Religion is becoming an increasingly important factor for theorists and policy makers alike in the consideration of United States foreign policy. In recent years a new school of faith-based diplomacy advocacy has emerged and begun to resonate with foreign policy practitioners. This article examines the efficacy of such faith-based approaches to foreign policy problems with a religious component and argues that such an approach is inherently flawed. The article argues that a combination of a distinct military culture, which feels itself morally superior to its civilian leadership and the activism of conservative evangelicals in the chaplaincy and military leadership makes such faith-based approaches unrealistic. While acknowledging a role for pluralist religious actors in foreign policy the article rejects a faith-based advocacy approach which can exacerbate rather than resolve foreign policy problems.

What is the impact of religious repression on forced migration? While current and historical cases highlight the significance of state-sponsored religions repression, existing quantitative studies on forced migration have not sufficiently addressed the role of religion as a determinant of flight. We argue that religious repression undermines the quality of life, quality of religious observance, and physical integrity of religious communities, and therefore increases incentives to leave. We test this through a quantitative analysis of forced migration data from 1990 to 2008 and several measures of religious repression, using a negative binomial regression. We find that state-driven religious repression, in particular religious bans, tends to increase forced migration. These findings contribute to the body of forced migration literature and the study of religion and politics by demonstrating the significant effects religious repression has on this aspect of world politics.

This study uses data from the Religion and State Round 2 dataset to examine the trends in religious discrimination and religious support between 1990 and 2008, finding a statistically significant increase in both variables. These findings are based on a longer time span and more comprehensive variables than previous studies, remain constant when controlling for world region and majority religion, and predate the events of September 11, 2001. This undermines the aspects of secularization theory which predict a decline in religion's public influence. Furthermore, economic development, one of the processes predicted by secularization theory decrease religion's public influence, is correlated with increased religious discrimination and support.

Recent debates in political theory have seen political liberals advocate and defend a doctrine of restraint, according to which citizens may not rely solely on religious reasons when supporting their favored public policies. This debate notwithstanding, very rarely have social scientists assessed the extent to which citizens actually violate this doctrine. This article evaluates the “political decision-making” model of political liberalism. Data from a nationally representative sample of U.S. adults are used to test this model for legalization of same-sex marriage. Our analyses show that while only a very small percentage of U.S. support this policy solely on the basis of their religious convictions, roughly a quarter oppose it for religious reasons alone. Furthermore, we find that higher levels of religious service attendance and importance of religious faith as well as affiliation with evangelical and black Protestantism significantly increase the likelihood of same-sex marriage opposition entirely on religious grounds.

In the current polarized political climate there is heightened attention paid to the American state constitutional provisions known as “Blaine Amendments” or “No-Aid Provisions” that were passed between 1835 and 1959 to prohibit public aid to religious schools. Judgments about No-Aid Provisions have largely been made by scholars on an ad hoc basis using narrative-based historical accounts, emotive language and without clear classificatory criteria. Using content analysis this article constructs the first quantitative scale of No-Aid Provision strength and subjects it to statistical treatment to explain why some prohibitions are much stronger than others. It finds that larger Catholic populations, Republican dominance, and Federal Enabling Acts make No-Aid language more strident. In so doing this article adjudicates between competing explanations for No-Aid Provision strength in a way that illuminates the interaction of politics, religion and education in America.

Studies of religious violence have established that when states restrict religious freedom, the probability of religious violence increases. Conventional wisdom holds that religious violence is primarily a result of religious grievances. When religious groups are denied religious freedom, they seek to revise the status quo in their favor though the use of violence. This study challenges this narrative. It finds, rather than being caused only by grievances, religious violence is also fueled by moments of opportunity. Utilizing cross-national data for the years 2008 and 2001–2005, it is found that religious violence occurs most frequently in anocratic regimes marked by weak and decaying state institutions. Hence, the current narrative is incomplete. Studies analyzing religious violence need to consider how various regimes provide or stifle the opportunity for religious actors to engage in violence as well as how those regimes fuel religious violence through restricting religious freedom and increasing religious grievances.

