It is a curious fact that in the many writings on the theory of probability, one rarely finds an instance of a clear cut definition of the fundamental problem of the subject. On intuitive grounds, one grasps the intent of most of the authors: it is to define the concept of probability and to show its relationship to the other concepts of science; and yet since the criterion of adequacy in the answering of this question is rarely stated, one must feel that the problem itself has remained undefined.

In order adequately to refute the charge that relativism makes against any absolute answer to problems of science, it will be necessary for us to generalize upon the principal theme and attempt a characterization of experimental methodology. Only by thus determining what constitutes experimental inquiry in general can we hope to define that particular aspect of it which involves the concept of probability.

The reader will be a patient one indeed who has not long since raised in his mind what appear to be pertinent and pressing problems concerning the description of experimental method that has so far been given. These questions are mainly concerned with matters of omission: for example, we have said that if a lack of control is shown, then the image should be changed. But how changed? What principle or method guides the selection of a new image of nature when the old is no longer permissible? Or again, we have said that “observations should be made“. But what is an observation? What principle or method guides the experimenter in deciding which of his activities are observations?

A physical theory intends to provide us with a picture of a certain domain of physical phenomena. We have become accustomed to deal rather with physical pictures than with phenomena themselves. This is indispensable, even if the number of phenomena contained in the picture is so large that we cannot have them in mind all at the same time or if the phenomena are not directly accessible to our senses and cannot be studied without the help of a set of very complicated apparatus.

Anyone who has worked in Science for forty years can be much surprised to realize how little he now hears about evolution, compared with such former times. At present, evolution seems to be accepted as an axiomatic or universal principle, while the mechanism of it is not much considered, except by a small group of specialists, who work on the subject in greatly limited ways. This is practically a reversal of the former emphasis. The chemist would probably suggest that the change is due to a better realization of the chemical difficulties involved in the mechanics of evolution, and his own change in viewpoint. The chemical difficulties will have increased to an almost incredible degree in this period, and his viewpoint will have changed correspondingly. A glance at some of these changes should illuminate the progress made in both subjects in this period.

In this paper a theory relating to the causal factors operative in the origin of living systems is presented.

Let us consider living forms as material systems exhibiting, in addition to those properties held in common with all matter, systemic properties of a specific nature. If, then, the matter of the earth is classified from this standpoint, it is found that these systems are distributed only over the surface of the earth or in a shallow upper layer. This fact indicates that the special properties of these systems are related in some manner to factors introduced at the surface and not operative elsewhere.

1. Introduction: the three parts of the essay: (I) reply to criticism of attempts at esthetic measure, (II) a glance at the pioneers, and (III) the development of a new approach.

In the article referred to in the title of this note, Winthrop quotes a paragraph from a recent article by me with italics inserted by him, and then proceeds to “translate” it into the language of an economic theory. Winthrop thoughtfully adds in a following paragraph the phrase, “… if I have not mistranslated him [Hull] into marginal terms.” The purpose of the present note is to correct what appears to have been a fundamental misunderstanding of the meaning of the passage, rather than an error of translation; at all events, it is only with the original meaning of the passage that this note is concerned. The paragraph as it originally appeared is as follows (p. 135) :

“Economic value in one of its more obvious and primitive aspects involves the exchange of an amount of commodity X possessed by person No. 1 for an amount of commodity Y possessed by person No. 2. This type of behavior can come about voluntarily and continuously only on the condition that person No. 1 has a striving potential for Y which is greater than would be his striving potential for X when he no longer has X; and when person No. 2 has a striving potential for X which is greater than would be that for Y when he no longer has Y. Thus the total striving potential of both persons is reduced by the transaction.”

In recent issues of the Journal of Philosophy John Dewey and Arthur Bentley have been making an attack on certain logical positivists and other logicians on the ground, of all things, that they display amazing contempt for clear and consistent definition of the terms they use. That logicians, whose business it is to define consistency, should themselves be inconsistent in the use of their basic terms is not really so surprising. It may merely prove them to be human, the victims of a simple failure to practice what they preach. If this were the case, the situation would not be so bad, for who better than a drunkard knows the evils of drink? And yet it is equally human to require preacher to be practitioner as well. So that the spankings which Bentley and Dewey are currently administering to Carnap, Cohen, Nagel, Ducasse, Lewis and Morris are quite in order. In fact in the case of the logical positivists they are long overdue. Carnap, particularly, has long outraged patience as well as common sense with rambling verbal analysis of the meaning of terms used in the exposition of logical positivism.

The literature of economic theory, like that of philosophy, abounds in prefaces and prolegomena. Methodology and analysis of concepts take an important place in a science which has not found the sure path of development. But there is no sure path for methodology either. The selfconscious methodology of social science has been largely a borrowing from that of physical science, where procedures have developed to a stage of considerable maturity. But the analogy falls down where guidance is most needed, at the points where social science is most likely to develop new concepts and new types of structure. Philosophers have not been lacking, indeed, to belittle the entire enterprise, and to deny the possibility of anything that could strictly be called social science.