Recent studies have highlighted the instrumental use of language, wherein actors deploy claims to strategically pursue policy goals in the absence of persuasion or socialisation. Yet these accounts are insufficiently attentive to the social context in which an audience assesses and responds to strategic appeals. I present a theoretical account that highlights the distinctly powerful role of international law in framing strategic argumentation. Legalised discourses are especially legitimate because law is premised on a set of internally coherent practices that constitute actors and forms of action. I then illustrate the implications in a hard case concerning US efforts to secure immunities from International Criminal Court jurisdiction. Contrary to realist accounts of law as a tool of the powerful, I show that both pro- and anti-ICC diplomacy was channelled through a legal lens that imposed substantial constraints on the pursuit of policy objectives. Court proponents responded to US diplomatic pressure with their own legal arguments; this narrowed the scope of the exemptions, even as the Security Council temporarily conceded to US demands. While the US sought to marry coercion with argumentative appeals, it failed to generate a lasting change in global practice concerning ICC jurisdiction.

What are the politics of, and prospects for, contemporary weapons control? Human rights and humanitarian activists and scholars celebrate the gains made in the UN Arms Trade Treaty as a step towards greater human security. Critics counter that the treaty represents an accommodation with global militarism. Taking the tensions between arms transfer control and militarism as my starting point, I argue that the negotiating process and eventual treaty text demonstrate competing modes of militarism. Expressed in terms of sovereignty, political economy, or human security, all three modes are underpinned by ongoing imperial relations: racial, gendered, and classed relations of asymmetry and hierarchy that persist despite formal sovereign equality. This means human security is a form of militarism rather than the antithesis of it. Drawing on primary sources from negotiations and participant observation with actors involved in the campaign for the ATT, the argument challenges the idea that human security has scored a victory over militarism. It also complicates our understanding of the nature of the accommodation with it, demonstrating the transformation as well as entrenchment of contemporary militarism. The argument reframes the challenges for controlling weapons circulation, placing the necessity for feminist, postcolonial anti-militarist critique front and centre.

In a recent article in the Review of International Studies Hans-Karl Pichler argues that Hans Morgenthau's intellectual universe was saturated by ‘typically European philosophical problems’ which he transferred to an American political context. He shows this by looking at how Morgenthau tried to overcome the value determinacy of social science, as pointed out by Weber, by grounding his political realist theory in a Schmittean understanding of the political, which defines war – the friend/enemy distinction – as the essence of the political and founds it anthropologically in the evil, dangerous nature of human beings.

After 11 September 2001, the Administration of George W. Bush dismissed any criminal-justice model, put forth by various voices at home and abroad, for understanding and combating terrorism. This was ‘war’, the President insisted on 17 September, as he did repeatedly – directly, implicitly, and by analogy – in his 20 September address to Congress and on many later occasions, with American war in Afghanistan and later Iraq making that claim true. The criminal-justice model persisted, however, not least in Bush’s more colourful rhetoric. As he commented on the 17th regarding Osama bin Laden, ‘There’s an old poster out west, as I recall, that said, ‘‘Wanted: Dead or Alive” ’. On the 20th came his odd analogy, ‘Al Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime’. On 11 October, drawing on crime-fighters’ lingo, he announced a ‘Most Wanted Terrorist list’ as part of his effort to ‘round up’ – both cowboy and cop words – ‘the evildoers’. In word and action, he kept blurring the neat line between war and crime he asserted.

This article develops a domestic institutional explanation for the growing institutional diversity in global economic governance. Transgovernmental networks linking domestic regulatory agencies have emerged in a number of areas alongside more conventional cooperation based on international organisations and regimes. At the same time, the number and scope of private self-regulatory schemes at the international level has markedly increased. While rich literatures have developed around each of these three governance cluster, less attention has been paid to the critical questions why, where, and when we are most likely to see one type of governance as opposed to another. The article argues that broad observable patterns of global governance result from specific configurations of domestic institutional variables in leading markets against the backdrop of the dynamics of market globalisation. Empirical evidence from case studies of global governance in the fields of securities, Internet domain names, intellectual property, and hedge funds broadly support the argument.

