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II. Postulates of Experimental Method

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

C. W. Churchman
C. W. Churchman*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
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Extract

In order adequately to refute the charge that relativism makes against any absolute answer to problems of science, it will be necessary for us to generalize upon the principal theme and attempt a characterization of experimental methodology. Only by thus determining what constitutes experimental inquiry in general can we hope to define that particular aspect of it which involves the concept of probability.

Type
Probability Theory
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 12 , Issue 3 , July 1945 , pp. 158 - 164
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1945

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References

Notes

1 See “On the Problem of the Most Efficient Tests of Statistical Hypotheses“, Philos. Trans. Roy. Soc. London, vol. 231, pp. 289ff., and Statistical Research Memoirs, vols. I and II. See also Wald, On the Principles of Statistical Inference, Notre Dame, 1942.

2 Thus a careless formulation of Heisenberg's principle might lead one to infer an indeterminacy in nature that was not at all inherent in its intent.