To illustrate one way in which philosophy may be helpful rather than merely critical in the present state of psychoanalytic theorizing, an attempt is made to disentangle issues in controversies about the unconscious. Eleven questions are distinguished and discussed. Logical, linguistic, methodological, metaphysical, empirical, and pragmatic components are set apart. It is found that there are no logical barriers to a construct of the unconscious, that it is linguistically feasible, need violate no methodological concepts, nor foreclose a metaphysical issue, nor have deleterious pragmatic effect. Feasibility and desirability of the construct in all these respects will depend on the character and extent of the scientific findings. Some issues are also raised concerning desirable types of models in the explanation of conduct, and concerning the relevance of recent studies of consciousness.

In this paper, I elucidate the main points involved in the question of the non-triviality of the conventionality of simultaneity within the kinematics of special relativity. I argue that there is an important distinction to be made between the inherited component and the sui generis component of the conventionality of simultaneity. The factual core of the kinematics of special relativity is explored, and it is shown that the Round-Trip Clock Retardation effect obtains if, and only if Winnie's Passage Time Principle holds. Some consequences of this fundamental fact are then explored. In particular, Grünbaum's view that the epistemological conventionality of simultaneity is logically prior to the physical inter-frame relativity of simultaneity is found to be based largely on what I call the inherited component of the former. Finally, a question is raised as to the very self-consistency of the claim, made by Ellis and Bowman, that standard signal synchrony and slow-transport synchrony are logically independent. In some concluding remarks, the author's general agreement with Grünbaum's conception of bridled conventionalism is indicated.

This article offers a characterization of what I call multiple-models juxtaposition (MMJ), a strategy for managing trade-offs among modeling desiderata. MMJ displays models of distinct phenomena together and fulfills different desiderata both in the individual models and by a comparison of those models. I discuss a concrete case from developmental biology, where MMJ coordinates generality and detail. I also clarify the distinction between MMJ and multiple-models idealization (MMI), which also uses multiple models to manage trade-offs among desiderata. MMJ and MMI differ in several points, such as the ways they manage trade-offs and the purposes of using multiple models.

An inductive method Cλ in the λ-system of Carnap [1] is immodest, on evidence e, iff its estimate, on e, of its own accuracy is higher than its estimate, on e, of the accuracy of any rival method Cλ′. Immodesty seems to be a condition of stable trust: if you trusted a modest Cλ, you should start by trusting its advice to replace it by a rival that it estimates to be more accurate. One might guess that any Cλ would be immodest on any evidence. But in [2] I proved that, under a certain accuracy measure taken from Carnap [1], §§ 20–21, there would be exactly one immodest Cλ. Unfortunately, that one sometimes turns out to be C0 (the straight rule); and since nobody in his right mind would trust C0 we are then left with no acceptable Cλ. Stephen Spielman [3] has proposed a remedy: an estimate of accuracy, on evidence e, should disregard accuracy under circumstances that are ruled out by e. Spielman proves that if this change is made, any Cλ is immodest on any evidence.

Quine's (1969) proposal that the foundationalist programs in epistemology should be abandoned in favor of a scientific study of how we come to hold our theories about the world is still widely misunderstood. It does not eliminate the possibility of rational adjudication of scientific dispute, nor is it essentially tied to behaviorist approaches in psychology. On the contrary, recent work in psychology and philosophy of science can very naturally be seen as embodying the sort of program envisioned by Quine; now freed of behaviorist strictures, it clearly addresses issues that have been of interest in traditional epistemology. This view is defended with particular attention to Quine's concerns with translation and the related concerns with belief individuation which have inspired critics of recent cognitive psychology.

Is sociobiology a new paradigm? A number of people have claimed that it is. I argue that, sociologically speaking, it may well be. But epistemologically, it is not. The case rests on one's interpretation of the major Darwinian evolutionary mechanism, natural selection. In this note, it is shown that sociobiology relies on an orthodox understanding of selection. Thus, in crucial epistemological respects, sociobiology is continuous with the rest of Darwinian evolutionary theory.

In this paper, I examine a number of alternative global structures for Newtonian space-time, and corresponding Newtonian theories of mechanics and gravitation. I argue that since these theories differ only with respect to questions concerning the relative distribution of inertial and gravitational forces, the choice between them is a matter of convention. Therefore, the global structure of Newtonian space-time is also a matter of convention. Since this result is based on a consideration of the nature of inertial and gravitational forces, rather than on general reductionist principles, it is a “limited conventionalist” result.

