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Reflections on the ‘new’ economic nationalism*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

James Mayall
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Extract

What is the student of politics to make of the revival of protectionism and the new mood of economic nationalism of which it is widely held to be a symptom? It is reasonably clear why nationalism raises problems for economists: for orthodox Marxists it entrenches false consciousness and delays the final crisis of capitalism; for liberals it frustrates the optimal allocation of resources by substituting group sentiment for the rational pursuit of individual self-interest and by endowing political frontiers with an economic significance to which their economic theory is opposed. But it is not self-evident that the assumptions on which the great neo-classical systems are built are the most helpful for understanding the phenomenon of economic nationalism or for evaluating the nature of the problem which it poses for international society. Since Marx himself was profoundly uninterested in the great debate between free trade and protection, while contemporary Marxist-Leninist governments all pursue economic policies which are unambiguously nationalist, I shall confine myself to the debate within the liberal tradition.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 10 , Issue 4 , October 1984 , pp. 313 - 321
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1984

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References

1. The phrase is borrowed from an essay by the late Dudley Seers, ‘Marxism and Other Neoclassical Models’, in The Political Economy of Nationalism (Oxford, 1983)Google Scholar.

2. Tivey, L., ‘States, Nations and Economies’ in Tivey, L. (ed.), The Nation State: the Formation of Modern Politics (Oxford, 1981), pp. 59–81Google Scholar.

3. See, for example, his article ‘The World Economy Today: Crisis or a New Beginning?’, National Westminster Bank Quarterly Review, September (1983), pp. 26–44Google Scholar.

4. Prospects for International Trade: Main Conclusions of the GATT Study for 1982–1983, GATT press release, 30 September (1983), p. 21Google Scholar.

5. Numerous editions. Book II, chapter 1, ‘Of Property’.

6. For example, Mill supported the British annexation of Oudh in 1856. See ‘A Few Words on Non-Intervention’, Dissertations and Discussions, Vol. III, 2nd edn, 1867Google Scholar. See also, Representative Government, chapter 16.

7. Jones, Roy E., ‘The English School of International Relations, The Case for Closure’, Review of International Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, January (1981), pp. 1–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8. See for example, Walzer, Michael, Just and Unjust Wars (London, 1977), chapter 6Google Scholar; Luban, D., ‘Just War and Human Rights’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, winter (1980)Google Scholar; Walzer, Michael, ‘The Moral Standing of States’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, spring (1980)Google Scholar; Hoffmann, Stanley, Duties Beyond Borders (Syracuse, 1981)Google Scholar.

9. See, for example, his ‘Little Europe, Wider Europe and Western Economic Co-operation’ in Tsoukalis, L. (ed.), European Community: Past, Present and Future (Oxford, 1983), pp. 173–4Google Scholar.

10. Article XXI reads as follows: Nothing in this agreement shall be construed (a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or (b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests (i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived; (ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials that is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment; (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or (c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.

11. For a discussion of the legal background to Article XXI, see Jackson, John H., World Trade and the Law of GATT (New York, 1969), pp. 748–52Google Scholar, and on the political background, Hill, Christopher and James, Mayall, The Sanctions Problem: International and European Perspectives, EUI Working Paper No. 59 (Florence, 1983)Google Scholar.

12. Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass., 1971)Google Scholar.

13. For a contrary third world view, see Jae-Ik, Kim, ‘The Need for the Developing Countries to Play Their Part in GATT’, The World Economy, November (1982), pp. 245–52Google Scholar.

14. Studies in Economic Nationalism (Geneva, 1960)Google Scholar.

15. European Community: Past, Present and Future, op. citGoogle Scholar.

16. New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, chapter 13, ‘The Campaign Against Keynesian Inflation’ (London, 1978)Google Scholar.