Development studies meet Pierre Bourdieu: the case of Chinese Private FDI in Zambia

Abstract

Inspired by Bourdieu's field theory and utilising the case of Zambia, this article aims to enhance the understanding of the intricate relationship between Chinese private investors and sub-Saharan state institutions. The study proposes an epistemological framework that integrates sociological, anthropological and neo-institutional approaches to development studies. Through extensive fieldwork and over 75 interviews with both Chinese and Zambian stakeholders, we explore various contexts in which group-actors related to foreign capital in Zambia operate. We argue that three separate habiti – inhabited by the Zambian political class, Chinese investors and ‘ordinary’ Zambians – are crucial for comprehending private foreign capital operations in this sub-Saharan state. The ordinary Zambians and Zambian political class fields converge primarily during elections, while interactions between ordinary Zambians and Chinese investors have remained very limited (predominantly employee–employer relations), creating an ideational structure of hostility. In contrast, the Zambian political class and Chinese private investor fields crosscut and are mutually constitutive.

INTRODUCTION

In spotlighting private Chinese investment in Zambia, this article seeks to contribute to scholarly debate on the relationship between foreign private investors and sub-Saharan state institutions (Ezeoha & Cattaneo 2012; Anyanwu & Yameogo 2015; Shan et al. 2018). We selected Zambia because of the magnitude of China's economic engagement with the country, the phenomenon of anti-Chinese sentiment in Zambian politics and the accusations that China has been ‘colonising’ Zambia. Socio-political developments in Zambia can also be seen as a litmus test for other sub-Saharan states (Kopiński & Polus 2011). The article offers an epistemological proposal that connects sociological, anthropological and neo-institutional approaches to development studies. The approach is motivated by the writings of Pierre Bourdieu and stimulated by the concept of habitus, various forms of capital exchange, praxis and the field (Bourdieu 1992). We have attempted to integrate these theoretical frameworks into the broader discourse on sub-Saharan states' (in)ability to reposition themselves in the international division of labour.

The article is structured into seven sections. Firstly, we outline how Bourdieu's ideas can be utilised in development studies; secondly, we provide an overview of foreign direct investment (FDI) and institutions in the Zambian context; thirdly, we detail our research methodology and design. The fourth section delineates the Zambian context, while the fifth section examines the Chinese context and investors' relations with Zambian institutions. In the sixth section, we analyse how Zambian institutions are positioned in relation to the political class and Chinese investors. Lastly, the conclusion offers reflections on the key findings of the article.

DEVELOPMENT STUDIES MEET PIERRE BOURDIEU

Bourdieu's concept of habitus has been used in economics and development studies previously (Dodd et al. 2018; Polus et al. 2020), while it is established practice to utilise a number of Bourdieuan concepts as part of a ‘thinking toolkit’ in international relations (Leander 2011). Moreover, we believe that, through increasing the reflexivity of both authors and readers, Bourdieu's ideas can help in understanding non-European contexts, shedding light on how a given constellation of relations (re)produces certain practices (Wacquant 2018: 3). Here, we stand convinced that the ways in which we have operationalised these concepts in our research practice (for the purposes of understanding, rather than in the service of complex explanation) are ‘deeply Bourdieuan’.

The essential Bourdieuan epistemological guideline is that in order to understand a given field of social relations, one must accept that any such field is constituted not merely of structures (material and ideational) and agents who operate within (them), (re)creating the structures, but rather by a constellation of relationships between – among other things – agents, structures, capitals and habiti. Put simply: the ‘real is relational’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant 2001: 76).

We believe that (following the scientific revolution that came with the enlightenment) academic endeavours have become ‘prejudiced’ by a preoccupation with the mechanistic, and structured by a cause-and-effect manner of thinking. Given this, we do not accept the premise that, by their nature, ideas are ‘becoming’ more rational – rather, such ideas become accepted as shared beliefs through relational processes of rationalisation within various social fields. These fields inform us of the hierarchical arrangement of the social actors within them, with individuals and social groups possessing various forms of capital (economic, social, political and cultural) that can be used to accumulate further capital, thereby allowing them to sustain or change their position in a given field.

Bourdieu attempted to capture the intuitive internalisation of particular activities in the concept of habitus. In this article, we employ the idea of collective habitus, which can be defined as: ‘principles, creating a system of durable dispositions and structures, responsible for organised, semi-conscious, or unconscious practices. These principles and rules are seen as common and are treated as objective. The principles are not orchestrated by any given actor, but are collectively produced and reproduced. Adherence to the rules comes from their perceived objectivity’ (Bourdieu 1992: 53). Our main task is, therefore, to understand the contexts, praxis and collective habiti in which Zambians, Chinese investors operating in Zambia and Zambian official institutions operate.

