This paper seeks to develop a deeper understanding of the role of policy-based reasoning in the determination of duty of care questions. In order to do this, the first part explores the distinction between considerations of interpersonal justice and considerations of community welfare in the determination of duty questions. While imperfect, the distinction illuminates the nature of the factors taken into account by courts in determining duty of care questions and has practical as well as theoretical implications. The second part of the paper analyses the respective roles of interpersonal justice considerations and community welfare considerations in a sample of first instance and intermediate appellate cases from England and Canada. That study suggests that community welfare considerations play a far less significant role in determining duty cases at the first instance and intermediate appellate level than at the ultimate appellate level. Analysis of the cases also reveals significant differences between the English and Canadian courts in their approaches to the interpersonal justice and community welfare aspects of duty of care questions.

It is now well recognised that contractual purposes play an important role in the construction of contracts. The methods by which purposes are taken into account have not, however, been systematically explored. This paper considers three central issues in the purposive construction of contracts: first, the reasons contractual purposes are relevant to the interpretation of express terms and the identification of implied terms; secondly, the way in which contractual purposes are identified and distinguished from individual party interests; and, thirdly, the different ways in which contractual purposes inform the processes of interpretation and implication. It is argued that reference to contractual purposes can both raise and resolve interpretive choices, and that purposive construction plays a significant and under-recognised role in the identification of implied terms.

The concept of home has attracted considerable critical attention in recent decades across a broad range of social science disciplines. Analysis of ‘home meanings’ provides important evidence of the values which people attach to property that they occupy as a home. This evidence could be utilised to argue that home represents a site of special significance, deserving some additional protection in law, over and above other property types. Where such arguments have been considered in English law, the tendency has been to confer special status on the family home rather than on home per se. This article identifies several weaknesses, both practical and conceptual, with the application of ‘family home’ analysis in the context of creditor/occupier disputes. The article proceeds to consider whether ‘family home’ is sufficiently attractive as a central organising concept in policy discourse to outweigh the specific criticisms outlined. An alternative and, it is argued, more desirable solution would be to approach the issue of security of tenure in the owner-occupied home from a more individualistic, rather than family-centric, perspective.

Genetic information is relevant not only to the patient, but also to their family. Where a patient refuses to share that information with family members, then their legal rights may conflict. This paper focuses on that conflict between the rights of individuals and the rights of third parties. We first examine the nature of the duty of confidence as it applies in these circumstances, and the extent to which it can appropriately accommodate the familial nature of genetic information. We then consider the situations in which a healthcare practitioner might owe a third-party family member a tortious duty of care. We conclude that in most cases, there will be no duty owed to third parties, but that in certain limited circumstances, a duty of care should arise.

This paper examines the new statutory regime for paying damages for personal injury by means of periodical payments instead of a lump sum. How are such payments to increase in future to take account of rising care costs, especially when these usually form the largest part of a major award? The answer to this question is crucial in determining the extent that the new form of payment will be used. How periodical payments are to be indexed is also a key factor in calculating the total cost of compensation and, in particular, in assessing the liabilities of the National Health Service. The issue gave rise to litigation which was voted by personal injury practitioners as the most important of the year. Here, that litigation and the statutory reforms which gave rise to it are set in their wider academic contexts.

This paper examines the interplay and tension between housing law and policy and property law, in the specific context of the right to buy (RTB). It focuses on funding arrangements between the RTB tenant and another party. It first examines how courts determine the parties’ respective entitlements in the home, highlighting the difficulty of categorising, under traditional property law principles, a contribution in the form of the statutory discount conferred on the RTB tenant. Secondly, it considers possible exploitation of the RTB scheme, both at the macro level of exploitation of the policy underpinning the legislation and, at the micro level, of exploitation of the tenant. The measures contained in the Housing Act 2004 intended to curb exploitation of the RTB are analysed to determine what can be considered to be legitimate and illegitimate uses of the scheme. It is argued that, despite the government's implicit approval, certain funding arrangements by non-resident relatives fail to give effect to the spirit of the scheme.

Extra-judicial divorces obtainable under some systems of family law are now very familiar to private international lawyers. The most familiar is the Muslim talak, by which a husband may unilaterally divorce his wife, but there are others including other forms of religious divorces and secular divorces obtained by administrative process or simply by mutual agreement. Some of these divorces may be hedged around by legal procedures; others may be extremely informal.

One of the most distinguishing features of an insurance contract (being a contract uberrimae fidei) is that it attracts the duty of disclosure. As it presently stands, this duty unfortunately has drawn such criticism from many quarters for inflicting what is arguably one of the most onerous burdens upon the insured. The irony of the situation is that the original intention of the doctrine, as had been expressed by Lord Mansfield himself in the celebrated eighteenth century case of Carter v Boehm, was for both contractual parties–and not just only the insured–to exercise the utmost good faith in their dealings. However, all through the intervening years, the tide had almost entirely flowed in one direction. There has, hitherto, not really been any case law developing, or even spelling out, the insurer's duty of good faith. On the contrary, landmark cases such as CTI v Oceanus and Lambert v CIS have been only too generous in showering the insurer with so many privileges that from the perspective of the hapless insured the duty becomes almost like ‘an engine of oppression’.

