This article is part of a special issue on the five Muslim democracies. It aims at understanding the role played by religion, and particularly by religiously oriented actors, in Turkey's democratization processes. The first section analyzes the different theoretical approaches to the role of religion in democratization. The second section analyzes the different phases of Turkey's political history since the 1980 coup, taking into account both democratization processes and the role played by religious actors in the political system, and trying to understand the possible relations between the two phenomena.

In recent decades, Evangelical churches in the United States have expanded their outreach to Latino immigrants, seeking to incorporate these new Americans into their churches. We investigate the implications of this movement by examining the impact of church affiliation on Latino immigrants’ conceptions of what it means to be “fully American.” Relying on the 2006 Latino National Survey, we find that church affiliation significantly impacts immigrants’ beliefs about what it means to “be American” in the eyes of other Americans and the likelihood of identifying themselves as “American.” Specifically, Protestant Latinos (be they mainline or Evangelical) are more likely than Catholic Latinos (the majority of Latinos) to identify as American and to believe that Americans think being a Christian is a defining feature of American identity. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings.

Following the 2007 war between Fatah and Hamas, Palestinian politics appears to have followed the regional trend where the competition between secularism and Islamism is developing into a major political cleavage. Through comparisons of the two movements' ideologies, however, the article questions the relevance of this religious-secular cleavage to explaining Palestinian factional politics. Fatah — the traditional hegemon in Palestinian politics and previously staunchly secularist — has turned increasingly religious in response to the spread of Islamism. Hamas for its part has shed its overly religious rhetoric, absolutist territorial claims, and insistence on a violent solution to the Palestinian problem, in tandem with the deradicalization of the Palestinian population. In finding that both movements have moved toward the center of the political spectrum to maximize support, the article concludes that their rivalry is best understood as a competition for the median voter rather than as an indication of political polarization.

This article examines interethnic tensions in Russia within the framework of the “post-Soviet religious model.” This term is understood as a set of mechanisms of cooperation between the state and representatives of “traditional” religious organizations. The article includes an analytical overview of the state of interethnic relations in Russia and how this issue is approached by the state and “traditional” religions. Based on this analysis, the author tries to expose weaknesses of the model and point out possible future problems.

Scholars contend that correctly applying religious cues is crucial to winning political elections. This article examines the effect of general religious cues by conducting an experiment on a national sample (N = 520). Through the use of a fictitious congressional candidate's webpage, we examine how subtle and overt religious cues interact with citizen religiosity to affect political evaluations. The findings demonstrate that politicians who use overt religious cues run the risk of alienating a large portion of potential voters. Religious cues do, however, appear to become more effective as citizens become more religious. We also find some evidence that overt religious cues are more polarizing than subtle religious cues. This article provides a foundation from which to more thoroughly consider how general religious cues can affect political outcomes and how these cues may interact with other factors.

How far can monotheism be reconciled with the pluralism characteristic of modern societies? In this article, I focus on the “value pluralism” of Isaiah Berlin, which I suggest captures a deeper level of plurality than Rawls's more familiar version of pluralism. However, some critics have objected that Berlinian pluralism is too controversial an idea in which to ground liberalism because it is profoundly at odds with the monotheism professed by so many citizens of a modern society. I argue that monotheists can be value pluralists as long as they do not insist that their faith is superior to all others. This pluralist position is exemplified by elements of the interfaith movement, according to which many religions are recognized as having roughly equal value. I also argue that a value-pluralist approach to religious accommodation, if it can be achieved, may be more stable than the uneasy combination of disapproval and restraint involved in the more orthodox solution to conflict among religions, toleration.

In 1967 the Church of Scientology's tax-exempt status was revoked on the basis that it failed to meet the criteria outlined in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Service. Between its loss, and eventual reacquisition in 1993, the Church of Scientology employed a number of political based tactics in an attempt to legitimize itself to the public sector. This article explores these tactics in relation to the religion's use of perception management. The article argues that the processes of both legal recognition and legitimization draw upon each other in a new faith's transition to mainstream theology. In this, the Church employed perception management in attempt to influence both processes. In exploring this, the paper contributes to our understanding of role that public legitimacy plays in a new faith's development.

This article investigates the attitudes of Israeli Jews on the proper relationship between religion and the state, using data from the 2009 Israeli National Election Study. Specifically we test whether association with the secular or religious communities structures mass attitudes on this important dimension of Israeli politics. Mass level disagreement in this area dates back to the pre-state period and represents a longstanding cleavage in Zionist thought and Israeli politics. We find that mass attitudes toward religion and public life are associated with religious observance and identification with religious parties and social groups.

In 2005, the European Commission formally inaugurated a “structured dialogue” between European institutions and major faith traditions and non-confessional bodies in Europe. The provision for dialogue was envisaged ostensibly as a mechanism to include religious and non-confessional perspectives in the ongoing construction of the wider European project. The language of “dialogue,” consensus-seeking, and mutual learning dominates both religious and political justification for this formalized provision. Analysis considers emerging praxis in the intervening period (2005–2010) to determine the extent to which consensus-seeking has prevailed over the role of power and interests. Findings indicate that a number of elements relative to the configuration of dialogue praxis have severely inhibited the communicative potential of the provision enshrined in Article 17.

The Christian Right is a long-standing social movement with a reputation for mobilization and activism at all levels of American politics. The Christian Progressive movement is a manifestation of religiously motivated political activity largely opposed to the policy goals of the Christian Right. Some have questioned, however, whether Christian Progressives have the internal cohesion to mobilize voters, activists, and movement organizations toward their policy goals. In this article, I update an existing measure of Christian Right influence and introduce a parallel measure for Christian Progressives. Analyses of these indices show that the Christian Progressive movement is visible and active in many states, though not the engine of influence that the Christian Right remains.

This article combines the research strands of moral politics and political behavior by focusing on the effect of individual and contextual religiosity on individual vote decisions in popular initiatives and public referenda concerning morally charged issues. We rely on a total of 13 surveys with 1,000 respondents each conducted after every referendum on moral policies in Switzerland between 1992 and 2012. Results based on cross-classified multilevel models show that religious behaving instead of nominal religious belonging plays a crucial role in decision making on moral issues. This supports the idea that the traditional confessional cleavage is replaced by a new religious cleavage that divides the religious from the secular. This newer cleavage is characterized by party alignments that extend from electoral to direct democratic voting behavior. Overall, our study lends support to previous findings drawn from American research on moral politics, direct democracies, and the public role of religion.

This article applies the conflict-amplification model to the development of Falun Gong. Falun Gong emerged in the early 1990s as a health-enhancing practice and part of the state-sanctioned qigong movement in China. Faced with increasing state suspicion of qigong and fierce competition from other groups, it metamorphosed into a new religious movement in the mid-1990s. State efforts to keep Falun Gong out of the political realm had the effect of releasing the group's political potential and led to its campaign of “truth clarification,” which further alerted the state to its ideological challenge and capacity to mobilize. Through a process of mutual feedback, the antagonism between the two parties culminated in religious violence and in Falun Gong's transformation into a political movement. The organizational evolution of Falun Gong is an illustration of the religion of the nonreligious and the politics of the apolitical in an authoritarian state.