A variety of robustness objections have been made against evolutionary game theory. One of these objections alleges that the games used in the underlying model are too arbitrary and oversimplified to generate a robust model of interesting prosocial behaviors. In this paper, I argue that the robustness objection can be met. However, in order to do so, we must attend to important conceptual issues regarding the nature of fairness, justice, and other moral concepts. Specifically, we must better understand the relationship between moral concepts and formal characterizations of games.

The conclusion urged in Mr Salmon's recent article ([1], pp. 252-261) is so remarkable that it may be worth recording some difficulties. He claims to rescue Reichenbach's notorious vindication of induction. This is essentially concerned with estimating long-run frequencies. By an estimator let us mean any rule for making estimates appropriate to various bodies of information. Reichenbach thought an estimator is sensible only if it is convergent, that is, roughly speaking, only if its estimates tend to approach the truth as more and more data is collected. Mr Salmon observes that an estimator should, in addition, be independent of the language in which the information is expressed. He contends that this criterion of linguistic invariance, when added to the rest of Reichenbach's train of thought, suffices to justify the “straight rule” for estimation: if m of the n observed A's are B, estimate the long-run frequency of B among A's as m/n.

Suppose my utilities are representable by a set of utility assignments, each defined for atomic sentences; suppose my beliefs are representable by a set of probability assignments. Then each of my utility assignments together with each of my probability assignments will determine a utility assignment to non-atomic sentences, in a familiar way. This paper is concerned with the question, whether I am committed to all the utility assignments so constructible. Richard Jeffrey (1984) says (in effect) “no”, Isaac Levi (1974) says “yes”. I argue for “no”, and raise in passing a problem for Levi.

Historians have shown that philosophical discussions about the implications of relativity significantly shaped the development of European philosophy of science in the 1920s. Yet little is known about American debates from this period. This article maps the first responses to Einstein’s theory in three U.S. philosophy journals and situates these papers within the local intellectual landscape. I argue that these discussions (1) stimulated the development of a distinctly American branch of philosophy of science and (2) paved the way for the logical empiricists who emigrated to the United States in the years before World War II.

Some philosophers understand natural kinds to be the categories which are constraints on enquiry. In order to elaborate the metaphysics appropriate to such an account, I consider the complicated history of scurvy, citrus, and vitamin C. It may be tempting to understand these categories in a shallow way (as mere property clusters) or in a deep way (as fundamental properties). Neither approach is adequate, and the case instead calls for middle-range ontology: starting from categories which we identify in the world and elaborating their structure, but not pretending to jump ahead to a complete story about fundamental being.

Research in evolutionary ecology on random foraging seems to ignore the possibility that some random foraging is an adaptation not to environmental randomness, but to what Wimsatt called “perceived randomness.” This occurs when environmental features are unpredictable, whether physically random or not. Mere perceived randomness may occur, for example, due to effects of climate change or certain kinds of static landscape variation. I argue that an important mathematical model concerning random foraging doesn’t depend on environmental randomness, despite contrary remarks by researchers. I use computer simulations to illustrate the idea that random foraging is an adaptation to mere perceived randomness.

Scientists have the epistemic responsibility of producing knowledge. They also have the social responsibility of aligning their research with the needs and values of various societal stakeholders. Individual scientists may be left with no guidance on how to prioritize and carry these different responsibilities. As I will argue, however, the responsibilities of science can be harmonized at the collective level. Drawing from debates in moral philosophy, I will propose a theory of the collective responsibilities of science that accounts for the internal diversity of research groups and for their different responsibilities.

I argue that the classical temperature concept falls apart in special relativity by examining four consilient procedures for establishing classical temperature: Carnot processes, thermometers, kinetic theory, and black-body radiation. I show that their relativistic counterparts demonstrate no such consilience. I suggest two interpretations for this situation: eliminativism akin to simultaneity, or pluralism akin to rotation.

Gerhard Schurz claims to have a solution to Hume’s problem of induction based on results from machine learning concerning meta-induction. His argument has two steps. The first is to establish a justification for following a certain meta-inductive strategy based on its predictive optimality. The second step is to show how this justification can be transferred to object-induction. I unpack the second step and fail to find a convincing argument supporting the transfer of justification from meta-induction to object-induction. My conclusion is that the problem of induction has not yet been solved by appeal to meta-induction.

Forber and Smead (2014) analyze how increasing the fitness benefits associated with prosocial behavior can increase the fitness of spiteful individuals relative to their prosocial counterparts, so that selection favors spite over prosociality. This poses a problem for the evolution of prosocial behavior: As the benefits of prosocial behavior increase, it becomes more likely that spite, not prosocial behavior, will evolve in any given population. In this article, I develop two game-theoretic models that, taken together, illustrate how synergistic costs and benefits may provide partial solutions to Forber and Smead’s paradox.

If categorical equivalence is a good criterion of theoretical equivalence, then it would seem that if some class of mathematical structures is represented as a category, then any other class of structures categorically equivalent to it will have the same representational capacities. Hudetz (2019a) has presented an apparent counterexample to this claim; in this note, I argue that the counterexample fails.

How should one discount utility across time? The conventional wisdom in social science is that one should use an exponential discount function. Such a function is a representation of the axioms that provide a well-defined utility function plus a condition known as stationarity. Yet stationarity doesn’t really have much intuitive normative pull on its own. Here I try to cast it in a normative glow by deriving stationarity from two explicitly normative premises, both suggested by the philosophical thesis of temporal neutralism. Putting the argument in this form helps us better understand exponential discounting and challenges to it.

There has been much debate among scientists and philosophers about what it means for (hypothetical) interventions invoked in causal inference to be “well-defined” and how considerations of this sort should constrain the choice of causal variables. In this article, I propose that an intervention is well-defined just in case the effect of interest is well-defined, and that the intervention can serve as a suitable means to identify that effect. Based on this proposal, I identify several types of ambiguous intervention. Implications for variable choice are discussed using case studies drawn from the sciences.

Robustness with respect to climate models is often considered by philosophers of climate science to be a crucial issue in determining whether and to what extent the projections of the Earth’s future climate that models yield should be trusted. Wendy Parker and Lisa Lloyd have introduced influential accounts of robustness for climate models with seemingly conflicting conclusions. I argue that Parker and Lloyd are characterizing distinct notions of robustness and providing complementary insights. Confidence, if warranted, need be by virtue of causally consistent climate models rather than by agreement upon projections by a diverse range of models.