Contemporary criminal justice is premised on a rights-bearing defendant safe-guarded by due process from arbitrary state punishment. The paucity of academic commentary on the role of the criminal defendant suggests that there is a common assumption that the role is static. However, the rights-bearing defendant is a relatively new concept. Through a legal history analysis, this paper demonstrates that the defendant's role can mutate in response to pressures placed on the criminal trial. Broadly, there have been three conceptualisations of the defendant: the penitent Anglo-Norman defendant; the advocate defendant of the jury trial; and the rights-bearing adversarial defendant. Importantly, the shift from one conceptualisation to another has occurred gradually, often without commentary or conscious effort to instigate change. There are many contemporary pressures that could be impacting on the rights-bearing defendant. The concept of a mutable defendant provides a new theory through which to analyse these pressures. This paper considers the introduction of adverse inferences regarding the right to silence and disclosure, and the rise of ‘digilantism’. These new pressures, it is suggested, help to facilitate a rhetoric of deservingness that goes against the rights-bearing defendant and raises the risk its role could once again be mutating.

After years of debate, and pages of parliamentary reports, the House of Commons has agreed in principle to allow the televising of its proceedings, both in the Chamber and in Select Committee hearings.’ The purpose of this article is to consider the application of parliamentary privilege to the broadcasting of Parliament by radio or television. The issue of parliamentary privilege arises because of the absolute privilege’ of freedom of speech for Members, which enables them in the course of ‘proceedings in Parliament’ to say or do something which, had it been said or done elsewhere, could have given rise to civil or criminal liability by the person concerned. Absolute privilege exists because it is of outstanding public importance that Members should be able to speak their minds, and this outweighs any consequential harm that may be suffered by an individual or the State. Examples of the use of the protection of absolute privilege are the making of a statement that appears to be defamatory, and the oral commission of one of a variety of criminal offences.

While it is no doubt possible to subsume many kinds of inquiry under the head of historical jurisprudence one should certainly distinguish between two rather different kinds. First there is the kind that takes a particular legal notion or idea as it becomes crystallised at some point in a country’s legal history and traces its subsequent history in legal thought, investigating its diffusion and influence and assessing its continuing utility. Such an inquiry is concerned only with the facts in the sense of the ascertainment of what has actually happened. It is in no degree speculative; nor does it seek to investigate the relationship between social conditions and legal notions or rely upon any particular theory of social evolution.

In English law, as in many of its common law satellites, the tort of privacy is still a curiously problematic one. Unlike Roman or generally civilian law where there is little doubt that an invasion of privacy is actionable, unlike also American law which in the last 80 years or so has fashioned an ample shield around a person's private sphere, English law has been deeply hesitant about admitting privacy as a civil right. Roman law, we may be surprised to learn, accepted from the very start that rules against personal injury include as well as rights to physical security also rights to feelings of human dignity and self-respect.

Laypeople are often deterred from undertaking altruistic acts, assuming that they face a risk of negligence liability should they injure others while helping. We argue that the laypeople's interpretation of the law does not correspond with the courts’ interpretation of negligence liability. Reviewing the case law, we demonstrate that the courts treat such cases with leniency in the spirit of the Compensation Act 2006, s 1 and the Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act (SARAH) 2015, s 2. Thus, the negligence liability rules do not offer a sufficient explanation for the widely-held opinion that acts of altruism may give rise to liability. We hypothesise that the public's perception of legal rules is determined by a number of well-known biases and is not founded in the law itself. In the light of those biases, we contend that the function of the Compensation Act 2006, s 1 and SARAH 2015 does not lie in the substance but in their value as potential signals to reassure laypeople.

The UK courts and the CJEU have often treated age discrimination as a less serious form of discrimination. This is reflected in the courts’ reluctance to offer rigorous scrutiny when evaluating whether age-differential treatment is objectively justified under anti-discrimination law. Further, a number of judges have asserted that age discrimination must be understood as different to other forms of discrimination, such as race or sex discrimination. This paper argues that age discrimination is not fundamentally different or prima facie less serious than other forms of discrimination. Age discrimination can undermine the same principles that paradigm forms of discrimination also undermine, including: creating inequality of opportunity by disadvantaging people because of a trait that is outside a person's control; undermining social equality by creating a hierarchy of social status between different groups; violating autonomy by diminishing people's capacity to have control over their lives; and communicating disrespect by conveying that particular groups have a diminished moral or social worth. It follows, contrary to the approach of much of the case law, that the courts should offer rigorous scrutiny of age-differential treatment to identify these harms and only permit age distinctions that are strictly tailored to enhance equality or other important values.

In most of the common-law world, legislation provides for damages to be apportioned where the claimant is guilty of contributory negligence. This legislation gives judges considerable latitude to determine the extent to which damages should be diminished for contributory negligence. It imposes what will be called a system of ‘discretionary apportionment’. This paper draws attention to the fact that, although most common-law jurisdictions are, by virtue of their apportionment legislation, in the thrall of the paradigm of discretionary apportionment, there are many, varied departures from this paradigm. This paper classifies these departures (which will be called ‘fixed apportionment rules’), emphasises that they conflict with the apportionment legislation and considers how the conflicts ought to be resolved. An important conclusion reached is that it can plausibly be argued that the landmark decision in Froom v Butcher, at least as it has been understood in subsequent cases, was decided per incuriam. Froom sits uncomfortably with the apportionment legislation. Attention is then turned to the arguments for and against a discretionary system of apportionment as opposed to a system that incorporates more fixed apportionment rules. It is contended that much stands to be gained from introducing more fixed apportionment rules.