An Ethnic Security Dilemma in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Civic Pride and Civics Education

Abstract

This article attempts to explore the link between education and democracy. Education is supposed to serve as a unifying factor and socialization agent among citizens of a state; teaching them who they are and what their country expects of them. The role of the educational system is important for the state in building a civic identity and patriotism among students. In Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), students complete a “Democracy and Human Rights” civics education course in primary and secondary schools; however, the current pedagogical implementation of instilling a civic identity is low, with little attention paid to civic identity promotion. This article examines the notions of civic pride and education among high school seniors in BiH via statistical analysis of original field data (n=5,749 surveys; 78 high schools in 53 towns). Identity politics and ethnic saliency are explored, with concluding views on the lack of (perceived) rights among the Croat student population. Cross-cutting cleavages and interpersonal trust are low, with the ethnic promoted over the civic.

In order to understand ethnic saliency and civic pride in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), an overview of the educational system must be put forth. Understanding the complex ethnically-based educational systems shows how the civic identity is disregarded in favor of the ethnic identity. The current educational system in BiH is highly decentralized and came about via the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (better known as the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords) ¹ and the 1994 Washington Agreement. Torsti (2009, 67) puts the blame squarely where it belongs, stating that: “[t]he Dayton Peace Agreement institutionalized the war-time educational division.” It failed in addressing primary and secondary education issues – that is, the educational system played a secondary role in the peace treaty (Pingel 2009, 258). The consequences of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords and the decentralized educational systems is that educational policy is left in the hands of ethnonationalist parties who wish to cement the ethnic cleansing that took place during the 1992–1995 war; indeed, since authority for creating and implementing educational policy was given to the individual cantons under the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Section III Article 4.b), the cantons have “ … organized their individual school systems according to national dividing lines” (Bartulović 2006, 54), thus giving rise to what Swimelar (2012) terms a “societal security dilemma.”

In BiH, there are three truths and three official versions of history. In her analysis of how the 1992–1995 Bosnian War is represented in the primary and secondary school history textbooks used in Republika Srpska, ² Bartulović (2006, 64) finds that the message portrayed is that “ … new conflicts will erupt sooner or later, since Serbs are separated from their fatherland and are being forced to sacrifice the unity of their nation ….” This underscores the concept of nationalism as a political theory of legitimacy, where political state borders should not cut across ethnic ones (Gellner 1983, 1) and that all people of a certain nation should live in the same nation-state. Anzulović (1999) notes that sacrifice through suffering has also been a historically important aspect for the Serbs; this harkens back to the sacrifice of Serbian Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović at the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje and the birth of the Kosovo Myth. In another analysis of history textbooks in BiH (Bosniak, Croat, and Serb), Baranović (2001, 24) found that these textbooks contribute “ … to the creation of a closed, ethnocentric identity of children, rather than to an identity open to diversity ….” This ethnocentric focus was most predominant in the Croat history textbooks, followed by the Serbian and Bosniak books (Baranović 2001, 24).

The country has three ethnonational curricula, ³ based on language: the Bosnian National Plan and Program (B-NPP), Croatian National Plan and Program (H-NPP), and the Serbian National Plan and Program (S-NPP). Within the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a separate, unified curriculum is used (students are segregated, however, in “mother tongue” language classes). BiH also has seven Catholic high schools and six madrassas. In this article, I refer to the B-NPP as the Bosniak curriculum for clarity purposes. Catholic schools are included in this study but madrassas are not. ⁴

Literature Review

Having an identity is an important aspect of being human; Erikson (1968, 130) states that “ … in the social jungle of human existence there is no feeling of being alive without a sense of identity.” According to Phinney (1996, 143), the study of ethnic identity emphasizes how individual group members understand and interpret their own identity. Ethnic saliency refers to how important their ethnic identity is to them (Roberts et al. 1999). According to identity formation theory, ethnic saliency is the outcome of ethnic identity search (Phinney 1993). From the perspective of social psychology, ethnic identity is a part of social identity, which Tajfel (1981, 255) defines as “ … that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.” Related to the idea of identity being a self-concept, Marcia (1980, 159) argues that identity is a “self-structure,” defined as being “ … an internal, self-constructed, dynamic organization of drives, abilities, beliefs, and individual history.”