The British Labour government under Harold Wilson was involved in several attempts to negotiate an early end to the Vietnam War. Such efforts helped to satisfy critics of the war on the Labour left and in the Commonwealth, to neutralize US pressure to join in the conflict and to emphasize Britain's importance on the world stage. The Davies mission, in which a left-leaning junior minister was sent to Hanoi, was Wilson's most unusual peace bid which ended as a much-criticized fiasco. This story helps to illuminate Wilson's approach to foreign policy-making, the difficulty of pursuing talks without normal diplomatic relations and the obstacles preventing a Vietnam settlement in 1965. The reluctance of both Washington and Hanoi, as well as flaws in the mission's execution, condemned it to failure.

It is impossible not to encounter Habermas as an important interlocutor in the fields of critical theory, feminist theory and international relations theory across which I work. He is the outstanding critical theorist of his generation, in the tradition of critique which was carried through the Frankfurt School and traces itself back to Kant, Hegel and Marx. And for feminists and international relations theorists, he represents one of the directions in which feminist theory or post-positivist IR could develop, deepening its epistemological and sociological understanding without sacrificing the possibility of the rationally grounded critique of contemporary world politics. This article is the beginning of an attempt to trace through layers of difficulty encountered in using Habermas as a normative resource for a particular version of feminist international theory, which understands feminism to be a transnational, cosmopolitan (but not univocal) project, neither authorised nor legitimised by any foundational ground or teleological end. I will argue that although Habermas's notion of discourse ethics seems initially promising as a way forward for non-foundational feminist theory, in the end any ‘dialogue’ on Habermasian terms turns out to be one-sided and exclusive.

Focusing primarily on questions of methodology, this article argues that mediation in international affairs has yet to be properly analysed using the theoretical tools provided by the post-positivist turn in international relations theory. Recognizing the familiar distinction between power-political and facilitative approaches, the article makes the case for a third approach based on the political theory of Jurgen Habermas. The debate between neorealist forms of analysis and critical theory is well known. More contentious, however, is the argument that facilitative forms of third party intervention, such as the Norwegian mediation of the Oslo Accords, cannot operate without a more formal and abstract notion of the ‘right’ in politics. Facilitation's gently working of the lifeworld has much in common with the hermeneutic approach to social science. Like hermeneutics, therefore, facilitation may suffer as it fails to root out relations of power and domination. Even ‘interim stages’ in conflict resolution need a sense of ‘final status’ to gather a sense of pace and direction. The Oslo Accords, for example, demonstrate the need to create a strong vision of ‘final status’ during the interim stage. The article leaves the practical political questions to one side. However, a ‘methodological space’ for critical theory opens up once the defects of the tradition are highlighted, a space which may be filled by distinct forms of mediation practice.

This article calls for a widening of the debate about humanitarian intervention to incorporate insights from constructivism, ‘Welsh School’; Critical Security Studies, and critical approaches to Third World International Relations. After identifying a series of problems with the contemporary debate, which is dominated by the English School, it calls for a broadening of the concept of intervention and suggests a need to rethink the meaning of humanitarianism and terms such as the ‘supreme humanitarian emergency’.

All history is tendentious, and if it were not tendentious nobody would write it.R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, rev. edn, ed. Jan Van Der Dussen (Oxford, 1994), p. 398.

History is therefore never history, but history-for.C. Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (La Pensée sauvage) (London, 1972), p. 257. This is reminiscent of Robert Cox's much-quoted statement that '[t]heory is always for someone and for some purpose'. See his 'Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory', Millennium, 10 (1981), pp. 126-55, at p. 128.

Introduction

War is a multi-causal phenomenon, not only in the oft-noted sense that a variety of factors contribute to the making of a war, but also in the perhaps less obvious sense that there are multifarious casual paths to war. Some of the more idiographically minded are adamant, therefore, that 'the only investigation of the causes of war that is intellectually respectable is that of the unique origins ... of the particular past wars'.A. Seabury and A. Codevilla, War: Ends and Means (New York, 1989), p. 50; emphasis in original. And even one of the more nomothetically minded has conceded, some dissentign voices notwithstanding, that 'the hope that there are a few necessary conditions that must always be present in order for war to occur is probably not going to be fulfilled'.J. A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge, 1993), p. 48. For a dissenting voice, see B. Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven, CT, 1981). Vasquez, however, goes on to suggest three necessary conditions of 'world wars'. For a brief, critical discussion of Bueno de Mesquita and Vasquez, see my On the Causes of War, pp. 74-9.

