Building on a partner-switching mechanism, we experimentally test two theories that posit different reasons why promises breed trust and cooperation. The expectation-based explanation (EBE) operates via belief-dependent guilt aversion, while the commitment-based explanation (CBE) suggests that promises offer commitment power via a (belief-independent) preference to keep one’s word. Previous research performed a similar test, which we argue should be interpreted as concerning informal agreements rather than (unilateral) promises.

Accurately estimating risk preferences is of critical importance when evaluating data from many economic experiments or strategic interactions. I use a simulation model to conduct power analyses over two lottery batteries designed to classify individual subjects as being best explained by one of a number of alternative specifications of risk preference models. I propose a case in which there are only two possible alternatives for classification and find that the statistical methods used to classify subjects result in type I and type II errors at rates far beyond traditionally acceptable levels. These results suggest that subjects in experiments must make significantly more choices, or that traditional lottery pair batteries need to be substantially redesigned to make accurate inferences about the risk preference models that characterize a subject’s choices.

Conditional cooperation is the tendency to cooperate if and only if others do so as well. It is the most common behavior in social dilemmas. We study how the incidence of conditional cooperation in the public goods game, the most widely studied social dilemma in experimental economics, varies with group size. In a laboratory experiment, we apply the strategy method to elicit how participants’ willingness to contribute to a public good depends on other group members’ decisions. A within-subject design allows us to evaluate and compare an individual participant's contribution behavior in different-sized groups. Two main findings emerge. First, the share of players who are conditional cooperators is consistent across group sizes. Second, the strategies chosen imply that conditional cooperators hold a (correct) belief that others are more cooperative in a larger than in a smaller group.

We report on the results of an experiment with a statistical choice task involving the toss of a fair coin. In our experiment, participants had to decide whether they were willing to pay a price to switch from betting on the future performance of one player to betting on that of another player. The switch was from a player who had been previously less successful in betting on five coin flips to another one who had been more successful in the same task. We conducted a treatment with the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism and one in which participants were faced with a fixed price. In both cases, participants exhibit a strong bias towards placing their bets on players with a good guessing history in the coin toss task. Participants’ behaviour is compatible with prescriptive luck beliefs, that is, the idea that luck is a somehow deterministic and personal attribute.

We provide evidence on the extent to which survey items in the Preference Survey Module and the resulting Global Preference Survey measuring social preferences—trust, altruism, positive and negative reciprocity—predict behavior in corresponding experimental games outside the original participant sample of Falk et al. (Manag Sci, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4455). Our results, which are based on a replication study with university students in Tehran, Iran, are mixed. While quantitative items considering hypothetical versions of the experimental games correlate significantly and economically meaningfully with individual behavior, none of the qualitative items show significant correlations. The only exception is altruism where results correspond more closely to the original findings.

We introduce a novel way to elicit individuals’ strength of altruistic motivation in the context of charitable donations, ranging from pure warm glow to pure altruism. Using the giving-type elicitation task of Gangadharan et al. (2018) and assuming that individuals maximise a Cobb–Douglas impure altruism utility function, as is used in Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2017), we can uniquely identify the strength of altruistic motivation for impure altruists, which is typically found to be the largest category of donors. We compare the introduced measure to an alternative survey-based elicitation from Carpenter (2021).

Players often fail to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium in laboratory weak-link coordination games. In this paper, we investigate whether such coordination failures can be mitigated by increasing the number of rounds or altering per-period stakes. We find that neither time horizon nor stakes affect equilibrium selection. In contrast to previous findings, players are not more likely to play above the previous period’s minimum choice when the horizon is longer or per-period stakes lower. We also investigate which socio-demographic factors and behavioral traits correlate most strongly with play both in the first round and in subsequent rounds. Cognitive ability as measured by a cognitive reflection test stands out as the characteristic that is most strongly associated with efficient coordination.

