supporting this relegation is an associated tendency among IR theorists to view nature abstractly, rather than materially, in alignment with the cartographic imagination. Meanwhile, realist scholars adhering to the tenets of classical geopolitics foreground the natural environment as a factor in global politics yet view it as ontologically static and materially deterministic in its effects. In an era of unprecedented spatial flux amid human-induced climate change, this article seeks to contribute to ongoing efforts in IR and political geography to develop alternative spatial frameworks that can account for the natural environment’s material dynamism and instability. To do so, the article adopts a post-humanist framework that centres matter’s ontological fluidity and mobility. By affording primacy to matter-in-motion, it is argued, a richer understanding of space as performatively produced through relational processes can be developed, where attention is attuned not only to what matter ‘does’, but also how it moves.

Independent experts are routinely appointed by international organisations for specific short-term assignments. Existing scholarship has studied their career trajectories, accumulation of resources, and mobility across occupational settings to explain their power and capacity to pursue their own agendas. However, it has neglected the fact that many transnational professionals not only move between professions but also practise them simultaneously. By using the example of the United Nations special rapporteur, an independent human rights expert, this article addresses this under-theorised feature by theorising them as plural professionals, or actors who practise multiple professions simultaneously. This multiple positioning in several professional settings at once can create tensions in how they approach their work. But, as I argue, it is also the source of their expert independence, rooted in a transnational social space connecting multiple professional identities, resources, and skills. Independence viewed through this lens is a socio-historical category which is made up of the combination of professional, biographical, and institutional resources as embodied and strategically mobilised by plural professionals. This argument builds on my original dataset of the professional biographies of 122 thematic special rapporteurs and 30 biographical interviews.

This article examines how nuclear weapons are depicted in video games. While the literature has explored the social and symbolic meanings of nuclear weapons and how they have been represented in popular culture, existing accounts have not thoroughly engaged with video games. Examining the bestselling game Call of Duty, I show how gameplay narratives contribute to normalising dominant knowledge about nuclear weapons. The overarching argument advanced in this article is that representations of nuclear weapons in video games contribute to legitimising the ongoing possession and modernisation of nuclear weapons. Drawing on feminist post-structuralist theory, I show how nuclear weapons are programmed to be an exclusive item that only the most skilled players can obtain, reinforcing the exclusionary power dynamics sustaining the nuclear status quo. Moreover, I show how game dynamics produce nuclear weapons as a win-condition, and thus a symbol of power and success that reinforces dominant understandings of their military value while masking the horror of killing. Deconstructing the playing dimension of video games, I situate the ludic aspect as a meaning-making system, working synergically with gameplay stories to reinforce dominant knowledge about nuclear weapons. Ultimately, the article draws attention to everyday discursive mechanisms that render a nuclear world possible.

This article investigates the assumption that survival should form the goal of the politics both of nuclear weapons and of International Relations (IR). Rather than being a self-evident grounding upon which political contest then plays out, survival has its own implications and limitations in the thermonuclear age, in which survival has become premised on the threat of total annihilation. As such, nuclear weapons allow us to unpack ‘survival’ in a unique way because they have the power to destroy everything: to end all survival. Yet at the same time, nuclear weapons have become deeply embedded into our world. In an age of thermonuclear weaponry, survival through annihilation has thus become a paradox that structures the ambivalence of nuclear technology and the tensions of nuclear politics. The article first establishes the nature of assumptions of survival as a taken-for-granted goal of IR and nuclear weapons politics. It then argues that the paradoxical logic of survival as annihilation that accompanied the nuclear era has resulted in a politics of repetition in which both deterrence and disarmament actors have become trapped. The article ends by outlining the limits of understanding whose survival is at stake in nuclear weapons discourse and why this matters.