The academic and policy debate on state failure reaches back to the early 1990s. Since then, its empirical and analytical sophistication has grown, yet the fact that state failure is a regional phenomenon, that is, that it occurs in clusters of geographically contiguous states, has largely been overlooked. This article first considers the academic and policy debates on state failure in the Political Science/International Relations and Development Studies literatures, and offers a definition of state failure that is derived from the means of the state, rather than its ends. Subsequently engaging with existing scholarship on the concept of ‘region’ in international security, the article develops a definition of ‘state failure regions’. Further empirical observation of such regions and additional conceptual reflections lead to establishing an analytical model for the study of state failure regions and allow indentifying a number of concrete gains in knowledge and understanding that can result from its application.

The principle of the self-determination of peoples is enshrined in the United Nations Charter and based on liberal and democratic values. However, the international community has, until recently, interpreted this principle very restrictively, so that it has amounted to little more than the right to be free from European colonialism. The collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia, as well as persistent ethno-nationalist conflicts around the world, have provoked new thinking about the right of self-determination in political theory. This article reviews six theories, and identifies what they have in common and on what they differ. It draws some cautious policy conclusions from this analysis and, in doing so, seeks to clarify the role and limits of theory in international politics.

Every social revolution has elicited some form of counter-revolutionary response from the international system. The impulse to reverse revolutionary transformation has much to tell us about the dynamics of social revolution as well as the nature of international order. The purpose of this article is to investigate the relationship between counter-revolution and international order. First it establishes a basic conceptual framework of international counter-revolution and argues that counter-revolution should be understood as more than just an active opposition to revolution and also examines the motives of counter-revolutionaries. Second, using two interpretations of the international system – those of Henry Kissinger and Raymond Aron – the article draws several conclusions about the international tendency to attempt to overturn revolution and concludes that there exist international systemic pressures, of a non-neorealist kind, which provide the basis for international order. These pressures not only produce order but, at certain times, impel states to counter radical transformations in parts of the world which seem, at first glance, to have little consequence for the functioning of international order.

How is Xi Jinping changing the course of China’s rise? Based on a Gramscian analytical framework inspired by Bob Jessop, this article provides an anatomy of Xiism (2012–) as an emergent hegemonic project, that is, a (fallible and contested) attempt by China’s party-based power bloc of altering global power balances in China’s favour while retaining domestic stability. Through juxtaposition with Maoism (1957–76) and Dengism (1978–2012), it is proposed that Xiism reformulates the power bloc’s strategy in three respects. First, the ideological vision of the ‘Chinese Dream’ negates Mao’s utopian-egalitarian universalism while readjusting Deng’s pro-market approach by emphasising ‘common prosperity’. Second, the economic accumulation strategy – built around the hyped Belt and Road Initiative – aims to reshape global trade and production patterns in a way that particularly benefits the state-owned sector, the Party leadership’s economic base. Third, Xi’s state project seeks to amalgamate Mao-style charismatic leadership and intra-party ‘self-rectification’ campaigns with both a Dengist commitment to political stability and traditional Chinese statecraft. The crucial issue for the coming decade is whether the Xi leadership will prove able to paper over the contradictions of this emergent ‘China Model’ and win support for it both at home and abroad.

This article focuses on gender mainstreaming policies and advocacy on gender equality in the post-tsunami context in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. Through the analysis, this article illustrates how gender mainstreaming policy documents and gender advocacy of the provincial and central government, when drawing from sex/gender division and binary of genders, reproduce heteronormative boundaries. By focusing on details, I argue that the image of the heteronormative nuclear family participates in normalising other identity categories; such as urban and middle-class. I also provide examples of how simultaneous to the production of dominant norms, gender advocacy challenges heteronormativity and norms governing heterosexuality and actively question the dominant gender norms. Drawing from postcolonial feminist and recent queer critiques, I argue that advocacy that solely focuses on gender and/or sexuality reduces human bodies and their desires to simplistic stick figures. Thus, it remains blind to other forms of violence, such as global economic and political frameworks that define ‘building back better’ primarily as recovery and rehabilitation of economy, assets and labour force.

