We have undertaken to discuss the nature of mathematical systems, the way in which they are discovered, and the uses to which they are put in the empirical sciences. The empirical sciences employ mathematical systems in framing final formulations, but adopt mathematical techniques long before reaching that stage. It is a prerequisite that the mathematics they employ has been developed separately and within its own domain. We shall return to the relation between mathematics and the empirical sciences before we are done, but in the meanwhile we shall be constrained to begin by discussing the situation in mathematics in isolation from any empirical considerations.

We describe a simple, flexible exercise that can be implemented in the philosophy of science classroom: students are asked to determine the contents of a closed container without opening it. This exercise has revealed itself as a useful platform from which to examine a wide range of issues in the philosophy of science and may, we suggest, even help us think about improving the public understanding of science.

Kevin Davey claims that the justification of the second law of thermodynamics as it is conveyed by the “standard story” of statistical mechanics, roughly speaking, that low-entropy microstates tend to evolve to high-entropy microstates, is “unhelpful at best and wrong at worst.” In reply, I demonstrate that Davey’s argument for rejecting the standard story commits him to a form of skepticism that is more radical than the position he claims to be stating and that Davey places unreasonable demands on the notion of justification in the physical sciences.

This paper provides the first thorough assessment of a physics-based answer, the Bound State Answer (BSA), to the Special Composition Question (SCQ). According to the BSA some objects compose something if they are in a common bound state. The reasons to endorse such an answer, in particular, motivations coming from empirical adequacy and conservativeness, precision, simplicity, and parsimony, are critically addressed. I then go on to compare the BSA to other moderate answers to the SCQ and consider whether objections raised against such answers can be raised against the BSA as well. I finally relate the discussion with mereological pluralism.

This article aims to complement causal model approaches to causal explanation by James Woodward, Joseph Halpern and Judea Pearl, and Michael Strevens. It centers on a strengthened Ramsey Test of conditionals: $\alpha \gg \gamma$ if and only if, after suspending judgment about α and γ, an agent can infer γ from the supposition of α (in the context of further beliefs in the background). Holger Andreas and Mario Günther used this conditional as the starting point of an analysis of ‘because’ in natural language. I refine this analysis so as to yield a fully fledged account of (deterministic) causal explanation.

Psychoanalysis is the name of a practical psychology, which seeks to make intelligible the aberrant phenomena in the stream of human experience which often are coincident with suffering and ineffectuality. In addition, it has another distinguishing characteristic in that it seeks to create a teachable method for the systematic treatment of these disturbances in adaptation. The application of scientific method to a psychology with these objectives created problems which are unique. These problems stem from the nature of the subject matter with which it deals and the particular objectives of the scientific maneuvers. Its subject matter constitutes material which no other psychology has seen fit to deal with and the objective, namely, therapy, is one which imposes upon this scientific discipline a social responsibility.

According to a certain type of instrumentalist, we may have good reasons for accepting scientific theories, but never for believing more than their empirical consequences. Horwich (1991) considers several attempts to capture a difference between acceptance and belief, and claims that none of them succeed. He concludes that instrumentalism has not been shown to be a coherent position. However, in the course of his discussion, Horwich himself deploys a conceptual apparatus which is sufficient for formulating the instrumentalist doctrine in a coherent manner. The worst accusation that can be laid against instrumentalists is that they have violated common linguistic usage.

This essay reviews two recent books commenting on, and contributing to, the “science wars.” In Who Rules in Science? James Robert Brown respectfully but firmly rejects the “nihilist” and the “naturalist” wings of social constructivism. He rejects attempts to debunk science in the name of a relativist or anarchist epistemology. He also criticizes the “strong programme” in the sociology of knowledge and its implied contrast between reasons and causes. In Prometheus Bedeviled Norman Levitt examines the cultural roots of current discontent with science. Levitt's analysis—and polemic—charges contemporary culture with a pervasive cheapening of intellectual standards.

Janet Kourany argues that philosophers of science should place more emphasis on the moral and political aspects of scientific research. As a possible site for philosophical intervention she discusses professional codes of ethics. James Brown describes various systemic problems in pharmaceutical research and proposes that socializing medical research is the best way to remedy the situation. I criticize each of their examples, but concur with many overall aspects of their expanded agenda for philosophy of science.

Barker and Achinstein misread Goodman's definitions of ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’. If we stick to Goodman's definition of ‘grue’ as applying “to all things examined before t just in case they are green but to other things just in case they are blue” (my italics), and his parallel definition of ‘bleen’, then Barker and Achinstein's arguments are seen to be irrelevant. The result is to by-pass the question whether Mr. Grue sees things as grue rather than as green while showing that it is possible for human conceptual schemes to employ different sensory terms. These two issues are separate.