What is the current state of Comparative Regionalism (CR) as a field of research? Since its inception, CR has suffered from a chasm between those who take European integration as the model for conceptualising, theorising, comparing, and designing regionalism worldwide, and the critics, who reject EU-centrism in favour of more contextualised approaches focusing on the Global South. This paper challenges this characterisation by showing how CR has fundamentally changed in the last decade or so. We detail three ‘silent’ transformations: (i) conceptually, scholars disaggregate regionalism into specific components, rendering systematic comparison more tractable and less individual case-centric; (ii) theoretically, scholars develop frameworks that build on general social science theories and actively seek to move beyond EU-centrism; and (iii) methodologically, scholars use more rigorous comparative designs and a broader range of data. These changes, we suggest, indicate a ‘mainstreaming’ of CR, with attendant benefits and costs.

This research examines the ways the hostile environment in the UK utilises domestic violence as a deterrent measure, weaponising this endemic form of interpersonal violence against migrant women. I argue that the state’s own processes of accountability and responsibility for domestic violence fatalities, and the active exclusion of migrant women from state-provided services that are key in intervening in cases of domestic violence, are sufficient for domestic violence against migrant women to be constituted as state violence. I frame this in the context of what an ontological security approach can offer to our understanding of the multiplicity of encounters and experiences that migrant women have with a state apparatus that is designed to offer both security and accountability to address the particularly gendered insecurity of domestic violence. The active exclusion of migrant women from these monitoring mechanisms embeds both an affective and a very real empirical insecurity in the lives of migrant women. This ontological insecurity is both inside and outside of state, making ontological security for some while unmaking it for others.

Typically, neoclassical realist scholars who prioritise state capacity as an intervening variable in their studies have often implied that states directly convert increased state capacity into improved military capabilities, leading them to engage in internal balancing and, occasionally, war. This article argues that the causal chain from state capacity to military modernisation and balancing is not as straightforward as the existing literature makes it look like. Using Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine as a plausibility-probe study, we propose that before states move from underbalancing to balancing, the process by which state capacity is translated into improved military capabilities might depend on conditional mechanisms. This novel theoretical model is labeled ‘conditional state capacity neoclassical realism’ and provides more case-specific explanatory power than the old state capacity theory.

Does neorealism contain a conception of human nature? Although neorealists usually claim to sidestep the question of human nature altogether, scholars frequently trace the theory back to the work of Thomas Hobbes, a philosopher who in fact defended a robust account of human motivations. As a result, some scholars have concluded that neorealism contains a Hobbesian view of human nature. Against the conventional wisdom, this article argues that neorealism contains a Rousseauian philosophical anthropology. Whereas Hobbes provides a deeply pessimistic account of human motivations, Rousseau combines optimism about human motivations with pessimism about social structures. Rousseau’s critique of Hobbes profoundly influenced neorealism’s founding father, Kenneth Waltz, a political theorist who later gravitated towards International Relations. After exploring Waltz’s reading of Rousseau and demonstrating Rousseau’s influence on Waltz’s theory, the article investigates what is gained by reading neorealism as Rousseauian. Returning to the Rousseauian roots of neorealism reveals the true character of the tragic heuristic employed in neorealist theory, sheds new light on the role of pity in neorealist foreign policy, and clarifies the logic of the theory itself.

The retreat of the modern liberal order in contemporary democracies can be understood as co-constituted with the normalisation of the far right. The far right has increasingly accessed the political ‘mainstream’ through the enabling of erstwhile-disavowing centre-right and right-wing counterparts. In contexts of political ‘victory’, the identity (re)formation of these mainstream right-wing subjects and discourses can be observed and analysed through celebrations alongside the far right and in emotions and attitudes like elation, gloating, and self-righteousness. In this article, I address how victory-related manifestations of enjoyment – or jouissance – are articulated in the discourses of mainstream right-wing subjects. I ask what enjoyment-based rhetoric reveal about the normalisation of the far right and the identity reformation of right-wing subjects and discourses. To address this, I first discuss the role of enjoyment on far-right normalisation by merging Derk Hook’s analytics of enjoyment (2017) with ontological security, expanding on the latter concept as a libidinal fantasy of ideological closure. Subsequently, analysing the case of the 2022 Swedish election, I explore three interrelated dimensions of co-(re)formation of right-wing enjoyment, discourses, and identities: the symbolic space where civilisational-securitising fantasies are produced; the threatening modes of enjoyment of cultural Others; and the imperilled enjoyment modes of the ‘real Swedes’.