In our view, a state institution (Bourdieuan philosophy is confined to the national context) must always legitimise itself by providing specific services and/or allowing social practices that meet the demands of those with the power to dismantle it. While this concept may seem to contradict the view that institutions form the building blocks of society, it is not. Here, sociology can be seen to meet neo-institutionalism. According to Scott (2010: 6), institutions are ‘social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience [and are] composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life’. On the other hand, as argued by Greenwood et al. (2008: 3), institutions should be regarded as entities that always seek legitimacy for their actions and adjust accordingly to changing contexts. These contexts do not, though, exist in a vacuum – they are embedded in habiti. However, since collective habiti are, as mentioned above, often semi-conscious or even unconscious, we can only ruminate upon them once we have established the relationship between praxis and context (Chwedczuk-Szulc & Polus 2020). This article intends to define the relevant contexts.

FDI AND INSTITUTIONS IN ZAMBIA

While discussion of the relationship between sub-Saharan states' institutions and FDI has been pervasive in the academic discourse (Kinda 2010; Brautigam & Xiaoyang 2011; Kragelund 2012; Demir 2016; Farla et al. 2016), the issue has not previously been considered from a Bourdieuan perspective. Instead, a significant proportion of the literature devoted to foreign investment in the Global South (especially in the extractive sector) focuses on the problem of investors' free-riding on weak and fragmented regulatory regimes (Haglund 2008; Vhumbunu 2017: 38). There is a virtual consensus among economists that ‘macroeconomic uncertainty adversely affects the flow of FDI, while institutional quality increases the flow of FDI’ (Asamoah et al. 2016). It may thus be argued that, in a Bourdiean sense, investors believe a host country's institutions provide the stability that in turn will constitute a predictable habiti for them.

As Sáez & Gallagher (2008) have pointed out, strengthening state institutions is considered one of the surest ways of promoting Africa's economic development. Given the threat of unsustainable debt faced by Zambia, which was clearly expressed in 2019 (Ndulo 2019 int.; Hinfelaar 2019 int.; Ofstad & Tjønneland 2019), as well as the neoliberal narrative concerning the need to create favourable conditions for FDI, Zambia, in theory, needs strong institutions that can serve as a signalling device to investors that the country is predictable (at least in the short and medium term). On the other hand, state institutions need to constantly legitimise their existence in a given field by achieving the functions they were created to fulfil.

Based on our findings, we believe that the canonical papers on Zambian institutions tell only part of the story. As such, we took a different approach. Rather than search for explanations attributable to an institution's design inefficiencies (Haglund 2008: 554–5), corruption (Asiedu 2006), legal empowerment (Bokpin et al. 2017) or the human capital or resources at its disposal, we looked at the constellation of relations contained inside the sphere of operations within which an institution legitimises itself. Knowledge of the interrelated contexts was then correlated with the fields and habiti in which Zambian institutions operate. The above findings allowed us to draw conclusions on the (in)efficiency of Zambian institutions established to attract and support FDI.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The problem of statistical data quality in sub-Saharan Africa is well-established in African Studies (Jerven 2013), and was something we experienced first-hand during our field research in Zambia. The Central Statistical Office in Lusaka is not mandated to collect data on the number of Chinese doing business in Zambia or the magnitude of Chinese FDI to the country. The Bank of Zambia representatives confirmed that they only track FDI above USD 5 million (The Bank of Zambia 2019 int.), while the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) only considers investments above USD 250,000. Consequently, a lot of private investment flies below the radar of Zambian institutions, an assumption further confirmed during our interviews with Chinese investors, many of whom did not know what their relationship with Zambian state institutions should look like.

Even government-related think tank ZIPAR (2019: 30) bases some of its estimates on secondary data – for example, the number of Chinese workers in Zambia given in its publications is taken from John Hopkins University. Another paradox is that our informants from the University of Zambia (UNZA) complained that we (as non-Zambian academics) had better access to officials and statistical data than they did. Zambian scholars also pointed to an ideational structure of mistrust and even hostility between the Zambian political class and academia.

