This work examines how a particular response of Stalin's victims had the effect of transforming them from mere pawns to participant agents in the system of repression. The disenfranchised (in Russian lishentsy, or literally, the deprived) were identified as anti-Soviet elements shortly after the revolution, and in the Stalin years of 1929–31 were stripped of all political and economic rights. Some wrote petitions to Soviet authorities and appealed for the reinstatement of rights. The newly opened Soviet archives contain hundreds of thousands of petitions from the disenfranchised, and they are the only widely accessible Soviet source that reveals the voice of Stalin's victims at the time of their persecution as they directly engaged state agents, formulated appeals, created personal identities, and offered testimonies of defense. The denunciations that appear in these petitions reveal how victims can be-come victimizers, and demonstrate that the damaging social identity of the enemy exploiter was ascribed and propagated not only by the regime and those who occupied society's favored roles. Damaging accusations against others were also made in the process of victim talk, as the disenfranchised invoked the official image of an enemy in order to enhance their own self-image as an innocent.

Recent literature commonly reports US lawyers as disheartened and discontented, but more than two dozen statistically based studies report that the great majority of lawyers put themselves on the satisfied side of scales of job satisfaction. The claim of this article is that, in three ways, these statistically based studies convey an overly rosy impression of lawyers' attitudes: first, that many of those who put themselves above midpoints on satisfaction scales are barely more positive than negative about their careers and often have profound ambivalence about their work; second, that surveys conducted at a single point in time necessarily fail to include the views of those who once worked in that setting but have now gone elsewhere; and third, that few studies address the problems of bias that may be caused by lower rates of response from the least satisfied persons in the population sampled.

The growth of judicial power globally has renewed scholarly debates about who benefits from increased judicial authority. Using original data, we examine the full universe of constitutional free expression decisions issued by three apex courts—in Colombia, India, and South Africa—across three categories of disputes that feature a diverse array of rights claimants. By so doing, we shed light on the limits of elite-driven accounts of judicial empowerment. We find that even where constitutional courts are empowered by elites seeking to advance their own interests, activist courts can develop a practice of rights-protection that benefits a diverse range of less powerful actors. Moreover, regardless of whether the speech claimants are elite or non-elite actors, these three apex courts regularly rule in favor of free expression for dissenting or unorthodox speech acts. In sum, where issues are peripheral to the governing regime’s core interests, relatively powerless actors are sometimes able to use legal processes to advance their rights and interests.

This article uses a critical theoryllegal mobilization perspective to study the 1987–92 trade union boycott of the British Columbia labour law. The problems encountered establishing a total boycott–one that would eschew all contact with the state–and the subsequent modification of the parameters of the boycott through a selective reliance on the law offer an important case from which to learn more about the role of law and legal rights in highly regulated organizations and how collectives mobilize the law. The author argues that legal rights are important to unions because of their ability to mediate the complexity of labour relations through a decentralization of authority. At the same time, mobilization of the law for this purpose accentuates localized identities and unequal resources that operate in tension with a boycott ethos, necessitating a deliberative politics to legitimize the law. By exploring the tension between these two forms of mobilization around law–one to reduce complexity, another to legitimize broad collective norms–the author analyzes and draws some conclusions about the reproduction of social unionism in British Columbia.

In the past 50 years, eligibility for admission to the bar has come to depend increasingly on the accreditation status of the law school attended. The author traces the history of the American Bar Association's law school accrediting standards and their impact on part-time and proprietary law schools, presents the results of a study of the ABA standard prohibiting the accreditation of proprietary law schools, and discusses ramifications for legal education and the legal profession.

Historians and political scientists have noted that appointments of judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals are not determined by senatorial courtesy alone. What has not been adequately explained is why and when a president defers to a senator's choice rather than seek to control the selection. This article attempts to understand the politics of federal appellate court appointments. The author first identifies a major change in the work of the courts of appeals during the years 1900-1945—the growth in review of the actions of newly created federal regulatory agencies. Then, by examining Justice Department files and presidential correspondence, he discoveres three patterns of appointment emerging in the same period. The patterns vary with presidential perceptions of the role of the federal government and of the courts of appeals' ability to affect accomplishment of administration goals. Appointments during the first years of the presidencies of Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt and during the Harding and Coolidge administrations were dominated by patronage concerns. Those administrations yielded to the recommendations of senators and demonstrated no interest in the policy-making potential of these courts. In the two other patterns the White House played a more active role, with senators more often deferring to the president's selection. Concerns about professionalism dominated selections in Taft's and Hoover's administrations: because they recognized the policy importance of those judgeships but saw the role of government as limited, they sought judicial craftsmen who would make policy only incrementally. Policy concerns dominated selections during Wilson's administration and the latter years of both the Roosevelts' administrations: Justice Department officials screened nominees to determine their policy orientation, because federal appellate court judgeships were perceived as crucial policy positions that could affect the president's ability to implement his reform programs.

