This paper analyzes the causes of the rise and the fall of the Algerian wine industry. It is hard to imagine in the twenty-first century global wine economy, but until about 50 years ago Algeria was the largest exporter of wine in the world—and by a wide margin. Between 1880 and 1930 Algerian wine production grew dramatically. Equally spectacular was the decline of Algerian wine production: today, Algeria produces and exports little wine. There was an important bidirectional impact between developments in the Algerian wine sector and French regulations. French regulations had a major impact on the Algerian wine industry, and the growth of the Algerian wine industry triggered the introduction of important wine regulations in France at the beginning of the twentieth century and during the 1930s. Important elements of these regulations are still present in European wine policy today. (JEL Classifications: K23, L51, N44, N54, Q13)

In the literature, there is no standard approach for estimating the return to wine or testing for a portfolio risk diversification benefit from holding wine. Using auction data for Australian wine, we show that the estimation method has a material impact on the estimated wine return distribution and that the type of diversification benefit test used influences whether or not wine is found to provide a portfolio risk diversification benefit. Our results indicated that a simple modification to the hedonic model, which we call a pooled model, is an appropriate method for estimating the return to infrequently traded heterogeneous assets such as wine. Across the various approaches to testing for a risk diversification benefit, we find direct estimation of the efficient frontier with bootstrapped confidence intervals to be the most transparent and comprehensive method of illustrating wine's potential for lowering portfolio risk. (JEL Classifications: G11, C61, C13)

This paper explores empirically the causes of extreme fluctuations in commodity prices from January 1990 to June 2010 and seeks to identify the relative contribution of advanced and emerging market economies to the changes in commodity prices. Our assumption is that analyzing two very distinct goods—crude oil and fine wine—helps to identify common determinants of commodity prices. We find that the growth rate of global aggregate demand is the key macroeconomic determinant of the fluctuations in both crude oil and fine wine prices over the sample period. While advanced economies account for more than half of global consumption, emerging market and developing economies make up the bulk of the incremental change in demand, thereby having a greater weight in commodity price formation. The coefficient of emerging market industrial output growth is about three times as high as that of advanced economies in oil price regressions and almost five times as powerful in fine wine price regressions. The results also show that the shift in the composition of aggregate commodity demand is a recent phenomenon. (JEL Classifications: Q11, Q39, Q41, Q43)

Consumers are always looking for new types of wines. Producers compete for their attention by trying to product differentiate at the same time as they are responding to technological improvements, climate change, and evolving demand patterns. In doing so, wineries are increasingly highlighting their regional and varietal distinctiveness. This paper examines the extent to which the choice of winegrape varieties in wine regions has already changed over the first decade of the twenty-first century in both the Old World and New World. In doing so, it reports a varietal intensity index of different regions and an index of similarity of varietal mix between regions. The study is based on a new database of vine-bearing areas circa 2000 and 2010 for nearly 1,300 DNA-distinct winegrape varieties, spanning over 600 regions in 44 countries that together account for 99 percent of the world's wine production. (JEL Classifications: D24, L66, Q13, Q15)

We empirically examine the relationship between price and willingness to pay (WTP) for wines by conducting a wine-tasting experiment with a manipulation of price similar to that used by Plassman et al. (2008); that is, with the same wines being presented at different prices. We find that for non-expert wine consumers a complex interaction exists between wine appreciation, price and WTP. The key conclusions from the study are that for non-expert wine consumers (1) there is no relationship between intrinsic wine character and enjoyment (individuals rated the same wines quite differently), and (2) price influences both appreciation of wine and WTP, but the latter more strongly. Buying decisions are determined by consumer surplus (the difference between WTP and price), and yet, for non-expert wine drinkers, WTP is itself strongly influenced by price. This complex interaction between the factors that determine buying behavior has strategic implications for competitors in the wine industry. We suggest an understanding of the relationship between WTP and price can be used to shed light on the crisis recently experienced by the Australian wine industry. (JEL Classifications: C91, D03, M30)

