United States–Caribbean relations over the period of the last thirty or forty years have rarely—if ever—been analysed in a thoroughly satisfying way. It is a strange omission in the international relations literature given the proximity of the United States to the Caribbean, and vice versa. But the fact is that most accounts of the relationship have fallen prey to a powerful, but ultimately misleading, mythology by which small, poor, weak, dependent entities in the Caribbean have either created trouble for, or alternatively been confronted by, the ‘colossus to the north’ that is the United States in whose ‘backyard’ they unfortunately have to reside. Virtually all analysts of the US–Caribbean relationship have thus drawn a picture marked at heart by the notion of an inherently unequal struggle between forces of a different order and scale. Within this broad metaphor the only major difference of interpretation has reflected the competing theories of power in the international system developed by the realist and structuralist schools.

Can trust – a core element of diplomacy – be taken online and if so, how? This article starts form the concern that trust is tied to face-to-face diplomacy, which is challenged in digitalising settings. We adopt a practice theoretical lens and study diplomatic information sharing in the Council of the European Union. Drawing on fieldwork from 2018–2021, we find that digital tools are indispensable for trust's enactment and, contrary to commonly held assumptions, do not negatively impede diplomatic trust, per se. Theorising from how diplomats handle digital tools, we find that this leads to a renegotiation of the place and boundaries of trust in diplomatic work. First, we show how digital tools create both new opportunities for and challenges to diplomatic trust, though these opportunities are more accessible to some than others. Second, whereas trust is taken online, it is not easily built digitally. Third, digital tools lead to a rearticulation of the place of transparency and confidentiality in diplomatic negotiations. It pushes diplomats to reconsider what it means to share information in an (un)trustworthy manner. Altogether, these findings further our understanding of contemporary diplomatic practice and offer a refined conception of diplomatic trust.

With RRW populist actors’ discovery of gender norms as a useful foreign policy tool, narratives constructed in terms of geographical value spaces have become central to the struggle for women's rights. Through a detailed examination of international and domestic actors’ engagement with the failed ratification process of the Istanbul Convention in Ukraine, this article aims to enhance understanding of the appropriateness of the use of these geographical value spaces when describing the struggle to combat GBV in Ukraine, and how connecting gender justice issues to geographically restricted value spaces impacts this fight. It finds that in practice neither the EU – despite Russia's allegations to the contrary – nor domestic political elites in favour of closer cooperation with Europe have provided meaningful support to the ratification of the Istanbul Convention. Faced with this situation, some Ukrainian feminists have increasingly sought to present the struggle to combat gender-based violence in a locally acceptable vernacular. This article, however, concludes that framing the struggle for women's rights in any type of geographical terms – be they of an international or domestic nature – increases the risk of either instrumentalisation of or selective engagement with the feminist agenda.

This article explores avian experiences with toxic war processes that unfold across space and time. Joining together three evolving areas of interest in global politics – ontologies of war, interspecies relations, and sensory politics – the article develops a view of war that centres ongoing war processes that affect more-than-human life in and outside of international warzones. Advancing a multispecies form of inquiry attentive to local voices, including Upper Cook Inlet Tribes, the article examines how interspecies relations emerge in national security debates about long-lasting ecological costs of war. Specifically, it offers an analysis of US Department of Defense hearings surrounding the controversy over reopening Eagle River Flats – an Alaskan estuary that had been polluted with white phosphorus munitions – for weapons testing and training during the Iraq War. The article also considers the experiences of two migratory avian communities (northern pintails and tundra swans) with toxic white phosphorus pollution, illustrating more-than-human sensory perspectives on the space and time of war processes. These conceptual and empirical moves reposition national security concerns about wartime risk into a much broader post-anthropocentric perspective.

Robert Owen, the early nineteenth-century social reformer, made a greatly more significant contribution to the theory and practice of International Relations than has hitherto been assumed. This article shows how Owen helped to develop an understudied but distinctive form of internationalist thought focusing on the role of education in the pursuit of peace. Owen's previously neglected contributions to human rights norms and to international organisation are also explored, including his promotion of universal rather than nationally-oriented human rights standards, his role in the nascent movement towards the formation of international non-governmental organisations, and his contribution to international federalist ideas. Following an introduction to Owen's place in the literature, this article discusses each of these contributions of Owen to the theory and practice of International Relations in turn. The analysis reveals that Owen's contributions in each of these aspects are as significant for their limitations as for their insights.

