This article focuses on the approaches and challenges to Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Accommodation of Kurdish rights via autonomy arrangements has a long history as an idea but negotiating actual autonomy agreements was often a fruitless task. However, the weakening of state power in Iraq since 1991 and in Syria since 2011 has created opportunities for Kurdish movements in these states to develop and consolidate their autonomous administrations. Consequently, in recent years, the debate on Kurdish autonomy in the Middle East has taken center stage in the regional political discourse. This article first discusses the literature on approaches to autonomy to set out the main models and assess their strengths and weaknesses. It then provides accounts of the models of autonomy that are either practiced or proposed by Kurdish actors or entities in Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. The final section assesses the ability and suitability of the proposed or practiced models for the accommodation of Kurdish rights and demands and develops insights into how the current difficulties preventing the accommodation of Kurdish rights in the Middle East may be overcome.

Ethnic territorial autonomy (ETA) is an institutional way to ensure simultaneously the integrity of the state and the rights of ethnic minorities through preferential policies in certain ethnically sensitive spheres. Language preferential policies differ greatly across multilingual ETAs and can be analyzed through the concept of “language territorial regime” (LTR). In this paper, we examine LTRs along two dimensions: (1) the scope of state regulation of language use and (2) the way language rights are perceived and used. The first considers the depth and universality of state regulation of language use – “strong” or “weak.” The second concerns whether the community's approach to language rights is symbolic or pragmatic. The combination of these two dimensions allows the categorization of LTRs into four main classes: “strong parting-regime,” “strong pooling-regime,” “weak pooling-regime,” and “weak parting-regime.” A comparison of South Tyrol, Vojvodina, and Wales allows conceptualizing LTR as a system of de jure institutional arrangements of linguistic issues and practice of self-organization and perpetuation of multilingual communities.

This article argues that post-Soviet mayors are foreign policy actors that deserve more attention from area studies and foreign policy analysis scholars. Mayors have their own diplomatic preferences and goals – rooted in geopolitical and ethnonationalist views – that they can enact using city hall institutions and networks. They can work either in harmony or in opposition with central authorities by bolstering or compromising the executive’s diplomatic goals and actions. These claims are explored in a case study of the foreign policy of Chișinău mayor Dorin Chirtoacă (2007–2017), whose diplomatic endeavors consolidated the Moldovan capital’s ties with Romania and the European Union and minimized interactions with countries in the former Soviet Union, including Russia. At times, the mayor’s actions abroad ran afoul of central authorities as he created an alternative foreign policy that undermined central foreign policy. The findings suggest that a more extensive investigation of how mayors interact with foreign actors would refine our understanding of foreign policy-making in the former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe more broadly.

There is a sizable Kazakh diaspora living in Turkey and Europe. Since their initial migration, these Kazakhs have been involved in actions aiming to preserve their group's cultural and ethnic boundaries. By studying these actions and related discourses, this article seeks to explain how these groups formulated and reformulated their identities and loyalties in their host states over generations. Many Kazakhs in Turkey and Europe originally came from Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang) and considered this area their homeland. However, Kazakhstan's independence in 1991 led to an important change in their homeland orientation and, after 1991, the activities of an increasing number of Kazakh diaspora organizations shifted toward Kazakhstan as the homeland. Therefore, this article focuses mainly on two periods: the period before and the period after Kazakhstan's independence. The fieldwork was conducted in Turkey, Germany, France, and the Netherlands and includes interviews with leaders of Kazakh diaspora organizations and other members of the diaspora.

Imagine all history written as if all people, even women, mattered. Until a couple of decades ago, that was at most an aspiration for those of us working on East European history. Since then, however, and especially with the fall of Communism, feminist scholars have made significant inroads toward achieving this goal. This review essay reflects on the contributions made by five such studies that focus on different aspects of women's lives under state socialism in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland, and Romania. In one way or another, each author asks similar questions about the relationship between the Communist ideological emphasis on gender equality as a core moral value, on the one hand, and the policies and actions of these regimes with regard to women, on the other hand. Moreover, all studies focus on how women themselves participated in articulating, reacting to, and in some cases successfully challenging these policies. In short, they present us with excellent examples of how pertinent gender analysis is for understanding the most essential aspects of the history of Communism in Eastern Europe: how this authoritarian regime transformed individual identity and social relations.