The problem of data accuracy is well illustrated by the controversy surrounding the fundamental issue of exactly how many Chinese nationals reside in Zambia. Reports about the number of Chinese in Zambia vary. While some sources estimate the number of Chinese citizens living in Zambia at over 100,000 (Elocate 2018), Postel (2017: 157) has argued that the ‘Chinese population in Zambia could range from a likely 13,000 people to a maximum of 22,000’. When conducting fieldwork in Zambia, we questioned both Zambian officials and Chinese investors regarding the exact number of Chinese citizens resident in Zambia. The most frequent answer was 30,000–50,000, which, again, is significantly below the figure (100,000) usually cited by opposition parties. According to an article published by a Chinese community leader, there are over 1,000 Chinese companies and 30,000 Chinese citizens in the country (Che 2020). Due to the difficulty of determining the exact number and the amount of capital invested in Zambia, all we can do is describe different narratives and understandings of the Chinese population in Zambia. It is this research strategy we have adopted to understand Chinese private investment in Zambia.

The paper is based on fieldwork in Zambia, and more than 75 semi-structured interviews in Lusaka and the Copperbelt Province in 2010, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2019 with Chinese private investors in three sectors: agriculture, mining and manufacturing¹ (see Table 1). Additionally, we visited and interviewed representatives of various Zambian institutions that have direct or indirect links with foreign investment, as listed in Table 2. To triangulate our data and provide a deeper contextualisation of the Chinese investment presence in Zambia, we also conducted interviews with a diverse group of respondents, including Zambian NGOs, journalists, church leaders and academics. In addition, we also conducted additional virtual interviews through phone, e-mail and Zoom to better understand the impacts of the political transition during 2021 and 2023.

Table 1. List of interviewed Chinese companies

Authors' note: The company names listed here are based on the interviewees' preferences, and are not necessarily the legal or official names of the companies.

Table 2. List of interviewed Zambian institutions

THE ZAMBIAN CONTEXT

Lee (2017) emphasises the existence of diverse forms of Chinese capital in Zambia and highlights the importance of distinguishing between state capital and private capital for robust academic analysis. Despite this, our interviews and fieldwork observation suggest the academic distinction between state-owned corporations and private Chinese firms is ambiguous and remains ambiguous within the Zambian discourse (Haggai 2019 int.). When Zambian journalists or academics were queried about the difference between private and state-led FDI, the most common answer was ‘they are all Chinese’ or ‘there is no difference’. This issue can be correlated with the performative dimension of the Chinese presence in Zambia. Chinese firms have been winning major infrastructural contracts in the country, with the visibility of Chinese companies evident on the Zambian street. Chinese companies operating in Zambia have faced accusations of corruption, and there is a notable dearth of data regarding numerous deals between the Zambian government and these Chinese firms. The repeated mantra of the PF Zambian government representatives was that if the country is to develop and become attractive to foreign capital, it must first build infrastructure that will attract investors (Sikazwe 2019 int.; Nonde-Simukoko 2019 int.).

Large infrastructural projects are also used during election campaigns as evidence that the government is doing ‘something’ to develop the country. Additionally, these infrastructural projects have a performative dimension due to their material nature. Fierce public debate has arisen over the necessity of constructing two national stadia (Levy Mwanawasa Stadium in Ndola and National Heroes Stadium in Lusaka), Kenneth Kaunda Airport in Lusaka, and the dual carriageway from Lusaka to Ndola, with controversies flaring over the financing of these projects (especially in the context of Zambia's debt to China, which has been labelled with the contested term ‘debt trap diplomacy’) (Brautigam 2020; Carmody 2020).² Brautigam (2022) noticed that: ‘Among all African countries with Chinese loans, Zambia has had the largest number of distinct Chinese lenders since 2000 (18) and the second largest number of different Chinese contractors winning Chinese loan-financed projects (29)’.

Nevertheless, cases of corruption exposed by the administration of President Hichilema seem to confirm the theory that has circulated for many years, concerning the importance of the vast patronage network created during the one-party state, which linked ethnic, regional and personal interests (Szeftel 2000). On the other hand, each new administration, starting with President Chiluba, had the fight against corruption on its banners and wanted to hold political predecessors to account (Taylor 2006), at the same time, to a greater or lesser extent (President Mwanawasa may be an exception) it also used neo-patrymonial networks to maintain political power. Taking into consideration decline in copper production, it should come as no surprise that contracts with China have become the focus of a neo-patrimonial network – which needs funding to function (van Donge 2008: 83–5).