Does international law have a place in a world being reshaped by globalization? Sceptics argue that international law belongs to a world order, based on relations among sovereign states, that is rapidly receding into history. But such a claim itself invites scepticism. Globalization is a journalist's term—a rough tool for making sense of what appears to be a trend toward a more integrated international economy and its attendant cultural homogenization.It is common to identify globalization with cultural uniformity and to contrast it with difference. See, for example, Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), and Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization, expanded paperback edn. (New York: Anchor Books, 2000). Academics who use the term link it to the proliferation of intergovernmental organizations and transnational interest groups concerned with human rights, the environment, or economic issues, and to the emergence of a new normative framework, distinct from classical (‘Westphalian’) international law, for ‘global civil society’ and ‘cosmopolitan democracy’.See, for example, Michael Walzer (ed.), Toward a Global Civil Society (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995) and Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Köhler (eds.), Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy (Oxford: Polity Press, 1998). Whether these trends will continue and how they might affect familiar political arrangements is not yet clear. It is possible that international law will disappear along with the pluralist system of sovereign states that the new global order is said to be replacing. It is more likely, however, that the old system will continue in a new form, and that there will be a place for international law in the new order. In this article, I discuss the character of law in the international system, on the assumption that globalization will not destroy that system. But even if international law does vanish, perhaps to be replaced by a different system of world law, the issues I consider here will remain relevant because they are inherent in the idea of law itself.

The purpose of this article is to compare three approaches to conflict, those of the ‘strategist’, the ‘conflict researcher’ and the ‘peace researcher’. Strategic studies, our starting point, are usually seen exclusively within the framework of power politics and the manipulation of threat systems. This approach to conflict is clearly of great importance, especially as it is the one most frequently adopted by decision-makers. It is not, however, the only possible approach, and the lineage of each of the three approaches can be traced back to antiquity.

In my study, The Natural Law Tradition and the Theory of International Relations, reviewed in Hedley Bull's interesting article, there are no chapters devoted to natural law thinkers before the thirteenth century. Any lengthening of an already long manuscript might have diminished its prospects of publication. In the absence of a full survey of the strengths and weaknesses of earlier theories, there are various explicit or implied judgements on positions of Aristotle, the Stoics, Cicero and Augustine in chapters dealing primarily with other matters. Whilst referring to sources of Aquinas's doctrine, I did not give a detailed account of the historical formation of his teaching. I concentrated upon St. Thomas's discussion of the various kinds of law and especially upon the doctrine of eternal law which he brought to a certain perfection. In doing this, I was consoled by the view which I shared with Vincent McNabb that “it was always the thought of Aquinas never the history of that thought which seemed of greatest worth…” Indeed, given the incompleteness of so much of the discussion on the intellectual reconciliation of natural and divine law before Aquinas, it is arguable that McNabb was hardly exaggerating very greatly when he wrote that Aquinas's treatise on law in the Summa theologiae “would seem be the first great treatise ever written on law”.

How do the terms ‘community’ and ‘communitarianism’ apply in non-Western contexts? How useful are they as social science terms in understanding Iranian and, generally, Middle Eastern politics? What is the impact of communitarianism as a political project in one of the few countries where it has been tried, namely Iran after the Revolution of 1979? This article seeks answers to these questions as a way of modestly advancing the liberal-communitarian debate in international relations theory. Its argument, built on limited but precise evidence, is that the concept of ‘community’ suffers from irremediable conceptual problems and ambiguities and that the project of communitarianism has pernicious political implications. The critique is in three parts. The first points to the inapplicability of the term ‘community’ to national society and its superfluousness as a social science term, using Iran and the Middle East as testing grounds. The second part develops the anti-essentialist argument on Islam and culture as a way of refuting the essence of ‘community’. The third part is an exposition of the links between ‘community’ as a political project in Iran with ideology, hierarchy and corruption.