The concept and process of identity formation does not begin or end during adolescence, but adolescence is a time period that is much more critical than other periods of life for identity formation (Marcia 1980, 160). Identity formation in adolescence may be influenced by a number of socialization agents, such as the mass media (Zaller 1996), families (Bringa 1995, 84; Erikson 1968), and schools (Ehman 1980; Gellner 1983, 34; Roper 2005; Torsti 2007). The process in which all of this occurs is known as “ethnic socialization,” which refers to the manner in which young people “ … acquire the behaviors, perceptions, values, and attitudes of an ethnic group, and come to see themselves and others as members of such groups” (Rotheram and Phinney 1987, 11). Anderson (2006) refers to such a group, the nation, as an “imagined community.”

School education is supposed to serve as a unifying factor and socialization agent among citizens of a state, teaching them who they are (e.g., national identity; Bartulović 2006) and what their country expects of them (e.g., civic duties of the citizen; Baranović 2001; Oder 2005). The role of the educational system is important for the state in building an identity and patriotism among students. ⁵ Schools also affect conceptualization of student identity because school education is a central form of political and ethnic socialization for young people (Roper 2005, 503; Torsti 2007, 92), and schools in postwar societies serve as a particularly strong socialization agent (Ajduković and Biruški 2008). In the context of the Soviet nationalities policy, Gorenburg (2001, 74) states that “[b]y establishing separate systems of native language education for most of the minority ethnic groups that had their own ethno-territorial administrative units, the Soviet government in effect created an institution dedicated to instilling a common and separate identity among the students.” Wertsch (2000) and Worden (2014) argue the opposite of Gorenburg (2001), claiming that the role of schools is limited as a vehicle of socialization in the Soviet and post-Soviet contexts.

When schools become divided along ethnic lines, such as in BiH, children have limited opportunity to meet and have contact with others across the ethnic divide. In such circumstances, students are socialized to not interact with the “other;” this therefore prevents inter-cultural contact from occurring ⁶ in such schools, as first put forth by Allport (1958). In postwar ethnically divided communities, such as in Vukovar, Croatia, the “ … children grow up within a context loaded with social signs saying the community wants you to stay within your own ethnic group” (Ajduković and Biruški 2008, 340). Indeed, the central concept of socialization theory is that educational institutions transmit norms, values, and models of behavior which are considered appropriate in a given society. Niemi and Hepburn (1995, 6) argue that the high school years should hold great interest for political scientists in particular, because “ … it is then that society makes the most explicit and concentrated effort to teach political knowledge and civic values.” Quaynor (2012, 33; 40–41) explores trends in post-conflict citizenship education, where four broad trends were found: “ … avoidance of controversial issues, the unique role of ethnicity, a lack of trust in political parties, and authoritarianism.”

In newly democratizing states, the automatic transmission of democratic ideals, which is taken for granted in the United States, cannot be taken for granted in societies that are in transition; for as Niemi and Hepburn (1995, 9) state: “…it cannot be readily assumed that education institutions or families will teach the appropriate knowledge and values” necessary to support a democratic polity. ⁷ In post-conflict societies, schools serve as “ … a site in which the politics of accountability and acknowledgment are played out,” whereby they teach “ … the history that led up to the conflict” (Sivac-Bryant 2008, 107, 115). In the case of the emerging democracies of postcommunist Eastern Europe and the Balkans, an understanding of the political socialization process can be done by examining the textbooks used in such classes as civics, history, and even geography – where the pedagogy used is part of the socialization process. Nationalist discourse may be found in the classrooms, where students are taught in an ethno-centric environment (Baranović 2001; Bartulović 2006; Korostelina 2010; Murgescu 2002, 92, 96–97). Understanding the impact of schools is especially important in BiH, since the country has three truths and three official versions of history, based on ethnicity. ⁸

Outside of the formal classroom, McFarland and Thomas (2006, 412, 418, 421) find that four specific high school extra-curricular associations are politically salient in encouraging political participation as adults, even seven to twelve years after high school graduation: student government (SGA), community service organizations, performing arts (debate club, drama club, or music), and religious organizations. Youniss et al. (1997, 629) also find that American students who participated in high school government are put “ … on a developmental path toward constructive citizenship.” Those who were SGA members were more likely to become members of civic organizations compared to those who were not involved in high school governance (Youniss et al. 1997, 620). This is because these students, along with those who participated in civic community service projects, observe that “ … their individual and collective actions make a difference by producing effects that have an impact on the high school and wider local community” (Youniss et al. 1997, 624). Hanks and Eckland (1978) found that participation in high school government or some other extra-curricular activity in high school was the strongest predictor of adult membership in civic associations.