In this paper, we use three different goodness-of-fit tests for log-normality in conjunction with kernel nonparametric density estimation methods to examine both the size distribution of California North Coast wineries over time and by age. Our kernel density estimates indicate that the size distribution of wineries has changed from positively skewed to bimodal. These results are inconsistent with those in other industries, but are consistent with recent empirical research in the wine industry, which finds that smaller firms are comprising a larger component of market share. In terms of the distribution of firm size by age, our results indicate that as wineries age, the size distribution of firms becomes less skewed and more bimodal, which is also inconsistent with the research on other industries which finds that as firms age, the size distribution becomes more normal. Our results indicate that unlike other industries, where entry is very difficult, small firms can enter the wine industry and survive. (JEL Classifications: L11, L22, L25)

As in the 17 years leading up to 2005, as shown in Gokcekus and Fargnoli (2007), there was no change in quality between 2006 and 2012. There was more variety and, perhaps most importantly, the average real price of wines on Wine Spectator's Top 100 List declined even faster. However, rather than wines from the New-New World and Non-incumbent countries, it was wines from Italy, Spain, and Portugal—New-Old World—that were primarily responsible for these beneficial changes (greater variety and more affordable wines in the Top 100 List) for American wine drinkers. (JEL Classifications: F120, F140, C200)

We use experimental data to disentangle the signaling and budgetary effects of price on wine demand. The experimental design allows us to isolate the two effects in a simple and intuitive way. The signaling effect is present and nonlinear: it is strongly positive between 3 euros and 5 euros and undetectable between 5 euros and 8 euros. We find a similar nonlinear price–quality relationship in a large sample of wine ratings from the same price segment, supporting the hypothesis that taster behavior in the experiment is consistent with rationally using prices as signals of quality. Price signals also have greater importance for inexperienced (young) consumers. (JEL Classification: D11, D12, D82)

A test for evaluating wine judge performance is developed. The test is based on the premise that an expert wine judge will award similar scores to an identical wine. The definition of “similar” is parameterized to include varying numbers of adjacent awards on an ordinal scale, from No Award to Gold. For each index of similarity, a probability distribution is developed to determine the likelihood that a judge might pass the test by chance alone. When the test is applied to the results from a major wine competition, few judges pass the test. Of greater interest is that many judges who fail the test have vast professional experience in the wine industry. This leads to us to question the basic premise that experts are able to provide consistent evaluations in wine competitions and, hence, that wine competitions do not provide reliable recommendations of wine quality. (JEL Classifications: C02, C12, D81)

We developed a partial equilibrium model to examine the welfare impacts of bird damage and its control in California wine grape production. The model incorporates the impacts of pest damage and its control and allows the impacts to vary regionally. Importantly, the model requires minimal information to apply; only elasticities, current market price and production data, and information on the cost and effectiveness of the pest control methods are needed. We rely on data from a recent survey of California growers and use the model to estimate changes in wine grape prices, production levels, and consumer and producer surplus that result from both bird damage and its control in three grape-growing regions of California. Results suggest that eliminating the threat of bird damage and control costs results in an increase in producer and consumer surplus of 1.3% and 3%, respectively. Furthermore, eliminating current bird control and allowing any resulting damage would decrease producer and consumer surplus by 6.6% and 11.5%, respectively. (JEL Classifications: Q11, Q18, Q57)

The purpose of this paper is to assess the role of expert opinion on the pricing of Bordeaux wines. To this end, we compile an original dataset including (1) retail prices, (2) scores attributed to wines from France, Spain, and the United States by nine experts from 2000 to 2010, and (3) the meteorological conditions under which the grapes were produced. With this dataset, we aim to determine the presence of bias rooted in the subjectivity of the experts. We assume that the expert wine scores have two main components: (1) an objective one that is driven by the fundamentals of wine production (the quality of soil, producers' skills, and climate conditions) and (2) a subjective one that is determined by the individual opinion of the experts. We use control function techniques to compare the respective impacts of these two factors and find that prices are influenced more deeply by the fundamental quality of the wine than they are by the judge's subjectivity. Furthermore, we notice the great impact of “highest ratings” on pricing, which we interpret as a “marketing effect”: the most favorable score is likely to be the most publicized, which influences the price of the respective wine. (JEL Classifications: C21, D89, L15)