The strategy method (SM) is, in practice, subject to a possibly severe economic-theoretical bias. Although many studies utilize SM to examine responses to rare or off-equilibrium behaviors unattainable through direct elicitation (DE), they ignore the fact that the strategic equivalence between SM and DE holds for the monetary payoff game but not the game participants actually play, which is in terms of utilities. We report three results. First, failing to account for estimation bias when decisions at one information set can influence utility at another may result in significant differences in decision-making. Second, the magnitude of this bias can be substantial, comparable to other measured treatment effects. Third, minor interventions targeting salience can amplify these differences similarly, causing treatment effects to differ significantly between SM and DE, even reversing in direction. These findings emphasize the need for reconsideration of the SM’s reliability for economic research.

We convey our experiences developing and implementing an online experiment to elicit subjective beliefs and economic preferences. The COVID-19 pandemic and associated closures of our laboratories required us to conduct an online experiment in order to collect beliefs and preferences associated with the pandemic in a timely manner. Since we had not previously conducted a similar multi-wave online experiment, we faced design and implementation considerations that are not present when running a typical laboratory experiment. By discussing these details more fully, we hope to contribute to the online experiment methodology literature at a time when many other researchers may be considering conducting an online experiment for the first time. We focus primarily on methodology; in a complementary study we focus on initial research findings.

In this study we investigate the effect of framing on bribery behaviour. To do this, we replicate Barr and Serra (Exp Econ, 12(4):488–503, (2009) and carry out a simple one-shot bribery game that mimics corruption. In one treatment, we presented the experiment in a framed version, in which wording was embedded with social context; in the other, we removed the social context and presented the game in a neutral manner. The contribution of this paper is that it offers a comparison of framing effects in two highly corrupt countries: China and Uganda. Our results provide evidence of strong and significant framing effects for Uganda, but not for China.

The literature on rent-seeking primarily focuses on contests for achieving gains, although contests for avoiding losses are also omnipresent. Examples for such ‘reverse’ contests are activities to prevent the close-down of a local school or the construction of a waste disposal close-by. While under standard preferences, investments in ‘reverse’ and ‘conventional’ contests should not be different, loss aversion predicts contests for avoiding losses to be fiercer than conventional ones. In our experimental data, the difference in investments between conventional and reverse Tullock contests is small and statistically insignificant. We discuss several explanations for this remarkable finding.

The widespread Internet “piracy” continues to fuel the debate about business models impervious to copyright infringement. We studied the displacement effects of “piracy” on sales in the book industry. We conducted a year-long large-scale field experiment: in the treatment group, we removed unauthorised copies appearing on the Internet and observed the sales data, whereas in the control group, we simply observed sales. We were able to substantially curb the unauthorised distribution, which resulted in a small, positive effect on sales. While using classical analysis we found it not to be significantly different from zero, a Bayesian approach using previous “piracy” studies to generate a prior led to the conclusion that protecting from piracy resulted in a significant sales boost of about 9 per cent.

This article studies whether people want to control what information on their own past pro-social behavior is revealed to others. Participants are assigned a color that depends on their past pro-social behavior. They can spend money to manipulate the probability with which their color is revealed to another participant. The data show that participants are more likely to reveal colors with more favorable informational content. This pattern is not found in a control treatment in which colors are randomly assigned, thus revealing nothing about past pro-social behavior. Regression analysis confirms these findings, also when controlling for past pro-social behavior. These results complement the existing empirical evidence, confirming that people strategically and, therefore, consciously manipulate their social image.

Most large real-world organizations contain multiple smaller groups, such as working groups within firms. However, can this sort of nested groups be used to alleviate coordination failures in the larger group? We report on a multi-player Stag Hunt experiment wherein we hierarchically structure a large group into mutually exclusive small groups. We offer varying incentive payments if efficient coordination is achieved at a large or small group level. The novelty of our design is that we hold the total payment size constant between treatments. In our nested incentive treatment, we reduce the reward for achieving large-group coordination by a small amount and reallocate the same amount to successful small-group coordination. The results reveal that incentive reallocations privileging small groups facilitate efficient large-group coordination in the nested group structure.

