How do legal strategies at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) vary among activists in highly asymmetrical social positions? Social scientists have demonstrated that legal mobilization raises the pressure on states to provide broader minority accommodation. While this may be true, such outcome-oriented studies overlook the fact that judicial mobilization is itself deeply imbued with inequalities and divergent interests among diverse activists. We lack comparative studies to examine how such differences play out in litigation. Drawing on a qualitative in-depth study among Sikh, Muslim, Catholic, Evangelical, and secular advocacy groups involved in religious freedom disputes at the ECtHR, this article argues that claims making often is a balancing act between legal power relations and extra-legal commitments, which leads to variation in activists’ leverage to challenge legal marginalization. First, hostile legal environments discourage more easily activists with weaker transnational connections who are in vulnerable domestic positions. Second, while the most marginalized readily seek to fit identity narratives into dominant legal frames of religion, more powerful actors can target the core of legal principles and power distribution within the legal field as such. Even when unsuccessful in judicial outcomes, they might affect broader political and legal debates.

Public participation is widely considered to be an indispensable part of contemporary constitution-making processes, largely because it is thought to create a sense of public ownership of the new constitution. However, as recent research has shown that public participation has little actual impact on the content of the constitution, this supposed link is puzzling. How can ineffective participation contribute to public support for the constitution? We address this puzzle by subjecting it to experimental tests. In two recontact survey experiments conducted across six countries, we empirically tested the effects of various forms of participation at the constitution drafting stage and their concrete impact on public support for the constitution. We found that the act of participating in itself has little effect on support for the constitution but that broader cues that give the impressions of a fair process can have significant positive effects. This indicates that participation in constitution drafting can increase public support for a constitution regardless of the extent to which it has an impact on the constitutional text and that the appearance of a fair process is the link between participation and support.

This article considers two recent books in the history of childhood, youth, and the law: Holly Brewer, By Birth or Consent and Stephen Robertson, Crimes Against Children. It argues that these works mark the emergence of age as a category of analysis in sociolegal studies. It calls for further investigations in the legal history of childhood and youth, outlines several areas of interest, and suggests that attention to age will alter how scholars look at the law by complicating key concepts such as innocence, authority, and citizenship. Studies of age and the law could benefit from cross-cultural and transnational approaches.

Law is often seen as peripheral to Southern life before the Civil War, and the South as an outlier in the American legal history of that era. In The People and Their Peace (2009), Laura Edwards demonstrates the profoundly legal nature of Southern society and takes an important step toward integrating the legal history of the South with that of the nation. Edwards identifies two dueling legal cultures in North and South Carolina between 1787 and 1840—the law of local courts, which she terms localized law, and the state law of professionalized lawyers and reformers. She argues that white women, slaves, and the poor fared better in localized law—which was based on notions of popular sovereignty and the flexible rubric of restoring “the peace”—than in state courts, which were steeped in a national culture of individual rights that led to more restrictive results. This essay questions Edwards's dichotomy between local law and state law and her depiction of the popular content of localized law, while building on Edwards's innovations to suggest a new direction for Southern legal history.

Throughout American history, a peculiar and recurrent disjunction has often arisen between the substance of transformative reforms and the decidedly less-radical governing arrangements that arise in the aftermath of reform. To account for this disjunction, this article puts forth a theory of postreform “recalibration.” Political processes of recalibration are the means by which vague, indeterminate principles of reform are given operational meaning and translated into new governing arrangements. This article illuminates recalibration processes by examining two case-studies: African American rights in the post-Reconstruction era of the 1870s and 1880s, and labor rights in the post–New Deal era of the late 1930s. Finally, the article also highlights the crucial role of the Supreme Court in recalibration processes and sets forth a theory of judicial behavior as driven by an institutional interest in stability.

Internal and international conflicts can often involve a level of impunity that allows sexual violence to persist unchecked by military and political leaders. The recent reversal by an appeals panel at the International Criminal Court of a pretrial decision not to charge President al‐Bashir of Sudan with genocide in Darfur offers an important foundation for introducing new types of evidence that can increase the investigation and prosecution of sexual violence during conflicts. The reversal cited the incorrect use of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard when the lesser standard of “reasonable grounds” applied. Social science provides methods and measures that can be uniquely used to develop reasonable grounds evidence, for example, to demonstrate the roles of physical perpetrators acting together in horizontal relationships, as well as to establish the indirect participation through vertical relationships of higher‐level defendants, in a chain of command of superior responsibility. We illustrate these points by presenting social science evidence of the responsibility of President al‐Bashir and middle‐ and lower‐level figures in genocidal violence in Darfur.