Although expressivism has been studied in relation to criminal justice since the emergence of modern international criminal law, an expressivist perspective in norms and criminal justice research resurfaced in the past decades, inviting a new viewpoint on the dynamic interplay between norms and symbolic action in International Relations (IR). Situated as an account of punishment, expressivism has been criticised for being too abstract and lacking an immanent meaning or for its dialectic position in relation to punishment. Addressing this theoretical shortcoming, this article remediates our understanding of expressivism, establishing new knowledge of the meaning of norm expressivism in IR and clarifying the relationship between expressivism and notions of punishment in criminal justice and norm research. To this end, it hermeneutically deconstructs the rhetoric of country delegates at the United Nations in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It examines crucial examples of expressivism: disagreement pronouncements, denunciation of norm violation, postulation of guilt, and penal analogies. While criminal justice research posits expressivism as a distinct account of punishment, the novelty of this article consists in illustrating how, even in the absence of prosecution in the courtroom, expressivist rationales can have a reinforcing effect on the international legal order.

This article makes a twofold contribution on the relationship between self/other securitisation, ambiguous threat constructions, and anxiety at the intersection of Securitisation Theory (ST) and Ontological Security Studies (OSS). First, we develop the concept topos of threat (TT) as a potent linguistic anchor in securitisation processes. TTs depict an entire self/other threat situation that warrants escape, serving identity needs while staying flexible and ambiguous. However, their frequent rhetorical deployment can blur the threat construction and increase anxiety: this challenges the classical scholarly assumption that antagonism necessarily alleviates anxiety. Second, we theorise metapolitics as an anxiety mediation strategy. Metapolitics is a mode of interpretation – a relentless analysis of surface clues to expose a deceptive, powerful adversary – which in the final event fails to alleviate anxiety. The dual practice of nurturing topoi of threat and metapolitics drives conflict because it sets in motion a vicious securitisation spiral that entrenches rigid patterns of self/other representation and fosters a bias of anticipating hostility. We employ abductive theorising: working with established theory alongside empirical discovery through a discourse analysis of Russia’s official rhetoric on NATO and the use of the TT ‘colour revolution’ since the conflict in Ukraine began in 2014.

In this article, we analyse how anti-globalist conspiracy theories were mobilised online to delegitimise national authorities and policies designed to curb the Covid-19 pandemic in Canada. These conspiracy theories attacked the political authority underpinning public health measures and targeted purportedly ‘liberal’ policies and ‘globalist’ actors. Our case study examines the Freedom Convoy, a series of protests against Covid-19 vaccine mandates that began in Canada but inspired global demonstrations. The Freedom Convoy fostered and relied upon anti-globalist conspiracy theories, including the ‘Great Reset’ and ‘Great Replacement’, both of which posit a global conspiracy to erode national sovereignty and impose a ‘liberal’ international order. We investigate far-right social media commentary from 4chan’s Politically Incorrect imageboard /pol/, Infowars, and Rebel News, showing how conspiratorial claims were marshalled in alt-tech spaces. These narratives were used to delegitimise public health measures to combat Covid-19 and the Liberal Trudeau government by linking them to various ‘globalist’ forces. In exploring three mechanisms of delegitimation – externalisation, personification, and Othering – we argue that far-right movements like the Freedom Convoy, motivated by anti-globalist conspiracism, mobilise the international realm by leveraging the legitimacy gap of international organisations and agendas to undermine the political authority of actors at the national level.