John Stuart Mill claims that free institutions are next to impossible in a multinational state. According to Will Kymlicka, this leads him to embrace policies kindred to those of Friedrich Engels, aimed at promoting mononational states in Europe through coercive assimilation. Given Mill’s harm principle, such coercive assimilation would have to be justified either paternalistically, in terms of its civilizing effects upon the would-be assimilated, or non-paternalistically, with reference to the danger that their non-assimilation would pose to others. However, neither possible interpretation is plausible; Mill takes Europe’s civilized status to shield Europeans from paternalistic coercion, and he opposes coercive assimilation where it could conceivably be justified in the name of defense. Although this much suggests that Kymlicka misinterprets Mill by ignoring his definition of nationality, it leaves scope for Kymlicka to argue that Mill favors policies that promote mononationality through neglecting the languages and cultures of national minorities.

Based on statistical sources, this paper examines to what extent citizens of the most advanced provincial cities in fin-de-siècle Hungary were multilingual. I argue that multilingualism was a far less present phenomenon than scholarship suggests. The exact features of multilingualism were closely connected to the local social relations (religion, gender, etc.) and market of languages. The growing nationalism promoted by the Hungarian government and the expansion of Magyar public space had an ambiguous impact on multilingualism, depending on the local society.

Although the repression and elimination of Roma from Hungarian society in the 1940s did not reach the same extent as in the German and Austrian part of the Third Reich, their characterization as lazy and work-shy, used to justify their persecution, was similar. This paper establishes the presence of racial hygienic discourse related to Roma during the late 1930s and the first half of the 1940s in Hungary, and traces its survival and influence on regional policy-making in the postwar period. It furthermore explores the transformation and adaptation of racism and eugenics to the socialist ideology of equality based on citizens' participation in productive work in the early state socialist period, including the first Party declaration on the situation of Roma in Hungary in 1961. Specific attention is paid to the role of medical experts who discussed the “radical solution of the Gypsy-question” in the early 1940s and the immediate years following World War II. Reflecting on wider transformations of racism in the postcolonial and post-World War II period in Europe and North America, the paper contributes to scholarship that complicates the evaluation of the state socialist past, including the connection between medicine and politics in Cold War Europe.

This article reviews three recent books on nationalism, each focusing on a different aspect of this multifaceted phenomenon. Mylonas and Radnitz’s volume explores the relationships between nationalism and the politics of treason, Hadžidedic’s book zooms in on the historical interdependence of capitalism and nationalism, while Maxwell’s historical monograph explores nationalist habitus as a form of lived experience. These three insightful contributions show the diversity and plasticity of nationalist ideology and practice.

This article attempts to explore the link between education and democracy. Education is supposed to serve as a unifying factor and socialization agent among citizens of a state; teaching them who they are and what their country expects of them. The role of the educational system is important for the state in building a civic identity and patriotism among students. In Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), students complete a “Democracy and Human Rights” civics education course in primary and secondary schools; however, the current pedagogical implementation of instilling a civic identity is low, with little attention paid to civic identity promotion. This article examines the notions of civic pride and education among high school seniors in BiH via statistical analysis of original field data (n=5,749 surveys; 78 high schools in 53 towns). Identity politics and ethnic saliency are explored, with concluding views on the lack of (perceived) rights among the Croat student population. Cross-cutting cleavages and interpersonal trust are low, with the ethnic promoted over the civic.