In his study of regional governments in Italy, Putnam (1993) found that 19th century civic traditions (if present), served as powerful predictors of 20th century effective, representative government at the regional level. He found that in order for democracy to work, the establishment of social capital is necessary (Putnam 1993, 185); where individuals do not possess the virtues or character of the vita civile, republics cannot be sustained (Putnam 1993, 132). Alexis de Tocqueville made a similar observation in regards to what makes democracy work in America at its founding: civic associationalism. For de Tocqueville, it was the robustness of civil society in America that allowed for republican, representative democracy to succeed in the U.S., while failing in his native France and the rest of Europe at the time. It is through civil society that social capital is built and sustained. In the 1830s, he observed that:

Americans of all ages, all conditions, all minds constantly unite. Not only do they have commercial and industrial associations in which all take part, but they also have a thousand other kinds: religious, moral, grave, futile, very general and very particular, immense and very small … (de Tocqueville 2000, 489).

The social and political implications of this civic-ness relate to the institutionalization of strong democratic governance and civil society, where the causal arrow points in both directions: civic culture and democracy support and build off of one another. Inglehart (1990, 22–25) finds similar support for the notion of civil society and democracy, drawing a relationship with the emergence of a “civic political culture” and interpersonal trust. The idea of the civic culture is thus: individuals in a society must be able to trust one another, which allows them to form civic organizations, which eventually leads to democracy (Almond and Verba 1989).

In regards to civil society in postcommunist states, organizational membership is consistently lower compared to other states due to a mistrust of communist organizations ⁹ as well as general disappointment in the postcommunist systems (Howard 2002). In the context of BiH, Perry (2009, 40) argues that civil society has not been able to take root because “ … voters make ballot choices not based on whether one party or another is making improvements in their lives but based solely on fear driven by nationalist party campaigning.” For Belloni (2001, 173) this is due to the fact that politics in BiH is constitutionally based on ethnicity; when this is the case, “ … civil society tends to have little ability to influence events on the political level or to invoke a change toward multi-ethnicity and tolerance.” A weak postcommunist civil society does not, however, mean that democracy is in danger (Howard 2002). In an empirical study conducted in May 1999 on civics education and the Project Citizen (Projekat građanin / Ja građanin) program ¹⁰ in BiH, Soule (2000, 19) found that students who participated in Project Citizen had greater political tolerance compared to students who did not participate in the program. Participation in Project Citizen also “ … positively affects skills and knowledge, and, to a lesser extent, attitudes and values that are supportive of democracy” (Soule 2000, 19).

In another study conducted in September 2000 and April 2001 in four cantons (two majority Bosniak and two majority Croat), Soule (2002, 21) found participation in Project Citizen made students more interested in politics compared to those who did not participate in the program. These findings provide some hope for BiH, but according to the most recent data on interpersonal trust in BiH, derived from the “European Values Study / World Values Survey 2017-2021 Report” (EVS/WVS 2017–2021 Report), it was found that only 9.6% of BiH citizens believed “most people could be trusted” (EVS/WVS 2017–2021, 172). Prior to the Joint EVS/WVS 2017–2021 Survey, the second-most recent data came from the 1999–2004 World Values Survey (Wave 4); in Wave 4, it was found that only 15.6% of BiH citizens believed “most people can be trusted” (WVS 1999–2004 Survey, 22). A lack of interpersonal trust, low social capital, and politics rooted in ethnicity may lead one to conclude that civic pride would be low among high school students in BiH. The exception would be among Bosniaks and self-identifying Bosnians, since they view BiH as their “homeland” and do not have an external “parent state” or “external homeland” to turn to.

Data and Methodology

Data was gathered via field surveys of high school seniors in BiH during the 2012–2013 academic year, using the Revised Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (Roberts et al. 1999; see endnote 15). Students were given the survey and answered the questions in class. The surveys were written in the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian languages. ¹¹ A total of 5,749 paper surveys were conducted at 78 high schools in 53 cities and towns across the country. The selection of cities and towns was based on a non-probability sampling approach. Within the Federation of BiH, a total of 4,288 surveys were gathered; in Republika Srpska, a total of 1,149 surveys were gathered; and in the Brčko District of BiH, a total of 312 surveys were gathered. In regards to the three national curricula, 36 surveyed schools operated on the Bosniak curriculum, 24 on the Croatian curriculum, and 13 on the Serbian curriculum. Three schools in Brčko and four Catholic high schools ¹² were surveyed as well. In this study, females constituted 61.78% of the population and males constituted 38.21%. Females constituted the majority in both urban and rural schools (61.92% and 60.10%, respectively; fieldwork by Becker 2015.