In ‘Beyond Economism in International Political Economy’, Marieke de Goede argues that the study of International Political Economy (IPE) fails to take seriously the insights generated by poststructuralism and discourse analysis. Specifically, much of IPE ‘remains wedded to a profound separation between the ideal and the realm of the real, whereby the politics of representation are seen to have a bearing only on the former domain, leaving the latter intact as an incontestable reality’. The result, especially apparent in analysis of international finance, is economism: the assumption of ‘a prediscursive economic materiality’ constituted independently of ideas, identity and discourse. Getting beyond economism requires using poststructualism to challenge the separation of the ideal and the real in the analysis of international finance and IPE more generally. Drawing on well-established literatures in geography and accounting, de Goede highlights the necessity of analysing the practices through which financial knowledge – and by extension capital itself – is produced.

Scholars of the societal security dilemma implicitly or explicitly aim to analyse actor responsibility in intersocietal group confrontations. However, adherence of these approaches to (neo-)realist theoretical assumptions of the security dilemma hinders this objective. This article provides analytical principles upon which a new societal security dilemma can be constructed in order to conduct a more comprehensive analysis of actor responsibility. A new societal security dilemma framework can be built upon three principles: (1) a security dilemma results in violence depending on how the actors themselves interpret the political structure in which they interact with others; (2) differentiation of actors' intentions as malign or benign is inconsequential; what matters is how actors interpret security and which tools they choose to adopt to achieve security; and (3) identity is not exogenous to the politics of security. Adopting these principles requires reconceptualisation of the security dilemma. It will be argued that a new societal security, which reflects the politics of security, can provide a more comprehensive, dynamic, political, and realistic analysis of actor responsibility in societal-level confrontations. These new principles will be illustrated through re-reading of the dissolution of Yugoslavia to analyse actor responsibility as a sketch of the new societal security dilemma theorising.

For several decades after International Relations (IR) became a fully-fledged field of study at British and American universities, it worked with a relatively simple conceptualisation of ‘politics’ as such. In the international context, ‘politics’ involved an ongoing struggle for power among sovereign states, with war the worst-case outcome of this struggle. Power itself was defined essentially in terms of military and economic ‘capabilities’. The fundamental structural condition of international anarchy meant that, in the absence of the kinds of constraints upon conflict that operate within states, only such crude mechanisms as a balance of power, or fragile institutions such as diplomacy or international law, served to impose some degree of order upon the system as a whole. While the Cold War brought an additional, ideological dimension to this struggle for power, in other respects it also simplified it by making it bipolar. Hence although much more was seen to be at stake in this contest than, for example, the nineteenth-century struggle for power in Europe, which gave the Cold War confrontation a zero-sum quality, the nature of the political processes at work was conceptualised in relatively straightforward terms. The ‘high politics’ of the global strategic contest between the superpowers not only transcended the ‘low politics’ of issues such as trade, they subsumed and gave a particular shape to numerous lesser conflicts in the Third World, which were frequently characterised as Cold War ‘proxies’.

The history of neoliberalism is a messy attempt to turn theory into practice. Neoliberals struggled with their plans to implement flagship policies of monetarism, fiscal prudence, and public sector privatisation. Yet, inflation was still cut, welfare slashed, and the public sector ‘marketised’. Existing literature often interprets this as neoliberalism ‘failing-forward’, achieving policy goals by whatever means necessary and at great social cost. Often overlooked in this narrative is how far actually existing neoliberalism strayed from the original designs of public choice theorists and neoliberal ideologues. By examining the history of the Thatcher government's public sector reforms, we demonstrate how neoliberal plans for marketisation ran aground, forcing neoliberal governments to turn to an approach of Managed Competition that owed more to practices of postwar planning born in Cold War US than neoliberal theory. Rather than impose a market-like transformation of the public sector, Managed Competition systematically empowered top managers and turned governance into a managerial process; two developments that ran directly against core precepts of neoliberalism. The history of these early failures and adjustments provides vital insights into the politics of managerial governance in the neoliberal era.

This article examines the idea of equality in the theory of international society. Contrary to the widespread contemporary notion of equality as a corollary principle to sovereignty, the central argument of the article is that equality and sovereignty can and ought to be disconnected, and that the concept of equality, when uncoupled from sovereignty, is a better point of departure when theorising international society than is, for example, non-intervention or sovereignty. An alternative approach to deal with equality of states and other entities within international society is sketched out.