The ongoing case against former Patriotic Front minister and spokesman Chishimba Kambwili is illustrative of a recognition on the part of Zambian citizens that the political class is enriching itself on the back of contracts won by the Chinese. Without prejudging the guilt or the political nature of the trial against Kambwili (who became a bitter critic of the Lungu administration's relations with China in Western media) (DW 2021), we find the nature of the charges and their reception by Zambians extremely telling. The Lusaka Times reported that ‘Kambwili has been jointly charged with two Zambia Revenue Authority officers for presenting a fake tax clearance certificate to secure contracts’ (Lusaka Times 2019). Having presented the fake clearance, Kambwili's company received a construction contract that was then to be implemented by China Henan International – a Chinese corporation associated with building a Lusaka–Chirundu road that was swept away during the rainy season – which paid over USD 0.5 million to Kambwili's company. The Kambwili case sheds a light on the ambiguous relationship between Zambian politicians and Chinese investors, corruption issues, the problematic quality of infrastructure projects, and the possibility of using state institutions for private purposes.

Before becoming president in 2011, Michael Sata politicised the Chinese influence in Zambia, labelling Chinese investors as ‘infestors’ and calling Zambia a ‘province of China’ (Hess & Aidoo 2015). Nevertheless, even before the 2006 elections – the first in which the Chinese presence in Zambia became politicised – Zambian NGOs and trade unions had raised the issues of poor working conditions and low wages in Chinese mines. The situation in the Chambishi copper mine (the biggest Chinese investment those days) was in the spotlight. In 2005, the explosion in this very mine caused the death of 51 Zambian miners and brought health and safety issues in Chinese enterprises in Zambia into the discourse (The New Humanitarian 2006). During the interview conducted with Michael Sata back in 2010 by one of the authors, he confirmed his deep ‘displeasure on Chinese investment’ and accused China of influencing the Zambian media, which he claimed was vilifying the Patriotic Front due to ‘Chinese money’ (Sata 2010 int.). As a consequence of Sata's pronouncements, China threatened to break off relations with Zambia if he became president (Reed 2006; Adem 2010), undermining China's official principle of non-interference. Sata did indeed become Zambia's head of state in 2011, following which there was an immediate and noticeable positive shift in his tone towards the Chinese and their investment, reflecting the distinction between election campaign rhetoric and political practice. Even so, it can be argued that many of the negative claims about the Chinese presence in Zambia stem from the anti-Chinese rhetoric adopted by Sata during his political struggle with the then-ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Anti-Chinese rhetoric intertwined with accusations of corruption was also part of the United Party for National Development (UPND) political narrative. While in opposition, current president Hakainde Hichilema stated that ‘Zambia does not need to sell its assets to China to raise money which the corrupt PF government is stealing at the expense of developing the nation’ (Lusaka Times 2018). In 2020, Michael Sata's nephew – current Lusaka mayor Miles Sampa – led a crackdown on Chinese companies, including the Bank of China, the state-owned Sinoma Cement company and private-owned restaurants and barbershops, earning him considerable praise from Zambians on social media (Li 2020). Playing the card of being threatened with re-colonisation (this time by the Chinese) goes down well in the Zambian habitus, shaped as it is by the formative experience of Kenneth Kaunda's reign, which was dominated by nationalisation policies and support for the independence movements in Angola, Mozambique and, above all, Zimbabwe.

There is also a visible split between the academic discourse on Sino–Zambian relations, which is dominated by issues of debt, trade and employment, and the narratives of Zambians with whom we spoke, who were preoccupied with issues of poverty and salaries. Below we focus on the issue most often mentioned in interviews, namely fears that the government is secretly collateralising state assets. Subsequently, we correlated these findings with the Zambian habitus.

Usage of state assets as collateral and the linguistic dimension of anti-Chinese sentiments

As a consequence of the Zambian government's failure to pay back the loans used to finance Chinese-built infrastructural projects, accusations have been made that state assets such as ZESCO (electricity provider), the public television network, the newly built Kenneth Kaunda Airport and even Kafue National Park will be handed over to China. These claims were supported by an Africa Confidential article and later repeated by media and even US National Security Advisor John Bolton (Servant 2019). However, when asked about the matter during our field study, no government official would confirm whether these assets could be seized by China if Zambia ceased to pay its debts.

In 2018, multiple controversies erupted when the state-owned Times of Zambia published an article in Chinese, fuelling accusations that the Chinese are poised to take over public media (Musambi 2018). Such concerns about a Chinese takeover of public institutions is reflected in the language used by Zambians, with some using words such as ‘Chanbia’ (implying that Zambia as a first Chinese African colony) or phrases such as ‘Zambia is chinalising too fast’ (in reference to the potential seizure of Zambian national assets by China). Furthermore, anti-Chinese political rhetoric meant the phrase ‘Chinaman’ already had derogatory connotations in the Nyanja language even before 2018.³ Since then, the Covid-19 pandemic and widespread claims that Chinese nationals brought the virus to Zambia have further strengthened negative perceptions of Chinese investors.