Student responses to two questions are the focus of this article. The first question asked the student was “How proud are you to be a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina?” Students had the following response options: (1) not at all proud, (2) not very proud, (3) quite proud, or (4) very proud. The mean BiH civic pride score ¹³ among students who self-identified as Bosniak (Sunni Muslim), Croat (Roman Catholic), Serb (Serbian Orthodox), or Bosnian (civic identity) is 2.67 (n=5,305). The second response question was student national self-identification, in which they were asked to provide the national self-identification of themselves and of their parents. Students were given the following response options: (1) Bosniak, (2) Croat, (3) Serb, (4) Bosnian, (5) Roma, or (6) Other. If respondents chose “Other,” they had the option to write in a national or ethnic group of their choice. For schools in the Brčko District of BiH, it was required to modify possible self-identification responses by the Brčko District of BiH Department of Education in order to carry out the survey in their schools. ¹⁴ This article focuses on students who self-identified as being either Bosniak, Croat, Serb, or Bosnian.

H1: Increased ethnic saliency will decrease civic pride among Croat and Serb students.

H2: Increased ethnic saliency will increase civic pride among Bosniak and Bosnian students.

Stata 12.1 was used to conduct four Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions, with Bosnian-Herzegovinian civic pride (BiH Pride) as the dependent variable. The independent variable “ethnic saliency” is derived from the “affirmation, belonging, and commitment” subscale factor of the Revised Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (Roberts et al. 1999). ¹⁵ The independent variables are ethnic saliency, whether or not the school is located in an urban or rural area (Urban), and student gender (Male). See Table 1 for the results of the regressions. Please see the Appendix for the survey items. My models are:

Model 1a (Bosniak): BiH Pride = Ethnic saliency + Male +Urban

Model 1b (Croat): BiH Pride = Ethnic saliency + Male + Urban

Model 1c (Serb): BiH Pride = Ethnic saliency + Male + Urban

Model 1d (Bosnian): BiH Pride = Ethnic saliency + Male + Urban

Table 1. Civic Pride among High School Students in Bosnia and Herzegovina

(Standard errors in parentheses)

+p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Results

In BiH, schools put forth an ethno-centric (Bosniak, Croat, or Serb) focus; since BiH is viewed as the Bosniak homeland, their education emphasizes the Bosnian state, whereas Croat and Serb education emphasizes either Croatia or Serbia as their respective homelands through the National Group of Subjects (Baranović, 2001, 24; Bartulović, 2006, 64). Due to this, a general negative outlook on BiH civic pride among Serbs was expected due to the anti-BiH sentiment within the Serb curriculum (Bartulović 2006) as well as the general political discourse within Republika Srpska. ¹⁶ In the case of the Bosniak curriculum, a general positive outlook on civic pride was expected due to its pro-BiH sentiment. Although nationality and school curricula are highly correlated, the author found that Serbs who study on the Bosniak curriculum had statistically significant, lower ethnic saliency scores in comparison to their co-ethnics on the Serbian curriculum (that is, studying on a “non-appropriate” curriculum). Given those findings, the results of this study present a quite unexpected result: as Serb ethnic saliency increases, so does their BiH civic pride in a statistically significant manner (p < 0.01). The same holds true for Croats. Hypothesis 1 must be rejected. The Croat situation potentially could be explained by the fact that in the case of Croats from Bosnia-proper, they have historically been supporters of a unified Bosnian state – unlike the Croats of Herzegovina (Tanner 2001, 285). The statistical results among Bosniaks and Bosnians are not surprising: increased civic pride is statistically related to high ethnic saliency (p < 0.001). Hypothesis 2 may be accepted.

One self-identifying Croat student from Posušje (located in West Herzegovina Canton) explained in an unsolicited message (written in Croatian) why she was not proud to be a citizen of BiH:

Uopće nisam ponosna, al’ niti malo. Jer je položaj Hrvata nebitan, nemamo nikakva prava. Ima nas samo 17%, te smo manjina. To bi se trebalo promijeniti da imamo neka prava i da donosimo bitne odluke u državi – HERCEGOVINA.

[I am not proud at all, not even a little. This is because the position of Croats (in this country) is irrelevant; we do not have any rights. At only 17% of the population, we are a minority. This needs to be changed so that we can have some rights and bring about essential decisions in the state – HERZEGOVINA.]