This investigation explores the ways in which discourses of security functioned to allow military intervention in Iraq to become ‘thinkable’, and how these actions serve to reconfigure not only the identities of states – the US and Iraq – but also the characteristics of the international as a spatial and conceptual domain. In the weeks preceding the military intervention in Iraq, significant negotiations were conducted between the US government and the UN that were commented on extensively in press statements and other documents released by both parties. Drawing on UNSC Resolutions, public debates and academic analyses, in this article I analyse the relations between the US and the UN in the build-up to the Iraq war, making two related claims.

First, I argue that each discourse is organised around a particular logic of security. By ‘logics of security’, I mean the ways in which various concepts are organised within specific discourses of security. That is, each competing conceptualisation of security has a distinct primary focus, referent object and perspective on the arrangement of the international system. The ways in which these claims are made, the assumptions that inform them, and the policy prescriptions that issue from them, are what I refer to as ‘logics of security’. Second, I argue that the intervention in Iraq, a violence undertaken in the name of ‘security’, has functioned to reproduce the international as a spatial and conceptual domain according to the logic of a highly conventional narrative of sovereigneity, and, ultimately, of state identity.

There can be little doubt that the conflict between the UN-authorized and US-led Multinational Coalition and Iraq at the start of 1991, as a result of the Iraqi Ba'athist regime's decision in August 1990 to invade and annex Kuwait, has produced profound changes in the political and diplomatic environment of the Middle East and North Africa, as well as in Mashriqi and Maghribi political attitudes. The new atmosphere of confidence amongst the governments and peoples of the Arab states of the Gulf is clear evidence of these changes, as is the dejection felt in capitals such as Amman, Sanaa and Tunis where government support for the Coalition was less than wholehearted.

This essay notes that the relationship of political values to social theory is an important but unresolved question for all social theory, but notes that in the discipline of International Relations the discussion is particularly undeveloped. Contemporary trends in IR theorizing are evaluated in order to contexualize the increasingly assertive forms of historical materialist thinking, derived from Marxian social theory, which are being given serious attention in the discipline. I argue that Marxian theory is at one and the same time empirical, normative and emancipatory, and conclude that while much of the new historical materialist thinking in IR advances our understanding of international relations empirically and theoretically, and offers a significantly ‘better’ explanation of the ‘international’ than Realism or other theories can, it is deficient because of its inattention to the centrality of normative and emancipatory questions at the heart of Marxian historical materialism. I further argue that because historical materialism necessitates, within the logic of its own theoretical construction, specific political values, a revisionist historical materialism that ignores these values, calls into question the theoretical integrity of the latter approach.

International relations is one of the areas of social science which most clearly brings home the tensions involved in the dual relation of inquirer to object of inquiry, as both scientific observer and moral judge, particularly in times of war. As social scientists, we are required to understand and explain our object, as moral beings, we are required to judge or evaluate it. Received wisdom in international relations premises the possibility of the former on its rigid separation from the latter, so that the understanding of, for example, war, is necessarily distinct from the question of the justice or injustice of war. The former is the task of the science of international relations, the latter task is within the province of the moral philosopher or the normative theorist. I will be arguing in this article that this separation of the realms of morality and politics, on which so much social science and moral philosophy is founded, can be traced back to Kant's critical philosophy, and that this separation has problematic consequences for the possibility of both explanation and evaluation in the international sphere. My argument falls into three parts. In the first part, I will put forward a condensed reading of the Kantian critical position and the problems that it poses. In the second and third parts, I will demonstrate how the discussion of international relations both in moral philosophy, and in political theory, is constructed by the Kantian morality/politics dichotomy, and how this limits and distorts both our moralizing and our theorizing. One contention in the third section of the paper will be that even the recent challenges to traditional international political theory, posed by critical theory and post-structuralism, are in danger of slipping back into a reliance on the morality/politics division, in spite of efforts to overcome it.

The principle that no sovereign state should intervene in the affairs of another state is enshrined in almost all international agreements made since World War II. For instance, the Charter of the Organization of American States of 1948 contains, in Article 15, the declaration that

No State or group of states has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State, or against its political, economic and cultural elements.