This article examines the determinants of chemical consumption by French winegrowers on an individual basis. We introduce criteria relating to the structure of vineyards and the financial situation of the winegrowers. Using data from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN-RICA) for the period 2002–2007 from an annual sample of 607 winegrowers, we study the different factors that encourage winegrowers to use chemical inputs to protect or increase the yield of their vines. Drawing on transversal and longitudinal analyses, we illustrate the benefits derived from differentiating the demand for inputs according to their classification: pesticides or fertilizers. Climatic variables, physical size, and turnover all act as driving forces in the decision to use chemical inputs. We show that taking out crop insurance functions as a substitute for inputs and observe a double moral hazard effect: Winegrowers who increase their insurance coverage reduce their consumption of inputs the most and receive greater compensation; among insured winegrowers, those who use the most inputs make the most claims. As wine grape growing is a consistent activity conducted over a long period, we observe permanence in patterns of use of chemical inputs. (JEL Classifications: Q12, Q13, Q14)

The influence of expectations on the sensory perception of wines is investigated in three studies in which New Jersey and California red wines are blind tasted. Studies 1 and 2, in which only the color of the wines is known prior to tasting, demonstrate that neither wine club members nor experienced wine professionals can distinguish between New Jersey and California wines in terms of personal enjoyment. In contrast, Study 3, in which tasters are informed that some (though not which) of the wines are from New Jersey, finds that when a wine is believed to be from New Jersey it receives lower enjoyment ratings than when the identical wine is believed to be from California—regardless of whether the wine is actually from New Jersey or California. The results enhance our understanding of the role of expectations in the interpretation of subjective experiences. Implications for wine producers and wine consumers are explored. (JEL Classification: C91)

Economic theorists maintain that wine is an experience good, a product whose quality can be evaluated only after purchase and consumption. Theory holds that consumers often rely on the price of experience goods as one cue to judge their quality. In this paper, however, I provide evidence that an important segment of wine consumers do not consider price a useful cue to quality. Specifically, I test the robustness of Goldstein et al.,'s (2008) finding that, in blind tastings, average wine drinkers consider less expensive wines to taste better than more expensive wines. Four blind tastings of 2006 red Bordeaux and 2009 white Burgundy with a price range of $20–$119 were conducted, in which members of a wine club rated their extent of enjoyment of each wine. In three of the tastings, there was no relationship between price and enjoyment, while in the other the relationship was negative, lending additional credibility to the contention that an important segment of wine consumers do not find enjoyment to increase with price. (JEL Classification: C91)

This article analyzes the contractual relationship between a wine cooperative (winery) and its member (growers). This relationship is plagued by moral hazard and adverse selection problems in grape quality. Indeed, growers can be opportunistic since the cooperative is unable to observe: (1) their effort level due to imperfect monitoring technology; and (2) their productive abilities (types) due to adverse selection. Because the growers' vineyard practices and efforts are one of the main determinants of grape quality, the cooperative implements an incentive compensation system to induce growers to make the maximum effort toward the achievement of quality. This compensation scheme is similar to that in tournaments (Green and Stokey, 1983; Knoeber, 1989; Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Prendergast, 1999). In our case, the cooperative promotes competition between growers by offering a promotion to a higher-quality contract, while, at the same time, organizing the contest by creating homogeneous groups of growers using a menu of contracts and monitoring through regular visits to the vineyard. Using a database of 1,219 contracts, we test the effect of: (1) the cooperative's tournament compensation scheme; (2) the menu of contracts and monitoring mechanism. The results of our econometric estimations provide some confirmation of both effects. (JEL classifications: L14, D82, Q13)

This study investigates factors influencing coordination of the California grape and wine supply chain. Results corroborate prior findings that quality considerations and needs to protect investments in specialized or durable assets significantly increase usage of more formal coordination mechanisms, such as formal contracts and vertical integration or ownership. Consistent with findings for other industries, such investments are associated with greater contract complexity and inclusion of enforcement provisions, while trade partners' prior experience working together decreases contract complexity. Furthermore, our results suggest that quality considerations extend to greater use of formal contracts further downstream. (JEL Classifications: L1, L2, Q13)