One of the things I attempted to do in my paper on independent testability (1980) was to illustrate convincingly the very real difficulties of distinguishing between the accidental and essential features of a scientific experiment. The importance of this distinction is that independent testability presumably requires differences that are essential and telling and not merely accidental reflections of existing experimental technique or of the procedural preferences of the experimenter. In the case of the Michelson-Morley (MM) and Kennedy-Thorndike (KT) experiments, I showed, following a suggestion of M. G. Evans, that Grünbaum's attempt to distinguish these two experiments does not work. I also showed that certain obvious and natural variations of Grünbaum's approach do not adequately distinguish these experiments. So, for example, it will not do simply to claim that MM is characterized by equal arms and KT by unequal arms, since equal arms are required for MM only in the absence of adequate photographic registration methods. But if these methods are not available then KT is not possible. Conversely, if these methods are available, then while both MM and KT are experimentally possible, MM need not be restricted to equal arms.

A recent controversy about neural networks allegedly capable of detecting a person’s sexual orientation raises the question of whether all research on homosexuality should be permitted. This paper considers two arguments for limits to such research, and concludes that there are good reasons to limit at least the dissemination of applied research on the etiology of homosexuality. The paper then briefly sketches how this could work, and looks at three objections against these limitations.

The social scientist is now applying his knowledge and skills in various fields. But in the American trade-union movement he faces unusual problems. His challenges are essentially those of determining how to serve, and how to implant a belief in the value of his findings and reports. There is no widespread acceptance of the conclusion that he can make a real contribution. He is still not considered necessary or likely to be useful in the routine operation of the union or in the development of its policy and tactics. Progress has been made during the last few years in securing his admission to the staff of unions. But much pioneering work has still to be done to obtain frank acknowledgment of his potential usefulness and free acceptance of his experimental, inquiring and critical approaches.

In their recent paper, Jackson and Pargetter (1977) have attempted to prove that simultaneity is not a matter of convention. They attempt to show that it is an empirical fact whether or not a moving rod A′B′ is perpendicular to a plane XY. If it is an empirical fact, then such a perpendicular rod can be used to synchronize clocks. We shall show that it is not an empirical fact, but it is in fact synchronization dependent.

We have undertaken to discuss the nature of mathematical systems, the way in which they are discovered, and the uses to which they are put in the empirical sciences. The empirical sciences employ mathematical systems in framing final formulations, but adopt mathematical techniques long before reaching that stage. It is a prerequisite that the mathematics they employ has been developed separately and within its own domain. We shall return to the relation between mathematics and the empirical sciences before we are done, but in the meanwhile we shall be constrained to begin by discussing the situation in mathematics in isolation from any empirical considerations.

Belot, Earman, and Ruetsche (1999) dismiss the black hole remnant proposal as an inadequate response to the Hawking information loss paradox. I argue that their criticisms are misplaced and that, properly understood, remnants do offer a substantial reply to the argument against the possibility of unitary evolution in spacetimes that contain evaporating black holes. The key to understanding these proposals lies in recognizing that the question of where and how our current theories break down is at the heart of these debates in quantum gravity. I also argue that the controversial nature of assessing the limits of general relativity and quantum field theory illustrates the significance of attempts to establish the proper borders of our effective theories.

H. S. Sullivan's approach to the study of psychiatry reflects the fact that his conception of scientific method was derived from work in physics rather than in the biological sciences. His definition of psychiatry as the study of “interpersonal process” appears to have been influenced partly by his previous training in physics, and also by his conclusion that the most significant aspects of personality could be revealed only through an understanding of the person's actual behavior in relation to others.

Lately, an increased interest in formal devices has led to an attempt on the part of some mathematicians to do without those aspects of mathematics which require intuition. One consequence of this movement has been a new conception of pure mathematics as a science of axiomatic systems. According to this conception, there is no reality beyond an axiomatic system which the statements of mathematics are about; the fact that a statement is a theorem in the system is all that is of interest. This is a sort of nominalist position, since the contrary position seems to be committed to a belief in the existence of a domain of mathematical entities, which are just as suspect as the universale commonly discussed in metaphysical treatises. More often it is called formalism.