In a seminal paper, Frederick et al. (J Consum Res 36:553–561, 2009) showed that people’s willingness to purchase a consumer good declined dramatically when opportunity costs were made more salient (Cohen’s d = 0.45–0.85). This finding suggests that people normally do not pay sufficient attention to opportunity costs and as a result make poorer and less efficient decisions, both in private and public domains. To critically assess the strength of opportunity cost neglect, we carried out a systematic review and a meta-analysis including published and non-published experimental work. In total, 39 experimental studies were included in the meta-analysis (N = 14,005). The analysis shows a robust significant effect (Cohen’s d = 0.22; p < 0.001) of opportunity cost neglect across different domains, albeit the effect is considerably smaller than what was originally estimated by Frederick et al. (2009). Our findings highlight the importance of meta-analyses and replications of initial findings.

MTVE is an open-source software tool (citeware) that can be applied in laboratory and online experiments to implement video communication. The tool enables researchers to gather video data from these experiments in a way that these videos can be later used for automatic analysis through machine learning techniques. The browser-based tool comes with an easy user interface and can be easily integrated into z-Tree, oTree (and other experimental or survey tools). It provides the experimenters control over several communication parameters (e.g., number of participants, resolution), produces high-quality video data, and circumvents the Cocktail Party Problem (i.e., the problem of separating speakers solely based on audio input) by producing separate files. Using some of the recommended Voice-to-Text AI, the experimenters can transcribe individual files. MTVE can merge these individual transcriptions into one conversation.

Many studies have investigated the role of socio-demographic factors (including gender, age, race), cognitive ability and cultural factors on time and risk preferences. Yet, research regarding the effect of mindfulness on risk and time preferences has been limited. This study investigates the association between mindfulness and time/risk preferences. We conducted a survey on a representative sample of the French adult population (N = 1154) in Spring 2020. We assessed individual mindfulness through the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS), and measured time and risk preferences with incentive-compatible economic games as well as self-reported questionnaires. Our results suggest that a higher level of mindfulness is associated with higher risk aversion and patience for stated preferences, but we found no relationship for revealed ones. We also observe that a higher level of mindfulness is related to greater time consistency, as we found a negative and significant association between the MAAS and the present and future biases.

Empirical evidence has shown that people with better self-control to a greater extent have the self-regulatory ability to act in line with their long-term goals. In this pre-registered study, the relationship between self-control and self-regulatory behavior was investigated both directly and indirectly, i.e., through affective forecasting ability. This is of great interest as it is necessary to be able to forecast one's emotional response to future events in order to make choices that maximize one's happiness. However, in a laboratory experiment with undergraduate students, I found no evidence of self-control being associated with affective forecasting ability, or that people with better self-control more often acted in a way that maximized their expected happiness.

We explore the efficiency and revenue of proportional auctions (PA) compared to first price auction (FPA) for budget-constrained bidders. PA auctions have been used in privatization of Russian assets and in cryptocurrency sales, as they can achieve higher efficiency and revenue than FPAs when bidders face severe financial constraints. The experimental results support this in that under a tight budget constraint PA achieved higher revenue and efficiency than FPA, with these results reversed under a looser budget constraint. Detailed patterns of bidding are compared to the theoretical predictions for both PA and FPA.

Internet services are often free of charge but ask for customers’ personal data in exchange for usage. We experimentally study whether the provision of information-based public goods is susceptible to restraint when contributions not only make contributors better off but also enable a non-contributing “big player” to acquire substantial profits. We show that the presence of the big player crowds out the willingness to provide neutral tokens, but no such effect is observed for the provision of private information. Hence, collecting anonymized personal data instead of monetary fees can be more profitable to service providers and create greater benefits for customers.