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Discussion: Levi's Decision Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Stephen Leeds
Stephen Leeds*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of Colorado at Boulder
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Abstract

Suppose my utilities are representable by a set of utility assignments, each defined for atomic sentences; suppose my beliefs are representable by a set of probability assignments. Then each of my utility assignments together with each of my probability assignments will determine a utility assignment to non-atomic sentences, in a familiar way. This paper is concerned with the question, whether I am committed to all the utility assignments so constructible. Richard Jeffrey (1984) says (in effect) “no”, Isaac Levi (1974) says “yes”. I argue for “no”, and raise in passing a problem for Levi.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 57 , Issue 1 , March 1990 , pp. 158 - 168
Copyright
Copyright © 1990 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

Jeffrey, R. C. (1983), The Logic of Decision, 2nd rev. ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
Jeffrey, R. C. (1984), “Bayesianism with a Human Face”, in J. Earman (ed.), Testing Scientific Theories. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 10. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 133–156.10.5749/j.cttts94f.9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levi, I. (1974), “On Indeterminate Probabilities”, Journal of Philosophy 71: 391–418.10.2307/2025161CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levi, I. (1980), The Enterprise of Knowledge. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
Levi, I. (1985), “Imprecision and Indeterminacy in Probability Judgment”, Philosophy of Science 52: 390–409.10.1086/289257CrossRefGoogle Scholar