This view expresses a sentiment amongst the Croats of Herzegovina that they are outvoted by the numerically superior Bosniaks within the Federation of BiH. This perception is also a reality, as may be seen through the election and re-election of Željko Komšić.

The country has three presidents, one from each constituent people. ¹⁷ The election of Željko Komšić to the Croat post of the tripartiate presidency (2006–2010; 2010–2014; 2018–2022) was viewed as illegitimate in all three election cycles because he received most of his electoral votes from Bosniak-majority municipalities and/or cantons with little to no support from Croat-majority municipalities/cantons: ¹⁸ for nationalist Croats, this was electoral fraud (Croat-majority cantons are located in the region of Herzegovina, with the exception of Posavina Canton – which comprises only two municipalities in the northeast of BiH). This has led to increased calls for a third, Croat-dominated entity to “guarantee” the electoral rights of the Croatian people. Bakir Izetbegović (a Bosniak) stated in 2018 – while he was the Bosniak member of the tripartite presidency – that Croats “cannot get a third entity in Bosnia without a war” (as cited in Lakić 2018, 1). A Croat entity would be in the interest of the nationalist leadership in Republika Srpska (led by Milorad Dodik, the current Serb member of the tripartite presidency and former prime minister of Republika Srpska), whose secessionist rhetoric would increase, claiming the Bosnian state is not viable. ¹⁹ Serb support for the nationalist Croat parties would drive a deeper wedge between the Croats and Bosniaks within the Federation of BiH as well.

Ethnic saliency is an emotional attachment to one’s own ethnic group. The ethnic is promoted over the civic in the BiH educational system. There is no statistically significant difference in mean ethnic saliency scores ²⁰ among Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. The paradox, then, is that although an increase in ethnic saliency statistically increases BiH civic pride among Serbs, their mean civic pride score is noticeably lower in comparison to the other two constituent peoples: 1.88 (Serb); 2.24 (Croat); 3.36 (Bosniak). Self-identifying Bosnians have a civic pride score of 3.13. Although civic pride “increases,” it does not have an emotional effect towards the state of BiH. That is, although higher ethnic saliency (an emotional attachment to one’s own ethnic group) correlates to a higher civic pride score, civic pride amongst the Serbs is abysmally low.

The effect of student gender was not a focus of this research, but it netted interesting results as a control variable. Student gender played statistically significant roles among Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, but had no effect among self-identifying Bosnians. Female Croats and female Serbs had a statistically significant (p < 0.001), higher civic pride score compared to their male co-ethnics. Among Bosniaks, the opposite occurred: male Bosniaks have statistically significant (p < 0.001), higher civic pride scores in comparison to their female co-ethnics. The role of gender ²¹ and nationalism would be an interesting topic to explore in future research but is beyond the scope of this article. The variable Urban only had a statistically significant (p < 0.01) effect among Croats and Serbs, but in an unexpected manner: attending school in a small town / rural area increased civic pride compared to attending school in a large city / urban area. A possible explanation for this is that these areas tend to be more homogenous with less prominent ethno-political divides. See Table 1 for the full regression results.

Along with gender, the role of religious service attendance and religious education in schools on civic pride and nationalist sentiment would be interesting topics to explore in future research. In her qualitative work, Bringa (1995, 79) states that religion and ethnic identity are linked together in BiH; however, I found in previous quantitative research (Becker 2015) that a coupling and de-coupling of religion and ethnonational identity are currently taking place in the country: among Bosniaks and Croats they are coupled, whereas among Serbs and self-identifying Bosnians they are de-coupled.

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

This article attempts to explore the link between education and democracy in a postwar society; it illustrates the complexity of a situation where ethnic identity can assume dominance. The institutionalization of the ethnic over the civic identity is the norm, with no changes in sight. ²² The current pedagogical implementation of instilling a civic identity is lacking in the country, although the Project Citizen program offered through Civitas BiH has helped in fostering tolerance and support for democracy. Formal civics education in BiH must be expanded beyond teaching the general democratic process and current government structures in the country. The notion of a “Bosnian-Herzegovinian” civic identity must be taught as well if the country is to experience true democratic consolidation. This goes beyond revising the current civics course, however; the manner in which other subjects are taught must be changed as well. Instilling a civic identity through teaching a common history should be introduced as well. This would involve revising the current National Group of Subjects (NPP), a matter that is closely tied to ethnic politics and ethnic identity – and constitutionally protected as a vital national interest, thus making it an “ethnic security dilemma.” ²³ The reason education becomes an “ethnic security dilemma” in BiH is because school education is an agent of socialization.

