In “Events and Causality” Mark Steiner argues that though Bertrand Russell was right to claim that the laws of physics do not express causal relations, nevertheless, Russell was wrong to suppose that therefore causality plays no role in physics. I argue that Steiner misses the point of Russell's argument for the first of these claims, and because of this Steiner's argument against the second fails to controvert it. Steiner fails to see that Russell's argument against causation, is in fact an argument against the existence of causal directionality or asymmetry. Steiner gives no reason to suppose physical theory requires this asymmetry after all.

The major question—what is categorial analysis and how can it be reliably performed?—lies beyond the scope of this paper. Indeed, I would presume that very little can be said significantly about it in general. One's convictions on the subject have to be shown by actual performance, which is my intention in the present instance. But it may help the process of communication if I try to indicate at the beginning the general frame in which this analysis of value occurs.

This is a review essay about David Corfield and Jon Williamson's anthology Foundations of Bayesianism. Taken together, the fifteen essays assembled in the book assess the state of the art in Bayesianism. Such an assessment is timely, because decision theory and formal epistemology have become disciplines that are no longer taught on a routine basis in good philosophy departments. Thus we need to ask: Quo vadis, Bayesianism? The subjects of the articles include Bayesian group decision theory, approaches to the concept of probability, Bayesian approaches in the philosophy of mathematics, reflections on the relationship between causation and probability, the Independence axiom, and a range of criticisms of Bayesianism, among other subjects. While critical of some of the arguments presented in the articles, this review recommends Corfield and Williamson's volume to anyone who is trying to stay abreast of Bayesian research.

In concluding section 2, chapter VI of part II of [6], Duhem claimed:

1. (I) ... the physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental test, but only a whole group of hypotheses ... ([6], p. 187)

2. (II) ... when the experiment is in disagreement with his predictions, what he learns is that at least one of the hypotheses constituting this group is unacceptable and ought to be modified; but the experiment does not designate which one should be changed'. ([6], p. 187)

In this paper I discuss a generalization of communication theory. I sketch a model of the communication situation sufficiently general to subsume all models of particular aspects of communication. Several definitions and lines of inquiry are proposed. It will be evident that much of what I say has been influenced by Bar-Hillel (1), and also that this paper goes beyond Bar-Hillel's both in generality of scope and in details of analysis. The more general aim of the paper is to suggest a reconstruction of our intuitions regarding communication. In particular, I argue that we should drop the idea that anything is “conveyed” in communication.

We argue that Horgan's program for nominalizing science fails, because its translation of quantitative statements destroys the inferential structures of explanations, predictions and retrodictions of nonquantitative scientific facts.

In his review of my Prelude to Galileo (1981a), Ernan McMullin rejects my emendation of Pierre Duhem's “continuity thesis” wherein I develop the case for a pronounced medieval-scholastic influence on Galileo's science based on parallels between Galileo's early Latin compositions and lectures given by contemporary Jesuits at the Collegio Romano (McMullin 1983). He does so on two grounds: (1) that the evidence of derivation I provide, using textual parallels, is so strong that it refutes the claim for any intellectual influence, being a better instance of mindless copying than one of personal appropriation; and (2) that, in any event, the logical structure of the argument which I attribute to Galileo's mature work is not that of demonstration ex suppositione as understood by Aquinas, and so the example I provide of Galileo's use of suppositio “does not link him in any significant way to the specifically Thomist tradition of natural science” (1983, p. 173). An adequate reply to this critique would require the introduction of more historical evidence than would be appropriate for the pages of this journal. A few remarks, however, may be in order concerning such evidence which bears directly on McMullin's first ground, and concerning the implications of this evidence for contemporary philosophy of science, which bear on his second.

An important class of teleological theories cannot explain the representational content of visual states because they fail to address the relationship between the world, projected retinal stimuli, and perception. A different approach for achieving a naturalized theory of visual content is offered that rejects the traditional internalism/externalism debate in favor of what is termed “empirical externalism.” This position maintains that, while teleological considerations can underwrite a broad understanding of representation, the content of visual representation can only be determined empirically according to accumulated past experience. A corollary is that a longstanding problem concerning the indeterminacy of visual content is dissolved.

A kinetic theory of permeability is developed both for the case where the cell membrane is a distinct phase and where it is simply the interface between cell and environment. A general expression for the diffusion current of a substance across the membrane is derived, which depends on two “coefficients of permeability” rather than one. Solubility and adsorption theories of permeability are shown to be special cases of the formulas. The permeability coefficients are expressed in terms of the difference of potential energy of the diffusing substance in the two phases; for a membrane of finite thickness they also involve the thickness, and the diffusion coefficient of the solute in the membrane.

When phenomenology was introduced as a new science by Husserl its methods were applied first to objects of logic. Later phenomenological investigation expanded gradually to the fields of psychology, ethics, esthetics, and sociology (Scheler, Pfänder, Hildebrand a.o.). More rarely, objects of the natural sciences have been treated phenomenologically. Scattered indications of this kind are to be found in authors who do not belong to the most intimate circle of Husserl's school (Helmut Plessner, Kurt Goldstein, Walter Frost, E. Buenning). Extensively, however, the phenomenological method has been applied to objects of the natural sciences once only, namely by Hedwig Conrad-Martius, a favorite pupil of Husserl's, in her Realontologie (Ontology of Reality) and Farben (Colors). Yet this less known branch of phenomenology is particularly interesting. Husserl stressed the basic difference between phenomenological ideation (Wesensschau) on the one hand and psychological introspection and description of the immediate data of awareness on the other. The peculiarity and scientific productivity of phenomenological method, therefore, can be studied best in a field which is as far removed from psychology as possible. We shall try to analyze the papers of Conrad-Martius more fully and shall refer to other authors occasionally as illustrations.

According to generally accepted views every material body has always just as much North as South magnetism, meaning that the total value of the North and South magnetism is always zero (div H = 0). One says therefore that there is no “true magnetism”. A body directs itself in the direction of the magnetic lines of force like a compass needle but it does not move from its place. On the other hand, it is known that there are electrically charged bodies (positive or negative electric ions) which move in homogeneous electric fields along the lines of force. There is thus a preponderance of positive or negative electricity on ions. One says also that there exists “true electricity”. A movement of charged matter in a homogeneous field is called a current. Consequently until now electric currents were known to exist, but no magnetic currents.

It is widely assumed that mechanistic explanations are causal explanations. Many prominent new mechanists endorse interventionism as the correct analysis of explanatory causal models in biology and other fields. This article argues that interventionism is not entirely satisfactory in this regard. A case study of Jacob and Monod’s operon model shows that at least some important mechanistic explanations in biology present significant contrasts with the interventionist account. This result motivates a more inclusive approach to mechanistic explanation, allowing for noncausal aspects.

Ferdinand Schoeman (1986) attempts to refute six arguments that I gave in The Probable and the Provable (1977, pp. 49–120) for not analyzing the standards of forensic proof in terms of any concept of probability that conforms to the familiar principles of the mathematical calculus of chance. But he evidently does not appreciate the strength of the case for rejecting the validity of any such analysis. In the course of discussing his criticisms, I shall add a seventh argument to fortify my position, though I concede that the second of my original arguments has to be discarded.