Introduction

In 'Does "Gender" Make the World Go Round? Feminist Critiques of International Relations',Review of International Studies, 22:4 (1996), pp. 405-29. Adam Jones claims that 'the most important ... contribution of feminist critiques has been to add a gender dimension to [IR]', but that their success will remain 'mixed' until their 'frameworks are expanded and to some extent reworked'. While Jones's piece is excpetionally wide-ranging, our view is that overall he presents three assertions. The first is that feminism is restricted by its 'standard equation of gender ... with women/femininity'; the second is that the 'classical tradition' is the standard by which feminist contributions to IR should be judged; and the third is that feminism is defective in its treatment of gender, because it does not adequately conceptualize and study men and masculinity.Ibid., pp. 420-1, 407, 405. In this article we take issue with each of these assertions in turn, drawing first on 'feminisms' generally, then using writers in feminist IR, and finally reviewing the literature on men and masculinity, both specifically feminist and otherwise.

The debate over the East Asian crisis has thus far been led by economists who have focused on technical economic issues and policy goals at the expense of macro historical-structural questions. Foremost amongst the neglected questions is whether and under what conditions ‘Postwar East Asian Capitalism’ (PWEAC) will either continue to flourish or undergo a radical political transformation ‘after the crisis’. This question must be understood in the context of the changing geopolitical framework of the post-Cold War era. PWEAC is under great pressure for reform from both external and internal forces. Whether a ‘new political architecture’ for capitalism in East Asia is emerging is the central issue and one which will determine the future direction of Asia. The demise of authoritarian-oligarchic capitalism in Asia may have been accelerated by the economic crisis. The most enduring result of the Asian crisis is not the presumed derailing of the (re)ascent of Asia in the world economy but rather the weakening of the non-democratic state forms that have characterized East Asia's capitalism for decades. Popular demands for change represent a real challenge to both the domestic authoritarian-oligarchic power structure of PWEAC and its crucial geopolitical underpinning and external orientation.

A people that has existed for centuries under a system of castes and classes can arrive at a democratic state of society only by passing through a long series of more or less critical transformations, accomplished by violent efforts, and after numerous vicissitudes, in the course of which property, opinions, and power are rapidly transferred from one to another...

Alexis de Tocqueville

Democracy in America, Vol. II, 1840

To reason with governments, as they have existed for ages, is to argue with brutes. It is only from the nations themselves that reforms can be expected.

Thomas Paine

The Rights of Man, Preface to the French Edition, 1791

Angelina Jolie's high-profile visit to NATO in 2018 signals a move to brand the alliance's strategic narrative within the language of celebrity through engagement with popular culture. The partnership represents a significant change in the alliance's approach to global security. It also builds on a shift in NATO's self-narrative through the advocacy of gender justice related to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. Rather than fading into the background, NATO appears to be pursuing the limelight for the purpose of ‘awareness raising’ as a tool to implement the WPS agenda. Drawing upon feminist scholarship on the WPS agenda, NATO, and research on celebrity humanitarianism and politics, we provide a critical study of this change in NATO's strategic narrative, through the analysis of visual and textual material related to Jolie's visit to NATO. Our focus is on the significance of this partnership and its contribution to legitimising the alliance's self-defined ‘military leadership’ in the area of conflict-related sexual violence. While Jolie's visit to NATO opened the alliance to public scrutiny it also symbolised a form of militarism, surrounded by orchestrated visual representations. As such, it only marginally disrupted the militarist logic present in NATO's wider WPS engagement.

In their rejoinder to our recent article, Vivienne Jabri and Stephen Chan argue that we have privileged epistemology at the expense of ontology. We welcome this engagement with our continuing discussion of the relationship between epistemology and ontology in international relations theory, and will confine our response to three main points: their interpretation of our argument, their use of the work of Giddens, and their arguments about the nature of epistemology in International Relations.

I critically examine the existing literature on the security dilemma in ethnic conflict, thus laying part of the foundation for constructing a dynamic and integrative theory of ethnic conflict. I show that many attempts to apply the security dilemma to the understanding of ethnic conflict have been based on an imprecise and often mistaken understanding of the concept. I then emphasise that the security dilemma theory and the broader spiral model constitute a dynamic, versatile and powerful theory of strategic interaction that captures some general dynamics leading to the outbreak of war. As such, the security dilemma theory and the broader spiral model, when properly understood, can serve as part of the foundation of a dynamic and integrative theory of ethnic conflict, and such a theory will be able to integrate many diverse understandings of ethnic conflict from different schools of International Relations (IR) theory. I show the feasibility and the utility of such a theory.