It is a familiar principle of the law of extradition that a fugitive should not be surrendered to a requesting State if his alleged offence is of a political character. Yet in recent years this exception to extradition has been the subject of criticism. With the increase in political violence in Europe in the 1970's it was feared that fugitive terrorists might be able to shelter behind the political offence exception. In the United Kingdom some politicians have been particularly disturbed by the application of the political offence exception by the courts of the Republic of Ireland to prevent cxtradition of alleged terrorists.

This article is an attempt to add to our understanding of the map of common law obligations. That there is such a thing is an article of faith among those who believe that the common law is based on reason. Any map does three things: it represents a certain area; it enables us to locate any point on that area by providing us with axes of reference (for example, longitude and latitude) and it identifies certain points on that area as significant. The map of common law obligations covers the set of all possible duties. A duty is located in that set by reference to its pattern (its content) together with its origin (the set offacts sufficient to give rise to that duty). The map of common law obligations identifies all the duties which the common law may give effect to by compelling those who are subject to those duties to comply with them.

This paper has two starting points, one theoretical the other practical. The theoretical starting point is Ronald Dworkin's rights thesis; the practical starting point is the controversial case of Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment. Our concern is to examine the relationship between the rights thesis and public law disputes such as Bushell. We suggest that this examination throws up some important leads as regards the development of a normative theory of adjudication for public law cases.

Sterilisation (vasectomy in the case of the male and tubal ligation or laporoscopy or other variants in the case of the female) is a common method of contraception. It is perceived as having none of the practical and aesthetic disadvantages of ‘mechanical’ methods and none of the health risks associated with oral contraception. It seems to be generally assumed that these procedures are one hundred per cent effective. Indeed, they probably are the most effective methods available, but there are at least two possible sources of failure. First, the procedure may not be performed correctly, though in the case of vasectomy this does not present a very serious problem if, as is normal vasectomy practice in this country, fertility tests are carried out over a fairly extended period before the patient is advised that he may rely upon the operation.

Problems relating to the admixture of goods have arisen in many contexts. An up-to-date example is where the supplier of goods subject to a reservation of title clause lays claim to materials in which the goods supplied have been incorporated. Notwithstanding the practical importance of the subject, the matter has not perhaps attracted the degree of discussion that it deserves. This article attempts to redress the balance somewhat but firstly an effort is made to put terminological inexactitude and imprecision at rest.

It is a fundamental principle that the expectation interest is protected for breach of contract. In protecting this interest, the main choice the law faces is between ordering specific performance and awarding damages. The former orders the defendant to carry out what he promised, whereas the latter gives the plaintiff a monetary substitute for performance. Traditionally, the expectation interest has been primarily protected by awarding damages, and specific performance has been a very secondary remedy.

Although the law relating to common mistake has engendered a plethora of conundrums, many problem areas have in fact been well-traversed in the literature. The present article does not seek to re-cover such welltrodden ground, but attempts, instead, to suggest a different and more systematic approach that would effect a merger of the common law and equitable branches of common mistake into one coherent, doctrine.

This paper explores law school portraits of women in law as a way to challenge the over-representation of men in law. Portraiture is a long-standing means by which professions celebrate worthy individuals and reproduce institutional values. In relation to law and the legal professions, portraits are predominantly of men and link law with masculine attributes, contributing to the visual and actual marginalisation of women in law's past and present. The paper begins by setting out why portraits of women exhibited in UK law schools are an important way to challenge gender inequalities in law. It then provides a snapshot of the gender dimensions of university and law school portraiture in the UK, before analysing the Inspirational Women of the Law exhibition at Newcastle Law School as a method of disrupting the dominant gendered visual order in law, and bringing into focus women in legal history.

One of the enduring features in Irish legal discourse in the postcolonial period is the manner in which the individual body has become a receptacle of contested meaning. In Ireland, with its birth out of a violent trauma based on a philosophy of blood sacrifice, the heroic patriot who dies in the service of his imagined nation is invested with particular symbolic capital and casts a traumatic shadow over discourses on death in Irish society. The nation is always already in the shadow of death, of the deathly apparition of the new nation, made hauntingly manifest in the photos of the dead body of the nationalist hunger striker Terence MacSwiney, as his corpse lay in state in 1920. This body being dead also signals the hope that, in the sacrifice of the individual for the national cause, liberation will one day come. This theme of the primacy of community over individual prefigured the manner in which in postcolonial Irish society the individual body of the citizen was relegated to a secondary position. The attempt to deny or repress death may be analogised with the similar attempt on the part of political elites to create a notion of political identity which is rigid and attempts to keep all those others associated with death and degeneration outside the body politic.

What little empirical work there has been in the field of contract law has revealed that the parties do not always regard the legal enforceability of their agreements as a high priority. Problems arise when this attitude is combined with the use of standard terms by one or both parties. Perhaps the best known example ofthis is the ‘battle ofthe forms standard forms are exchanged with no attention being given to their inconsistencies and it then becomes very difficult to determine which set of terms actually form the basis of the contract. Another problem occurs where the parties have carefully negotiated some part of their contract only to discover, when a dispute arises, that it is inconsistent with the standard terms which were incorporated into the contract and to which neither party had paid much attention. This article is concerned with the problem which occurs when one party has a set ofstandard terms but has introduced them into the transaction after the contract has been concluded.