In August 1920, the political fate of the Kurdish nation, along with its territory, Kurdistan, were on the line, after the Allies asserted their interest in national rights to self-determination following World War I. Under the Treaty of Sèvres, Kurds were acknowledged as an ethno-political entity in the Wilsonian perspective, yet the ideal of self-determination failed to crystallize as a full legal right to independent nationhood. Thus, Kurdish statehood was annulled. In contrast, the drawing of states’ boundaries in Europe took place mostly along national lines. The result has been an untenable diversity across regions affected by the War in the varieties of self-determination, arguing that some peoples’ nationhood was credited with less legitimacy than others. The departure of imperial powers and subsequently the League of Nations from self-determination for achieving territorial independence came as a result of imperialist world policies to reorder political influence. With the adoption of self-determination as one of the purposes of the UN in 1945, and with the crystallization of self-determination as a legal right in 1966 and the subsequent campaign of decolonization, it could be argued the Kurds’ status was not repositioned and in some way is invisible to the law of self-determination, as applied.

This article offers an overview of myths that may become a foundation of for shared memories of the Ukrainian nation’s past. According to Anthony Smith, common historical myths play a key role in the “ethnic” model of nationhood that constitutes the East European path to building a nation-state. The list of key myths that help constitute the Ukrainian identity includes Cossackdom, freedom, national independence, individualism, and democracy. It is argued that the existing historical myths have to be carefully assessed and adapted to the needs of nation-state building.

In the half century from the Russian annexation of eastern Georgia (Kartli-Kakheti) to the outbreak of the Crimean War, Transcaucasian society underwent a deep and irreversible transformation which, in its effects, was as fundamental a metamorphosis for Armenians and Georgians as were the contemporary political and industrial revolutions for “western Europeans. Whether the move into the Russian orbit was “progressive,” as Soviet historians insist, or a fatal perversion of these nations’ natural development, as some nationalists argue, is not really a historical judgement capable of empirical demonstration. What can be shown, however, is that with the Russian occupation a historical process began which rent the fabric of traditional Georgian and Armenian society and produced both new opportunities and loyalties for some and a persistent, if ultimately futile, resistance to centralized bureaucratic rule by others. Responding to that resistance, the tsarist administration enticed the nobility of Georgia into participation in the new order, and at the end of the first fifty years of Russian rule, the once rebellious, semiindependent dynasts of Georgia had been transformed into a service gentry loyal to their new monarch. At the same time, the Armenian merchants and craftsmen of Caucasia's towns benefited from the new security provided by Russian arms and, while competing with privileged Russian traders, oriented themselves away from the Middle East toward Russian and European commerce. In the process they laid the foundation for their own fortunes and future as the leading economic and political element in Russian Georgia. The peasantry of Transcaucasia was forced in the meantime to submit to new exactions as their status became increasingly more similar to that of Russian peasants. And the respective churches of Georgia and Armenia made fundamental and irreversible accommodations to the new political order.

Any society sufficiently cohesive to evolve even the most rudimentary political structure will also, as a matter of course, develop a set of shared concepts about the nature of that society and a justification of its political structure. Scholars usually ascribe the word “Ideology” only to a set of values which is highly abstract, rational, and articulated in the form of theoretical treatises, so that in the modern period liberalism or Marxism is considered as an ideology, but this is not entirely warranted. Medieval states frequently expressed their social and political myths through the medium of ceremonial and symbol, hence the considerable attention to artistic evidence given by the great scholar of medieval political theology Ernst Kantorowicz or by his student Michael Cherniavsky, whose field was Medieval Rus',1 Even in medieval western Europe, but overwhelmingly in medieval Rus', much political thought, like our current symbolic respect for the “flag,” was expressed in extremely laconic terms. Phrases, concepts, and titles served in lieu largely of theoretical treatises, and ideologues demonstrated their creativity and originality in the manipulation of these phrases, concepts, and titles, not the elaboration of intellectual definitions of their significance. Such definitions were superfluous to contemporaries who all understood the shared vocabulary of political discourse, what we might call a political culture, but their absence compels the modern-day historian to rely upon his informed imagination to decode such social and political myths in order to establish their intended meanings. This is not to imply that modern political ideologies lack overarching myths. Indeed the very opposite is exactly the case; in Russian history the myth of the “people” (narod) in Populist thought and the myths of the proletariat or (later) the Party in Marxist/Bolshevik writings spring readily to mind. The lack of elaborate theoretical discussions of comparable myths in pre-Petrine history inevitably requires different methods of study from those one can apply to subsequent centuries.