Zambian fields and habitus

The issues most often mentioned in the literature on Zambia's political culture include narrow elitism, a rhetorical commitment to the idea of a developmental state, and equating the ruling party's interests with the national interest (van Donge 2008). Given that a habitus does not change overnight, we argue that Zambia's political culture should be regarded as a product of habitus and mutual relations within various fields rather than a structural feature of Zambian political life. Under Kenneth Kaunda, an extensive neo-patrimonial network was created,⁴ alongside a ‘winner-take-all’ approach to political transitions – this in turn shaped the dispositions of those in the Zambian political class, prompting them to act in certain ways. Kaunda attempted to concentrate national resources in his hands in order to sustain an inclusive network of patronage, thereby providing Zambia with much-needed stability. The economic collapse of the late 1980s forced Zambia to accept a raft of neoliberal reforms as part of the country's new macroeconomic strategy, including privatising Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM)⁵ and creating conditions favourable for FDI. While macroeconomic conditions changed, the Zambian habitus did not, with inclusive patronage still predominant in both economic and political life. The neo-patrimonial network endured because there was enough economic capital (coming from international aid, borrowing on international markets and relatively high international copper prices) in the system to sustain it. Political and social capital within the Zambian field, combined with dispositions shaped by the neo-patrimonial habitus, opened up access to economic capital accumulation. In fact, in the Zambian context, it can be argued that it is political capital that allows the accumulation of economic capital, rather than vice versa, as might intuitively be assumed.

In 2020, Zambia found itself technically bankrupt, with Zambian economists claiming that the country had in fact been caught in an unacknowledged ‘soft’ default since 2018 (Manchishi, Phiri, Nakamba-Kabso 2019 int.). Zambia borrowed money and the political class created a belief that investment in infrastructure would generate more jobs. However, there was insufficient economic capital in the system to sustain the inclusiveness of the neo-patrimonial network, with the resultant impossibility of absorbing new people into the network leading to the creation of a new field consisting of the Zambian political elite and Chinese investors. This field is perceived by ‘ordinary Zambians’ as being impossible to penetrate without the necessary social capital – i.e. connections – which in turn leads to apathy on their part (White Fathers 2019 int.; Mafa 2019 int.).

The overwhelming feeling of a lack of access to the Zambian political elite/Chinese investor field manifests itself in public perceptions of the Zambian state institutions responsible for encouraging FDI and ensuring foreign investment has a positive effect on Zambians. Thus, institutions such as the Citizens Economic Empowerment Commission or ZDA are perceived as acting in the interests of agents operating within a field ordinary Zambians are excluded from. While several respondents condemned the use of state institutions for personal/family benefit (Mafa 2019 int.; White Fathers 2019 int.), they also felt a lack of agency when it comes to enforcing greater effectiveness on the part of such institutions. Meanwhile, Zambian officials explained the institutions' ineffectiveness in meeting their statutory objectives as due to understaffing and under-financing. From our point of view, the complete separation of the field in which state officials operate from the field in which Zambians define themselves as agents means that, in principle, Zambian institutions do not have to legitimise themselves before the Zambian people. Moreover, the lack of inclusivity of the state patronage network can be seen as a cause of Zambians' political apathy. The patronage network was seen as impossible to spend, and thus impossible for the individual Zambians to improve their material status.

THE CHINESE CONTEXT

No systematic surveys have been conducted among Chinese living in Zambia on their attitudes towards Zambians and the country's state institutions (Wu 2020). Most information gathered regarding Chinese perceptions of Zambia is either anecdotal or has been produced on the basis of ethnographic and anthropological research techniques. Against this backdrop, we sought the views of Chinese private investors on Zambia's institutions through a series of interviews with individuals in this group.

Despite the worsening economic situation in Zambia, the interviewed Chinese investors generally held a positive attitude towards the future, with many declaring that they perceive Zambia as a place they want to stay and develop their businesses in. Regardless of the difficulties discussed below, respondents described Zambia as ‘a place of multiple opportunities’ (various Chinese entrepreneurs 2017 and 2019 int.), and no one indicated they were considering moving back to China. We encountered two Chinese companies that had relocated from Angola/Nigeria to Zambia, citing the reason that conducting business in Zambia is ‘more transparent’. In the section below, we list the four most commonly mentioned aspects of Chinese business activity in Zambia that arose during the interviews.