The three national curricula could be sustainable in a positive manner, however, if reconciliation is included in the school learning environment. Indeed, the wider research dataset from which this article draws upon has shown that the divided schooling and ethno-centric lessons do not have the effects that previous qualitative research and “policy experts” from the international community in BiH have claimed; the majority of BiH students are actually willing to interact and be friends with those from a different ethnonational group. ²⁴ This willingness amongst students must be built into interpersonal trust and a civic identity, however, in order for democratic consolidation to truly occur in BiH. Willingness for interaction and friendship is the first step, however. Inglehart (1990, 22–25) also draws a relationship with the emergence of a “civic political culture” and interpersonal trust. Identity is currently a zero-sum game for ethnic elites and is used for nationalist party campaigning (Mujkić and Hulsey 2010). Identity should not be a zero-sum game; indeed, it is possible for citizens to have multiple identities if promoted and taught in schools: civic, ethnic, regional, etc. An example of promoting civic-ness may be seen in the case of the de facto independent, but unrecognized (except by the Republic of Turkey) Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), in which ethno-centric and ethnonationalist history textbooks and lessons were changed to promote civic-ness (a Cypriot “territorial” identity) along with co-existence and reconciliation (Vural and Özuyanık 2008). A similar undertaking in the Republic of Cyprus by the Greek-Cypriots has yet to occur, however (Vural and Özuyanık 2008, 150). The findings of Dembinska (2017) confirm those of Vural and Özuyanık (2008), in that the educational shift allowed for a civic-territorial identity to emerge and co-exist with an ethnic-Turkish identity.

What does the TRNC example mean for BiH? It shows that reconciliation and the promotion of a shared civic identity is possible in a post-conflict society when the proper political will is present. This political will, unfortunately, is not currently present in BiH. Smith (2003, 30) puts it bluntly: “ … the most crucial question that citizenship education must address in a divided society is whether its citizens are committed to integrated development through shared institutions or more disposed towards a form of peaceful coexistence that involves separate development.” The phenomenon of “two schools under one roof” ²⁵ lends itself towards peaceful coexistence rather than integrated development.

Almond and Verba (1989, 372) claim that in order for a new country to establish a civic culture, it “ … needs both the unifying symbols and system affect that the Mexican Revolution has provided, as well as the cognitive skills that exist in Germany. There must be a symbolic event, or symbolic, charismatic leader, or some other means of creating commitment and unity at the symbolic level.” BiH currently lacks a cross-ethnic leader who is popular among the three constituent peoples, and its history is still very much political – viewed through an ethno-centric lens. Even the medieval Bosnian Kingdom cannot serve as a civic rallying point among the three groups at this point.

An expanded Project Citizen program (which was not explored in the original dataset) could help foster a deeper commitment to democratic consolidation and civic-ness, thus creating commitment and unity among the citizenry. Indeed, it has already been found that Project Citizen has positive effects on its participants in comparison to those who do not participate in the program (Soule 2000, 19). A unifying agent or symbol must be implemented. One potential symbol has since been turned into an ethnic one, unfortunately: the fleur de lis, claimed by Bosniaks. Ultimately, the people of BiH must take the initiative for any change they wish to see; the development of a robust civil society with cross-cutting cleavages will be the key to BiH’s democratic consolidation. Unfortunately, BiH must overcome not only the problems of post-communism (Howard 2002) but also post-conflict issues, which has been preventing the implementation of strong civics education (Niens and Chastenay 2008; Quaynor 2012). It is still a society deeply divided along ethnic lines, where identity is viewed as a zero-sum game. Project Citizen can be the foundation for this to occur.

Student involvement in high school governance (SGA) or other high school extra-curricular activities should also be promoted, as these are the strongest predictors of adult membership in civic associations (Hanks and Eckland 1978; McFarland and Thomas 2006; Youniss et al. 1997). Student Government Associations must also go beyond school-related issues and promote cross-community volunteer initiatives, such as joint projects with schools of opposite ethnic groups; in towns where “two schools under one roof” exist, this would be easier to organize since the town itself is not mono-ethnic. Outside of SGA-organized activities, civic groups must also possess cross-cutting cleavages since the majority of schools do not possess multi-ethnic student bodies; otherwise, they only serve the interest of the ethnic over the civic. The citizens of BiH must decide: do they want joint development or separate co-existence with the ever present shadow of three competing ethnic security dilemmas?