Between the late 1970s and early 1990s, the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) altered its First Amendment advocacy, shifting from being an ardent supporter of the strict separation of church and state to being a champion of the government accommodation of religion. At the same time, the denomination also became unswervingly pro-life. In this article, I use the SBC case to identify a previously under-analyzed link between abortion politics and church-state politics. I suggest that pro-life politics played an important role in the SBC's shift away from the separation of church and state. I focus on three areas where abortion politics aided this shift: (1) opposing separationists’ assertions that anti-abortion policies violated the Establishment Clause; (2) becoming allies rather than foes with Catholics; and (3) promoting a greater emphasis on the free exercise of religion. I conclude by discussing the implications for the relationship between religion, law, and politics.

Islam has emerged as the focus of immigration and diversity debates in Europe, especially in relation to the incorporation of Islam within political democracy. Using the least-liked group approach, the present study investigates political tolerance among Sunni and Alevi Muslims of Turkish origin living in Germany and the Netherlands. A relatively low level of political tolerance was found with higher intolerance of Alevis compared to Sunnis which was due to Alevis' strong rejection of religious fundamentalists. For both Muslim subgroups and in both countries, stronger religious group identification was associated with higher tolerance. Political tolerance was also found to be lower in Germany than in the Netherlands and in the latter country tolerance was positively associated with host national identification. The findings show that Islamic belief, Muslim group identification and the host national context are important for political tolerance.

Conclusions from empirical analyses on how Islam influences democratic attitudes in Arab countries differ widely, and the field suffers from conceptual ambiguity and largely focuses on “superficial” democratic support. Based on the non-Middle Eastern literature, this study provides a more systematic theoretical and empirical assessment of the linkages between Islamic attitudes and the popular support for democracy. I link belonging (affiliation), commitment (religiosity), orthodoxy, Muslim political attitudes, and individual-level political Islamism to the support for democracy and politico-religious tolerance. Statistical analyses on seven WVS surveys for Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia show that tolerance levels are remarkably lower than “democratic support”; the influence of being (committed or orthodox) Muslim and Muslim political attitudes are negligible however. Political Islamist views strongly affect tolerance negatively. They also influence “support for democracy,” but if the opposition in an authoritarian country is Islamic, these attitudes actually strengthen this support.

The recent Arab revolutions/rebellions/protests have raised once again an old question: what features should the Arab political systems ideally have? Inescapably, perhaps, the case of Turkey frequently appears as a model to be emulated in the Arab world. A variety of actors, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, from Rashid Ganouchi to Hillary Clinton has in fact viewed Turkey in that role. Even though, many intellectuals and academics usually raise doubts about the suitability of Turkish model for the Arab world (see, for example, Mamedov and Makarov 2011), it may still prove fruitful to consider the case of Turkey more seriously.

This research focuses on the variable “psychological security” as a mediating influence for religion, and its influence on political tolerance. While the composite variable of "psychological security" (typically measured by dogmatism, self-esteem, and trust) has been part of many studies of political tolerance, insufficient attention has been paid to the influence of these separate indicators. This is problematic because certain religious beliefs, practices, and/or affiliations may contribute differentially to the particular components of psychological security that are linked with greater political intolerance. So, we do not know “if” and “how” religion may influence these separate psychological security components or the mediating influence of these components in the religionpsychological security-political tolerance connection. The objective of this project is to “unpack” the unique influence of the psychological security components in our understanding of political tolerance and to assess the mediating influence of these same components on the relationship between religion and tolerance.

This article questions the assumption that — prior to July 2013 when the Egyptian military removed former President Mursi from power — the Muslim Brotherhood was in the process of implementing an Islamic state that would have involved a reversal of secularization and an upheaval to the status quo in terms of fundamental shifts in institutions and legal categories. Rather, the article argues that the Muslim Brotherhood evolved to embrace secularism of a certain sort-a statism in which it is the state that determines the boundaries of religion and politics. It illustrates this by looking at the role the Muslim Brotherhood envisaged for the Supreme Constitutional Court — and how this relates to the religious scholars of al-Azhar — in the formulation of legislation and in the assessment of whether legislation conforms to Article 2 of the constitution, both the 1971 one and the 2012 one, which was suspended in July 2013. In addition, the article will show how the Muslim Brotherhood has defined the public order with a particular focus on the idea of the Islamic “framework,” the rights of non-Muslim minorities, and personal status law.

