This paper aims to detail Frisch’s choice of setting the accelerator principle at the core of his impulse-propagation model (1933a), referred to as the “rocking horse model.” The innovative aspects of this model rest not only on the rise of macrodynamics regarding the equilibrium concept but also on the reformulation of business cycles in terms of production of capital goods. This is a deliberate choice, which relies on his work on business cycles started in 1927, and can be obviously traced back to his debate with John Maurice Clark and the American Institutionalists, but relies more deeply on a specific appropriation of Norwegian approach to this principle.

This paper exhaustively examines all Adam Smith’s references to “machines,” including machine metaphors or analogies, with a view to a comprehensive interpretation of the significance of the machine in his thought as a whole. By bringing together all Smith’s references to machines (and variants of that term), as well as his references to related phenomena, mechanics and engines (and variants), the totality of the various different kinds of uses of these terms assists in clarifying the meaning of each of them. However, this exercise is undertaken particularly with a view to the significance of machines in Smith’s political economy.

To this day, the so-called Arrow–Debreu model represents a trademark of rigorous economic research—be it as a benchmark for extending the model, for weakening its assumptions, for structuring data sets, or for providing alternative models. But who should earn the credit? Arrow or Debreu? This essay presents “the making of” Arrow’s and Debreu’s joint article of 1954 as documented in their extensive letter exchange between their first contact in February 1952 and submission in May 1953. I show, pivotally, that Arrow and Debreu did not share the same interest in their work, that they played different roles, and drew different lessons from it. Moreover, neither Arrow nor Debreu can be identified with the way the profession would later refer to the Arrow–Debreu model. To the contrary, both, in their own ways, sought to counter what others perceived as limitations when placing their hopes in the model.

This paper discusses the historical changes in economic and ideological conditions through which greed turned from one of the deadly sins into a passion from which society derived social benefits. Adding to the perspective developed by Hirschman in his The Passions and the Interests, three stages are distinguished in the construction of the notion of the social utility of greed: (1) the self-sufficient community; (2) the mercantile state; and (3) commercial society. The paper relates how changing conditions led philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to recognize the conditional usefulness of greed and, eventually, to build a dream on the idea of greed as instrumental in establishing the material foundation of progress in society.

The notion of interdependent preferences has a long history in economic thought. In its general form, it can be found in the works of authors such as Hume, Rae, Genovesi, Smith, Marx, and Mill, among others. In the twentieth century, the idea became more widespread mainly through the works of Veblen and Duesenberry. Recently, an increasing number of theorists are interested in issues such as reference income, relative consumption, and positional goods, which are all based on the concept of interdependent preferences. However, such preferences were never part of the corpus of orthodox theory. For instance, although Pareto and Marshall were aware of their existence, they did not advocate their incorporation into orthodox economic theory. This paper argues that the structure of mainstream economic methodology and the challenging theoretical implications of adopting interdependent preferences were two possible reasons for the mainstream rejection. The discussion includes the more recent orthodox attitudes towards such preferences.

The paper critically discusses some recent contributions to the literature that argue that Smith incorporated the needs of the poor within his account of justice. Three specific claims are examined and rejected: that Smith blurred the traditional distinction between perfect and imperfect rights; that he endorsed the doctrine of the right of necessity; and that he maintained that all people have a natural right to subsistence.