Over the last decade China has become a dominant player in Africa's rapidly growing hydropower sector. These mega projects typically employ thousands of Africans yet research on labour relations at these sites remains extremely limited. This article provides a rare systematic analysis of workers’ experiences on a Chinese-financed-and-constructed hydroelectric dam in Africa. We find that chronic verbal abuse of African workers by Chinese managers is a defining feature of labour relations at this project in Uganda. This abuse has tainted many workers’ attitudes towards the Chinese contractor Sinohydro, the Chinese government, and to a lesser extent Chinese people themselves. Workers also perceive Ugandan organisations and the Ugandan government as complicit in these poor labour relations. These findings underscore the limits of accountability to labour standards by Chinese firms operating in Africa, especially in contexts where host organisations and governments fail to advocate aggressively for the rights of African workers.

Inspired by Bourdieu's field theory and utilising the case of Zambia, this article aims to enhance the understanding of the intricate relationship between Chinese private investors and sub-Saharan state institutions. The study proposes an epistemological framework that integrates sociological, anthropological and neo-institutional approaches to development studies. Through extensive fieldwork and over 75 interviews with both Chinese and Zambian stakeholders, we explore various contexts in which group-actors related to foreign capital in Zambia operate. We argue that three separate habiti – inhabited by the Zambian political class, Chinese investors and ‘ordinary’ Zambians – are crucial for comprehending private foreign capital operations in this sub-Saharan state. The ordinary Zambians and Zambian political class fields converge primarily during elections, while interactions between ordinary Zambians and Chinese investors have remained very limited (predominantly employee–employer relations), creating an ideational structure of hostility. In contrast, the Zambian political class and Chinese private investor fields crosscut and are mutually constitutive.

After nearly 30 years of civil war, Angola gained peace in 2002. The country's diamond and oil wealth affords the national government the means to pursue economic reconstruction and urban development. However, in the diamond-producing region of Lunda Sul, where intense fighting between MPLA and UNITA forces was waged, the legacy of war lingers on in the form of livelihood uncertainty and uneven access to the benefits of the state's urban development programmes. There are three main interactive agents of urban change: the Angolan state, the mining corporations, and not least urban residents. The period has been one of shifting alignments of responsibility for urban housing, livelihoods and welfare provisioning. Beyond the pressures of post-war adjustment, the wider context of global capital investment and labour market restructuring has introduced a new surge of corporate mining investment and differentiated patterns of prosperity and precarity in Lunda Sul.

Interest in the real potential of small-scale enterprise dates from the early 1970s, when it was gradually realised that the industrialisation policies pursed by many developing countries would not be able to create enough employment. It was observed, moreover, that a large part of the active population was engaged in petty trade and crafts, particularly in urban centres. Thus, in addition to the modern, ‘formal’ type of economic activity, an ‘informal’ sector was identified with the following distinctive features: (1) The production processes are labour-intensive, based on simple technology. (2) The smallness of the various industries enables their owners to work as managers as well as producers, and to have direct contact with their employees, while some relationships may be based on non-economic considerations. (3) The enterprises often break the law — that is, they seldom adhere to legally fixed minimum wages, they frequently neglect to observe safety and other regulations, and they tend to evade registration and tax obligations.

One of the most important issues of political development and nation building in Africa is national integration. One major political institution which the new nations have employed in the pursuit of this goal is the political party. Ironically and unfortunately, political parties stand for division and cleavages. Thus as Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan have noted, in Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignment: an introduction (Glencoe, 1967), ‘“Party” throughout the history of western government stood for division [my italics], conflict, opposition within a body polity. “Party” is etymologically derived from “part” and since it first appeared in political discourse in the late Middle Ages has always retained this reference to one set of elements in competition or in controversy with another set of elements within some unified whole’ (p. 3). These indeed have been the main characteristics of political parties in most parts of Africa. That is, most of them are fragmentary, and thus contribute to national disintegration rather than fostering national integration. In other words, many political parties in most African nations have not functioned efficiently for the good of their respective countries.