In a number of high profile disasters, human and financial, in recent years, such as the Piper Alpha oil rig fire and the collapse of the BCCI bank, employees had concerns about the impending disaster but did not raise them for fear of repercussions at work. This has led to increased recognition of the role that employees can play in safeguarding the public interest. In 1998 legislation was finally passed to provide employment protection for employees who raise concerns about malpractice and wrongdoing at work. The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA) provides protection against dismissal and detrimental action where employees make disclosures about a range of specified subjects. Protection is primarily aimed at internal disclosure, but the Act also provides a framework for raising issues externally. This article examines the provisions of the Act and assesses its potential to protect those who risk their livelihoods to raise concerns that are in the public interest.

It is now well recognised that contractual purposes play an important role in the construction of contracts. The methods by which purposes are taken into account have not, however, been systematically explored. This paper considers three central issues in the purposive construction of contracts: first, the reasons contractual purposes are relevant to the interpretation of express terms and the identification of implied terms; secondly, the way in which contractual purposes are identified and distinguished from individual party interests; and, thirdly, the different ways in which contractual purposes inform the processes of interpretation and implication. It is argued that reference to contractual purposes can both raise and resolve interpretive choices, and that purposive construction plays a significant and under-recognised role in the identification of implied terms.

A contract which is believed to be legally binding sometimes turns out to be unenforceable by one or both parties because of some defect at the time it was made. An agreement may be affected, for example, by mistake; by uncertainty; or by the incapacity of one of the parties. Often preparation or performance has already begun, and the question then arises as to how the relationship – which was thought to be governed by the agreement – is to be adjusted. Where one party has received what he was promised under the agreement there exists the possibility of a claim against him in restitution. A difficulty in many cases of this kind is that the same factors which render the contract unenforceable also provide an argument against allowing a restitutionary claim. However, this is not always the case; and even where it is, there may be some justification for permitting recovery in restitution whilst refusing an action in con tract.

Contemporary British counter-terrorist legislation is dominated by ‘counter-law’ in Richard Ericson's terms: by using law against law, it systematically undermines the rule of law. This paper supports this proposition by developing a detailed ‘archetypal’ account of the rule of law considered as a critical ideal, drawing on Fuller's ‘morality of law’. The rule of law is identified with four tendencies in law – towards greater universality, knowability, followability and justifiability – and ‘counter-law’ with tendencies to block or reverse all of these. Counter-law tendencies in contemporary counter-terrorist legislation are discussed in detail, with particular reference to the proliferation of inchoate, preparatory and situational offences. This critique is also related to contemporary debates on law and counter-law; it is argued that critiques which relativise or historicise the liberal model of the rule of law fall short by failing to engage with it on its own terms, thereby undervaluing its utility as a normative resource. The paper concludes by discussing the range, significance and gravity of the departures from the rule of law that have been identified, considering some counter-arguments and drawing conclusions for policy-makers and legal scholars.

The nature of separate legal personality is a perennial debate in corporate law. This paper uses insights from a previous iteration of the debate to argue that separate legal personality is best seen as a two-step process: it is a concession from the state to something real. That real thing is the economic concept of the firm, which has been recently debated within institutional economics. Viewing separate legal personality as a two-step process lets us explore whether the concession of separate legal personality is operating as it should. Law imposes no prerequisite requirement that a firm exists before establishing a company, nor limits firms to only one company. Law thus facilitates misalignments between the firm and the company. Such misalignments will only occur if two constituencies within the company structure – the ultimate shareholders and directors – consider it in their interests to create such misalignment. As a result, these misalignments harm third parties by allowing risk to be exported to them through opportunistic misalignment. This paper then explores the methods of misalignment and reviews current legal tools which are available to be deployed to re-align the company to the firm, and argues that they should be deployed.

This paper focuses on the drivers steering companies’ behaviour over uses of patented health technologies, taking Covid-19 as a case study. Global equitable access to health technologies is vital to bringing the pandemic under control. Reflecting this, global mechanisms for rightsholders to share intellectual property rights, data and know-how over such health technologies have been developed. Yet, to date, there is limited support from corporate rightsholders for such mechanisms. Instead, health technologies have been licensed largely based on bilateral deals, with vast global inequalities emerging. Given the traditional focus within company law on prioritising shareholders' short-term financial value, we argue that it is unsurprising that many corporate rightsholders adopt a protectionist approach to patents, even in the face of health crises. However, we argue that the tide may now be starting to shift, catalysed by an emergence of engaged shareholders petitioning for socially responsible corporate behaviour, including for uses of intellectual property over health technologies in a manner that more clearly aligns with public interests. If harnessed and encouraged, such engaged shareholder behaviour could present an opportunity to reframe the conception of shareholder value towards one that considers a long-term sustainable approach and ultimately to shift corporate behaviour around uses of intellectual property over health technologies to take public interests into account.

The demand for family mediation to adapt and change has risen sharply in the contemporary English and Welsh family justice system. This paper focuses on a crucial, yet overlooked, barrier to reform: the tensions felt within the family mediator profession. It first provides an important overview of the introduction of family mediation in the late twentieth century, highlighting the distinction between the traditional therapeutic mediator and the subsequent lawyer mediator. Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that friction exists amongst the two mediator sub-groups, similar to earlier tensions felt between lawyers and mediators. The remainder of this paper is based on an empirical study, comprising 17 interviews with family mediators, which confirms these tensions, as well as a lack of national identity across the profession. However, the data also reveal mediators’ desire for collaboration and community within the profession. The paper is hopeful that regulatory reform can help mediators to ‘mediate themselves’ going forward, and questions whether this transition is supported by a new hybrid mediator.