This paper is intended to explore Jeffrey's proposal for the measurement of the simplicity of scientific laws. The first part is a sketch of Jeffreys’ development of a view on simplicity, which will be followed by a discussion of what seem to be some rather crucial defects in the proposal as it stands. It will be suggested here that no plausible way of countering these defects seems available.

Every month some one pronounces that science must be rejected if we are to preserve a belief in human freedom, or that only by a faith in freedom that flies in the face of logic and the principle of causality can democracy be justified. Equally often other authors insist that the increase of knowledge in the science of human behavior makes plain the irrelevance and sentimentality of pious talk about free and rational choice. What is the source of this dispute? Why is no resolution of it arrived at?

This paper approaches a theory relating authorship, meaning and purpose by semiformalized developments of two “presupposed theories”: of purposeful behavior and of sign-reading.

The theory of purposeful behavior is made to rest upon two undefined predicates. 'Wt(a,p,q)' abbreviates the claim that at time t, person a works at bringing it about that p in order to bring it about that q. 'Bt(a,p)' abbreviates the claim that at time t, person a brings it about that p. A number of definitions and laws are based upon these two predicates. One practical utility of the symbolism is a constraint to symbolize differently a purpose, according as what is intended is a purposing or a thing purposed.

The theory of sign-reading undertakes to assimilate sign-reading to inference. The theory proposes ‘Rt(a,p,q)‘ as a basic undefined predicate, abbreviating the claim that at time t, person a reads that p as a sign that q.

The theory of deliberate sign-production, and more particularly of authorship, is approached by permitting the two above sets of symbols to supply arguments one for the other. Specifically, making a deliberate or a candid sign is defined as bringing about a state of affairs in order that an addressee will read the bringing about by the sign-maker of that state of affairs as a sign that such and so.

The laws of the two first parts of the paper are then appealed to in order to show that when the sign-making is candid (defined in the paper), the such and so mentioned above must be a feigned or actual purpose of the author. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of what in this total signified purpose of the sign-making might be indentified by reference to the conventional sign-type (sentence) presented. Thus “meaning” of a sentence is thence viewed as an abstraction from the signified meaning (always a purpose) of the uttering.

Piccinini’s usability constraint states that physical processes must have “physically constructible manifestation[s]” to be included in epistemically useful models of physical computation. But to determine what physical processes can be implemented in physical systems (as parts of computations), we must already know what physical processes can be implemented in physical systems (as parts of processes for constructing computing systems). We need additional assumptions about what qualifies as a building process. Piccinini implicitly assumes a classical computational understanding of executable processes, but this is an assumption imposed on physical theories and may artificially limit our picture of epistemically useful physical computation.

Recent findings in different areas of psychology and cognitive science have brought the unconscious mind back to center stage. However, the unconscious mind worry remains: What renders unconscious phenomena mental? I suggest a new strategy for answering this question, which rests on the idea that categorizing unconscious phenomena as “mental” should be scientifically useful relative to the explanatory research goals. I argue that this is the case if by categorizing an unconscious phenomenon as “mental” one picks out explanatorily relevant similarities to a corresponding paradigmatically mental conscious phenomenon. Explanatory relevance is spelled out in terms of mechanistic norms.

Since the turn of the century there has been a strong trend to break through the wall which has separated philosophy from the “special sciences” and to investigate the problems which require a good judgment in both philosophy and science. The evolution of science itself and the increasing relevance of science in human life have given immense momentum to this trend. But this momentum could not be appreciated in its actual strength because scientists who wanted to raise their voices had trouble in finding a Journal where they could communicate with the people who were interested, for almost all the scientific journals were devoted exclusively to technical papers. In founding Philosophy of Science Dr. Malisoff started the construction of a channel by which this important flow of scientific investigation could reach its public. This line of thought found in the journal a possibility of self-expression and it became a real force in the life of the community of scientists and scholars, and even of educated men in general. From the first volume, papers were published which have later been quoted in every discussion about the philosophy of science. I mention, as an example only, R. Carnap's paper on Testability and Meaning. Nobody who has wanted information and stimulation in this modern field of investigation could get it without looking into Malisoff's Philosophy of Science.