Applying a historical institutionalist theoretical perspective to the ethnic minority policy domain, the article attempts to explain why state policies toward minorities may be difficult to reverse once introduced. Focusing on a case study of the cultural status of the Vojvodina Hungarian minority in Serbia, the article attempts to find out the forms taken by self-reinforcing dynamics associated with minority-related policies, once they are de-institutionalized. The paper deals with the evolution of the concept of Hungarian cultural autonomy in Vojvodina in the context of the transition from the socialist framework of minority rights protection, applied in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina under the 1974 Constitution, to the system established by the Law on National Councils of National Minorities and the Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina adopted in 2009, after the interim period of state centralization in the 1990s. The Vojvodina case study exemplifies the costs faced by governments aspiring to reverse these policies and allows the identification of path-dependent factors behind the collective action processes related to the main principles of these policies, and conditions that allow these principles to outlive the abolishment of respective institutional arrangements, persist across radical political and social changes over time, and re-emerge at later historical stages, in new institutional settings.

This article is an attempt to explore the territoriality of languages in the context of ethno-national mobilizations. It maps the transnational interplay between linguistic spaces that overlap national frameworks. This makes it possible to scrutinize the horizontal and vertical differentiation processes that contribute to the definition of a distinctive literary field. In order to study these processes, we favor a strong empirical anchorage by referring to the notion of transnational historical space, defined as a configuration which covers both spatial and temporal dimensions, bringing territories into contact and linking various temporalities. Our case presents a large geographic space formed by Turkey, the Republic of Azerbaijan, and Iranian Azerbaijan. This unusual scale of analysis helps in understanding how ethnic entrepreneurs can capitalize symbolic resources in their strategies to make their ethnic idiom into a national language and to invest the political field with ethnonational claims.

Every nation has its own history and its own way to create civic culture. The problem of civil society in Estonia is rather specific being first and foremost related to the nation's cultural development and only then with its political development. The restoration of civil society in Estonia from 1987 to 1988 is based on our own historical experience of civil initiative rather than the example of the other post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe.

How can one understand the phenomenon known as “ethnic violence?” Does subsuming events under the category “ethnic violence” assist our understanding or does it obscure it? Are there lessons that the form ethnic violence takes can teach us? These questions are important not only for anyone interested in the causes and prevention of ethnic violence but also for those who wish to understand group behavior more generally. I explore this question more fully through analysis of the case of the Russian Federation. Russia is a country where in recent times skinhead violence against ethnic minorities has become an important issue. According to Tarasov, Russia contains between 60,000 and 65,000 skinheads active in at least 85 different cities. These skinheads daily commit appalling acts of violence against members of ethnic minorities and human rights activists. Three instances of violence all from the year 2006 help to illustrate some of their activities.

Troeshchyna is a down-at-the-heels late Soviet moonscape that happens to be located on the fringe of Kyiv, though it is indistinguishable from hundreds of other socialist neighborhoods built in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s anywhere between Berlin and Beijing. This Brezhnev-era district has almost no distinguishing features other than the Ukrainian capital's most robust and scraggly markets. Walk by one of Troeshchyna's neighborhood elementary schools, such as School 247, and something looks not quite appropriate for this part of the world. The school's playground will be chock full of kids from countries and cultures not traditionally associated with the central Dniepr, including children from Afghanistan, Angola, Korea, Mongolia and Vietnam.