This article follows two earlier pieces in which the author reported the findings of a pilot empirical exploration of how well the discovery system in civil litigation is functioning. Brazil begins by focusing on the principal problems his field studies exposed and by suggesting a theory of discovery reform which responds to the nature and sources of those problems. His principal thesis is that too often neither judges nor attorneys assume sufficient responsibility for the discovery system as a system. Most of this article is devoted to two major proposals that are designed to promote in the judiciary and in counsel a sense of responsibility for the pretrial system and to equip the judiciary to convert that sense into action. Brazil proposes a comprehensive model rule that courts could use to manage the pretrial development of civil actions. He then uses his model as a background for suggesting modifications to and extensions of the proposed revision of Rule 16 that the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has circulated for comment. He also offers a critique of current provisions for sanctions and advances an alternative sanctions rule that acknowledges a right to compensation for damages caused by an opponent's breach of pretrial obligations and that reduces the scope of judicial discretion to refuse to impose compensatory awards.

The outrageous history of German judges during the Third Reich should not so structure historical research as to distract historians from examining their role in the nineteenth century. Prussian judges played an important role in electoral politics by serving as parliamentary deputies between 1849 and 1913. This essay poses and answers two questions: What was the political, legal, and social setting that led to judges sewing in parliament? And, why did their number decline after 1877? Theoretical discourses of separation of powers, construction of a Hegelian “general estate,” and independence of the judiciary converged with administrative-legal-constitutional developments in Prussia begun under the absolutism of the eighteenth century and professional and personal interests of judges to bring them into parliament, often as members of the liberal opposition. But success in the liberal project of building a national state, including legal reform, professionalization, and the advent of mass politics, reduced the need and attraction for judges in parliament, resulting in a decline after the 1860s.

Largely absent from US criminal sentencing since the early 1800s, shame penalties have been staging a comeback. This revival has been met by a number of debates among legal scholars, one of which centers on the potential for such penalties to reduce crime. This study addresses this debate by investigating the impact of formal shaming on drunk driving and alcohol-related traffic safety in Ohio. In accordance with the Traffic Law Reform Act of 2004, judges have since been mandated to issue “restricted plates” to certain first-time and all repeat DUI offenders with limited driving privileges. Results indicate a curvilinear association between punishment levels and drunk driving. Increases in the certainty and visibility of plates are associated with decreases in suspension rates, but there is a point at which increasing the punishment level no longer retains its intended impact. In addition, levels of punishment are unrelated to alcohol-related traffic safety.

Over the past three decades, the legal profession has experienced globalization, the rise of mega-law firms, and intensified competition. These transformations have been associated with declining career perspectives, the hyper-specialization of legal work, and increased levels of stress. We argue that the concept of alienation offers valuable insights into these changes by providing an original analysis of the objective and subjective experiences of early career lawyers at work. We elaborate a multidimensional typology that covers the content and retributions of legal work. By categorizing experiences of alienation along these two axes, we identify four ideal-types of alienation: powerlessness, purposelessness, time deprivation, and unfairness. Based on qualitative studies carried out in France and Switzerland, we illustrate how young lawyers differentially experience each type of alienation, according to gender, status, and firm size. We conclude by suggesting how these factors combine to produce long-terms effects, such as the high female attrition rates observed in the Swiss and French legal professions.

Criminal cases against domestic violence in India frequently result in unlawful “compromises” where litigants breach legal procedure and negotiate out-of-court settlements. Using ethnographic and interview data, this Article analyzes how legal cases become extralegal settlements. I argue that India’s legal environment engenders an “aspirational-strategic” legal consciousness among survivors, who simultaneously believe they deserve what the law promises while distrusting legal procedure and law enforcement personnel. Their bifurcated vision of the law leads them to negotiate illicit settlements. These findings indicate that expansions in legal rights can have contradictory effects on rule of law. Depending on the political economy of the legal institutional environment, citizens may respond to rights by simultaneously adopting new norms while ignoring legal rules and procedure.