MOST economists agree that industrialisation should help to increase agricultural productivity and raise the living standards of rural producers. In the 1970s, however, manufacturing in sub-Saharan Africa, even including South Africa, grew at a slower rate than in any other region except South-East Asia. Furthermore, far from promoting the anticipated outcome, industrialisation in Southern Africa undermined peasant farm cultivation and contributed to the present crisis in African agriculture.

Before 1960 there was little general interest in the Belgian Congo, and the published material available on any aspect of its development was extremely limited. The accession of the Congo to independence in July 1960 and the prolonged crisis which followed has, however, completely altered this situation, and in the last three years more books and articles have been published on the Congo than on any other country in Africa. The purpose of this article is to list and evaluate at least some of this material and to suggest the main sources which exist for a study of the various aspects of the Congo crisis.

Even the more remote and isolated villages of dynamic and disparate Africa are changing rapidly. To understand this transition, a detailed descriptive record of human activity enables comparisons to be made of different groups and of one group at different times.

The hourly, daily, and yearly behaviour patterns of rural people living in the Nsukka division of the former Eastern Region of Nigeria (now Biafra) are briefly described below. This information is based on field research carried on during 1966 in eight clusters of compounds near Nsukka town. At the time that the study was made, this was a rapidly developing Igbo village 43 miles from the regional capital city of Enugu.

Relations between the United States of America and Africa have important historical, economic, and political dimensions which are by no means confined to the United Nations. The historical ties predate the creation of international organisations, but it was the emergence of the United Nations from the ashes of World War II that provided the greatest opportunity for close bonds by creating an institutional framework within which the common goals and interests of Americans and Africans could be pursued.

For many years ‘there has been a widespread sense of expectancy’ in Zaïre, a premonition of ‘fin de reégime’. Yet as Crawford Young went on to explain as early as 1979, although a ‘dissolution of the current fabric of power is an ever-present possibility… the surprising survival capacity of the régime makes risky any assertion of the inevitability of such a change.’1 During the last two decades there have been repeated reports that the political life of Zaïre' authoritatrian and absolute Head of State has been in grave danger for a whole variety of reasons, including the alleged loss of support from some powerful army general or ‘baron’, or the ruined credibility of his régime among international financial organisations, etcetera. The fact that Mobutu Sese Seko continues to remain in power as President means that we need to question our understanding of the situation in Zaïre. Before addressing ourselves to the issue of political succession and of possible scenarios in the future, I shall try to explain the main reasons for the ‘survival capacity’ of the power structure.

All the new states in Africa have drafted economic and social development plans, for varying periods. Everywhere one sees political leaders and party functionaries singing the popular song of nation-building while crowds respond with enthusiasm. Thus national planning is increasingly becoming synonymous with nation-building throughout the developing nations of Africa. A common problem facing the leaders of the new nations is not how to draft a brilliant plan or organisational charts; this any state can do by seeking the assistance of planning experts and artists. The problem centres on plan management and implementation. This article raises some of the questions and critical problems implicit in plan execution which have arisen during Tanzania's brief experience of nationhood.

As numerous review articles attest, approaches to the study of military interventions in African politics have varied widely in their methodology and foci of concern.1 Over the last decade, a good deal of runing has been made by quantitatively-inclined political scientists, such as Alan Wells, Roberta McKown, Ruth Collier, and especially Robert Jackman, whose particular path towards the understanding of military interventions has Iain through aggregate-data analysis of structural fratures of African states.2 This line of approach has recently been brought to a high level of sophistication in two major articles: Thomas H. Johnson, Robert O. Slater, and Pat McGowan, ‘Explaining African Military Coups d'Etat, 1960–1982’, in The American Political Science Review (Washington, D.C.), 78, 3, September 1984, pp. 622–40, and Pat McGowan and Thomas H. Johnson, ‘African Military Coups d'Etat and Underdevelopment: a quantitative historical analysis’, in this Journal, 22, 4, December 1984, pp. 633–66. The A.P.S.R. article is described by the authors as ‘only the latest and not the last word on these matters’ (p. 637), and it has already fulfilled this implicit prophecy by generating debate among those who have adopted a similar methodology.3