Violent hazing has been a longstanding issue within African American, collegiate fraternities and sororities, otherwise known as black Greek‐letter organizations (BGLOs). This article investigates how and what hazing victims know about their hazing experiences. Additionally, the article examines how victims' knowledge of hazing may hold serious implications for tort defense doctrines like assumption of risk and comparative fault. Specifically, the authors conduct two studies—one quantitative and the other qualitative—to find that not only are BGLO pledges aware that their pledge experiences are likely to involve mental and physical hazing, but that they believe such experiences will likely continue throughout the entirety of their induction process. Moreover, appreciation for hazing experiences is often captured in the fraternal chants, greetings, and songs they learn or create, which together reflects some understanding of danger and risk. The authors contend that these elements of black “Greek” hazing culture may serve as evidence of assumption of risk or comparative fault.

This article demonstrates how civil liberties lawyers’ efforts to address the complaints of imprisoned people in the 1970s inadvertently helped provide state attorneys with tools they used to stymie prisoners’ organizing efforts. Using North Carolina as a case study, I explain why a diverse range of legal actors—including civil liberties lawyers, federal judges, and state attorneys—supported the creation of prison grievance procedures. I then reveal how state attorneys successfully used them, once implemented, to argue that because the procedures offered a seemingly fair, institutional avenue for imprisoned people to express their grievances, prison administrators could ban prison organizing without violating prisoners’ First Amendment rights to free speech and assembly. The history of prison grievance procedures, I suggest, highlights the limits of constitutional rights litigation for achieving social change, offers a new approach to the study of legal endogeneity, and helps explain the demise of the prisoners’ rights movement.

As the very title of John Mackie's The Cement of the Universe reminds us, causation permeates and holds together our lives, our language, and our laws. Causal claims are part of our everyday discourse, causal assumptions undergird many of our actions, and causal relationships lie at the heart of that large body of laws presupposing such a relationship between the immediate regulatory target and some more foundational governmental concern. Not unexpectedly, the omnipresence of causal relationships and the pervasiveness of our concern with them have generated multiple conceptions of what it is for something to be the cause of something else. Insofar as these various conceptions are cabined within the domains in which they have been developed, and for which they are most useful, little harm comes from mutually coexisting but different conceptions of causation. Yet the inevitable and desirable leakage among disciplines, and among professional, political, and public domains, has as an unfortunate byproduct an increased risk of conceptual confusion as strikingly different conceptions of causation are misleadingly referred to under the same rubric in the same domain.

As conventionally understood, anti-corruption programs rely on legal rules to define and control the abuse of official power for private gain. This study explores the limits to law-based standards of corruption where state officials obscure bribery and the abuse of power beneath a veneer of legality. Drawing on an empirical study of two public-private partnerships (PPPs) in Vietnam, it asks whether the failure of anti-corruption laws to curb malfeasance in PPPs is attributable to insufficient enforcement, to targeting the wrong behavior, or to both of these issues. It argues that if anti-corruption laws are blind to the opportunistic manipulation of laws in PPPs, then we must consider other ways of conceptualizing and controlling corruption. This argument links the way in which corruption is conceptualized to the efficacy of policy instruments used to curb corruption in PPPs. In particular, it examines whether public interest corruption provides a framework that makes malfeasance in PPPs visible and thus offers a mechanism for holding officials accountable. This study concludes that public interest corruption broadens the analysis of corruption in PPPs from transgressions of legal boundaries to an examination of public inclusion and exclusion from decision making.

Racially restrictive covenants—subdivision rules or neighborhood agreements that “run with the land” to bar sales of rentals by minority members—were common and legally enforceable in the United States in the first half of the twentieth century. In spite of their demeaning character, these racial covenants took away opportunities from excluded minorities, rather than things, and thus they amounted to something less than the dramatic “dignity takings” that Bernadette Atuahene (2014) describes in her new book on dignity takings in South Africa. In this article, I explore some significant ways in which racially restrictive covenants differed from dignity takings as Atuahene defines them, as well as the shadowy similarities between racial covenants and Atuahene's dignity takings; I focus here on the dimensions of dehumanization, state involvement, and property takings. I conclude with a discussion of remedies, particularly considering measures that restore dignity through both public policies and private actions.

What happens to gains in human rights protections if states learn how to use international human rights courts to evade future scrutiny? This article centers on Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, a landmark 2012 migration case at the European Court of Human Rights. Rights advocates characterized the case as a legal victory for migrants. Subsequent shifts in Italian bordering and policing on the high seas demonstrate unintended consequences of this litigation. While Italy implemented the judgment, compliance went hand in hand with state efforts to undermine rights protections in practice. Italy carved out new areas of discretion among maritime police, human rights advocates, and migrants on the high seas. Ultimately, assessing the impact of case law requires looking not only at judgments and at execution. It requires attention to subsequent policy environments and policing efforts that may violate the spirit, if not the letter, of human rights obligations.