The subjective correlates of abortion attitudes for six different religious traditions (Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam). For all six groups, attitudes toward sexual morality exhibit the strongest relationship with abortion attitudes, followed by the effects of attitudes toward human life. Gender role attitudes are much less powerful predictors of abortion attitudes. Further, the multivariate models which explain abortion attitudes are remarkably similar across religious traditions, with inter-religious differences largely being attributable to differences in the marginal distributions of the independent variables.

Few studies examine religiosity-of-interviewer effects, despite recent expansion of surveying in the Muslim world. Using data from a nationally-representative survey of 800 Moroccans conducted in 2007, this study investigates whether and why interviewer religiosity and gender affect responses to religiously-sensitive questions. Interviewer dress affects responses to four of six items, but effects are larger and more consistent for religious respondents, in support of power relations theory. Religious Moroccans provide less pious responses to secular-appearing interviewers, whom they may link to the secular state, and more religious answers to interviewers wearing hijab, in order to safeguard their reputation in a society that values piety. Interviewer traits do not affect the probability of item-missing data. Religiosity-of-interviewer effects depend on interviewer gender for questions about dress choice, a gendered issue closely related to interviewer dress. Interviewer gender and dress should be coded and controlled for to reduce bias and better understand social dynamics.

Informal institutions continue to govern political exchange in Africa, but the traditional, ethnic-based form of “big man rule” is now threatened by an alternative informal institution — charismatic Pentecostalism. This study evaluates the status of Pentecostalism empirically, in a micro-level experiment in Ghana. Using data from a variant of the dictator game, in which participants divide a resource endowment with randomly assigned partners as well as cultural leaders, the study provides evidence of Pentecostal exclusivity, excessive allegiance to leaders, and a shift away from ethnic-based patronage to Pentecostal patronage. As Pentecostalism continues to expand, these findings suggest a modification in the exchange of resources for loyalty in Africa, and grounds for viewing the movement as a new form of big man rule in the region.

High voter turnout gives legitimacy to the political system and strengthens the stability of a country. Since voter turnout matters, it is important to determine which factors boost electoral participation. While there is a vast literature on turnout focusing on institutional, socio-economic, and contextual indicators, there appears to be a shortage of scholarship on the relationship between religion and turnout. In our study, we evaluate the impact of the Islamic religion on electoral participation. Drawing on a large dataset that incorporates all legislative elections worldwide from 1970 to 2010 and controlling for compulsory voting, the electoral system type, the decisiveness of the election, the competitiveness of the election, the size of the country, the regime type and development, we find that Muslim-majority countries have lower turnout rates than majority non-Muslim countries. We also find electoral participation to be lower in countries where Islamic tenets are more strongly entrenched in politics.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been a dramatic increase in social scientific literature on the topic of “religious violence,” much of it arguing that there is a uniquely intense and disturbing connection between religion and political conflict and bloodshed. In this article, I challenge mainstream accounts of “religious violence” with an illustrative example from the 16th century of the theoretical and empirical problems with all such essentialist claims. The terms employed in the construction of “religious violence” might today just as easily be applied to the violence of the putatively “secular” nation-state. Furthermore, framing the debate in these sharp binary terms, as William Cavanaugh compellingly demonstrates, is itself part of a political project that had a very particular historical beginning and that conceals as much as it reveals about the nature of violence, both in the past and in the present.

What is the appropriate place for religious argument in the public realm of a liberal-democratic polity? The primary competing positions have been a “liberal” account and a “revisionist” response arguing for a greater role for religious argument in liberal democracy than the liberal position is ordinarily understood to allow. Liberals and their revisionist critics disagree about whether restraints on religious arguments and justifications are justified and desirable. Jürgen Habermas has intervened in this debate with a provocative account of the place of religion in the public sphere. Habermas presents his account as an alternative to both the liberal and the revisionist perspectives, and purports to do justice to the legitimate claims of each without falling prey to the failings of either. This article critically analyzes Habermas's interesting proposal and argues that it does not succeed.