In a recent study of 90 developing countries by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organisation, 52 of them were found to have more than 15 per cent of their populations undernourished. This figure was determined using the F.A.O. minimum intake of 1,600 calories per day, only about half of that of the average diet of citizens in the ‘First World’. In Black Africa, 29 of the 33 independent nations included in the F.A.O. study fall into the category of undernourished. Contributions of aid in the form of food and food-production technology are therefore extremely important to this region. Obtaining an adequate supply of food for their people must be high on the priority list for governments in sub-Saharan Africa, and is the focus of this article.

The performance of Africa's external sector during the 1970s has been described in a number of important publications. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the continent's share of world exports declined from 3·9 per cent in 1970 to 3·4 per cent in 1979. The performance of the region's export sector had been sluggish throughout this period, growing at an annual rate of only 0·6 per cent in volume compared to 6 per cent during the last five years of the previous decade. The World Bank report on sub-Saharan Africa described the 1970s as having been characterised by growing balance-of-payments deficits, attributable partly to external factors — notably the two large oil-price shocks, the slow growth in world trade in primary commodities, and the persistently rising price of imported manufactured goods — but partly caused also by domestic factors. Even within the group of developing countries, Africa's share of non-fuel exports is estimated to have declined from over 18 per cent in 1970 to about 9 per cent in 1978. During this decade the volume of imports expanded by an estimated 58 per cent annually — although for the sub-Saharan region the growth rate was only 3 per cent — while the terms of trade worsened significantly. Official development assistance rose substantially as a whole, but offset only a part of the growing deficit.

The first substantive point raised in the 1972 communiqué issued by Premier Chou En-Lai and President Richard Nixon at the conclusion of their meetings in Peking, was that ‘extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held… on the normalisation of relations' between their two countries.1 In other words, after more than 20 years of non-recognition and hostility, it was agreed to accept areas of disagreement, and to move towards co-operation in matters of mutual interest. There was an implicit acknowledgement of the futility of efforts, either to initiate instant revolution, or to prevent basic changes inside the nation-state system, and of the inevitable need to work within the realities of international power.

Knowledge of what actually transpires in African economies is soft. This is particularly true of the vitally important agricultural sector, where statistics are especially weak. Given the paucity and unreliability of the data, analysts often make inferences on the basis of surrogate figures, a process which multiplies the probability of mistakes. This note shows that such an error has been made in the interpretation of African food-import data, and that its correction casts doubt on a widely accepted nation concering African food Production.

Does Zimbabwe provide the model for the likely transformation of white minority rule in the industrial heart of Southern Africa? With their morale boosted, the expectations of many black South Africans have been raised. Likewise many outside commentators predict the inevitable downfall of the white bastion along similar lines of escalating military confrontation after the last buffer state but Namibia has gone. Even Nationalist newspapers draw the lessons by admonishing the Government to pay attention to the ‘real leaders’ of the subordinates instead of unrepresentative collaborators. The Afrikaner political leadership uses the Rhodesian example to drum home its message of ‘adapt or die’ to a bewildered electorate.

For a long time, women's work has not been valued very highly, mainly because of the belief in many cultures that whatever is undertaken in the house is a natural duty and/or act of love for the husband and the family. Indeed, in many parts of subsistence Africa, the heavy duties performed by women in preparing, planting, weeding, and harvesting crops are regarded as ‘domestic’ commitments and hence not serious labour. This situation can hardly be said to be characteristic of only ‘non-developed’ societies, in which patriarchal attitudes are still dominant, since according to a 1985 study, although women make up more than half of the world's population and do two-thirds of the world's working hours, they receive only one-hundredth of the worl'ds property. This state of affairs, however, is now changing, because as women everywhere unite in order to achieve legal, social, and economic equality, the value attached to their work naturally increases.