To one not philosophically inclined, idealism seems a rather fantastic doctrine—one quite obviously false. The great Dr. Johnson thought he could adequately refute it by kicking his toe against a stone. In one form or another, however, it has existed wherever men have thought deeply on the fundamental nature of mind and of the external world. One cannot go far in a study of the sources of knowledge without becoming aware that the only immediate evidence of external objects lies in our sense impressions. The mind has no way of putting itself in contact with things external to itself except through the five senses. Up to this point there is fairly general unanimity. The difficulty lies in correctly interpreting this fact.

Curie’s principle asserts that every symmetry of a cause manifests as a symmetry of the effect. It can be formulated as a tautology that is vacuous until it is instantiated. However, instantiation requires us to know the correct way to map causal terminology onto the terms of a science. Causal metaphysics has failed to provide a unique, correct way to carry out the mapping. Thus, successful or unsuccessful instantiation merely reflects our freedom of choice in the mapping.

This study is an attempt partially to describe the sociological foundations of modern science. When the question is put, under what social circumstances did the idea of science develop, one sees that there is here an inadequately explored sociological area. Perhaps a definition and a contrast will make this clearer. By the idea of science is meant simply the proposition that the valid source of human knowledge is to be found in the analysis of experience. But knowledge in this sense was not a problem in the medieval period. In the first place, it was then taken for granted that the universe was intelligible to man on the basis of divinely revealed principles. Secondly, man constituted the center of the universe, which in its entirety was thought to be subordinate to man's destiny. Thirdly, not only was the universe which existed for man then known by him, but it was endowed with human qualities. The categories of interpretation were substance, essence, form, matter, quality, and purpose. The reason why rain fell upon the earth was to grow crops; the purpose of the moon and the stars was to light the earth at night, and to act as guideposts for him on his travels. Bodies tended to their proper places, light ones upward, heavy ones earthward. Quantitative differences were inferred from these qualitative ones. It is well-known, for example, how tenaciously was the knowledge held, that heavier objects fall more quickly than lighter ones. And finally, the universe was religious. If the world existed for the benefit of man, man existed for the glory of God. Human sojourn upon the earth was merely preparation for permanent residence in eternity.

Many believe that the Marxist philosophy of history entails that man is not free in a sense in which it seems obvious that he is. In particular it is held to be (1) materialistic, (2) holistic, (3) economistic, and (4) fatalistic. It is claimed, in short, that since the Marxist philosophy of history has these features, man is not capable of shaping his own (social) destiny if it is true. I show for each of these features either that it does not entail what it is believed to entail or that it is not correctly attributed to the Marxist philosophy of history.

The correspondence theory of truth is one of the most venerable philosophical theses. Yet it was known almost from the beginning to entail the antinomy of the liar. This antinomy affects any use of the word “true,” not only the use which the correspondence theorist intends. A definition of truth for formalized languages which avoids the antinomy was not formulated before 1931. Tarski's proposal of that year uses an ingenious device. His definition concerns the truth or falsity of the sentences of one language, the object language, but it is given in a different language, the metalanguage. Adapting this definition to natural languages poses some problems, but let us assume they do not exist. Then we may freely apply the word “true” even to sentences of natural languages. We need have no fear of getting involved in antinomies. The use of the word “true” has been rehabilitated. But what about the correspondence theory? Has it too been rehabilitated? Many philosophers claim it has, in particular Karl Popper and his followers. But whether this is so depends of course on what exactly the correspondence theory asserts.

This paper is a tentative step toward formalizing in symbolic logic some of the central assumptions of Clark L. Hull's theory of behavior. There will be noticeable deviations from Hull's own terminology and form of statement, but this will be largely in the interest of greater logical simplicity. The notation of symbolic logic will not be used, but the behavioral axioms will be so stated as to admit of easy translation into such notation. Such easy translatability seems to be a prerequisite if theorems are to be derivable with genuine deductive rigor.

Psychometric g—a statistical factor capturing intercorrelations between scores on different IQ tests—is of theoretical interest despite being a low-fidelity model of both folk psychological intelligence and its cognitive/neural underpinnings. Psychometric g idealizes away from those aspects of cognitive/neural mechanisms that are not explanatory of the relevant variety of folk psychological intelligence, and it idealizes away from those varieties of folk psychological intelligence that are not generated by the relevant cognitive/neural substrate. In this manner, g constitutes a high-fidelity bridge model of the relationship between its two targets and, thereby, helps demystify the relationship between folk and scientific psychology.

In this note, we wish to remark on some of the relations between deciding one's own action and predicting one's own action. This topic is relevant both to current discussions of the nature of analysis and to the continuing controversy over the nature of scientific explanation.