Work permits

The majority of Chinese respondents identified acquiring work permits for their compatriots as the biggest challenge they faced. Respondents highlighted the non-transparent procedure, a lack of information, and the ‘need to hire companies’ that ‘make it easier’ for Chinese nationals to obtain a work permit in Zambia. An official from the Economic and Commercial Counsellor's Office of China in Zambia admitted in an online interview that he had heard many complaints from Chinese investors in the country, observing:

Many Chinese business leaders and community leaders in Zambia have informed us about the difficulties they face in obtaining work permits. They told us that getting work permits for Chinese citizens is really time-consuming, tedious and troublesome. The Economic and Commercial Counsellor is certainly aware of it. When meeting with Zambian officials, we always emphasise how important it is to create a friendly business environment in the country. But honestly, we cannot do much. Because as diplomats, it is important for us to not to cross the line as ‘non-interference’ is a basic principle of China's foreign policy (Official from China's Economic and Commercial Counsellor's Office in Zambia 2021 int.).

In addition, according to various Chinese managers responsible for applying for work permits, they are required to pay ‘tips’ to officials from the Zambian Department of Immigration. The additional ‘tip’ required to pay for a single work permit usually ranges from 10,000 to 45,000 Zambian Kwachas.⁶

Linguistic problems

Chinese investors mentioned communication issues with Zambians, with some acknowledging the problem was also on the Chinese side, where there was a lack of knowledge of English and/or local languages. Additionally, some Zambian workers employed in Chinese companies complained that they were uncomfortable with how Chinese managers communicated with them, saying it could be considered arrogant and offensive. During our fieldwork, we also found that the English-language proficiency of many senior Chinese technicians and experts responsible for teaching skills to the locals had not improved over time, despite years of living and working in Zambia. For instance, a Chinese agriculture expert we visited who had a doctorate degree and had resided in Zambia for nearly 15 years could barely speak English, and had to rely on a Chinese interpreter whenever he held meetings with Zambians.

Work ethics

Previous research has identified notable differences in work ethic between Chinese and Zambian workers, which can lead to a misalignment between the expectations of Chinese procurers and Zambian suppliers (Fessehaie 2012; Fessehaie & Morris 2013). For instance, a study conducted by Fessehaie & Morris (2013) found that Chinese mining companies operating in Zambia experienced significant frustration due to local suppliers' inability to meet their expectations in terms of reliability and timely delivery. Many Chinese investors also noted differences in the work ethic of Chinese and Zambians, with some interviewees explaining that in situations where a particular input can be sourced from a Zambian supplier, they prefer to turn to their Chinese or Indian counterparts, who usually ‘work 24/7’. A Chinese procurement manager, for example, claimed, ‘on weekdays after 5:00 PM, they [Zambian suppliers] go to pubs for beer; they go to church on weekends. But for us, time is money and we cannot wait’ (Chinese procurement manager from Chinese manufacturing company 2019 int.). A number of Chinese investors also complained that Zambian suppliers ‘do not deliver on time’, with a senior manager from a Chinese mining company explaining:

Ideally, we would like to work with local companies more closely, but we found it very challenging as we have very different work ethics. I am not saying which one is superior or which one is better. I am just saying it is different. For example, most of local sourcing companies do not work after 5:00PM, they also do not work on weekends. Well, personally, I think this is good for them. If I could choose, I would not work overtime. But this is not how we work. When we face an issue, we would like to sort it out as soon as possible, no matter it is weekday or weekend. Working with Chinese companies, we work under similar work ethic. We can communicate anytime; it is more effective. Especially if the Chinese commit a time to deliver, I can trust my Chinese partner to deliver on time. But this is not the case when you are working with a Zambian one. It is more difficult to build mutual trust. We have had lessons. We just want to play a safer card (senior Chinese manager from a Chinese mining company 2019 int.).

Here, it should be emphasised that even the Zambian Minister of Labour was aware that the Chinese work ethic is impossible to transplant into Zambian conditions (Nonde-Simukoko 2019 int.). In addition, a number of Zambian suppliers have expressed concerns about the apparent lack of support from Chinese companies in terms of direct or indirect assistance, as well as the perceived lack of investment in building stronger partnerships with local suppliers. A former official from the Ministry of Works and Supply (dissolved) explained:

Chinese companies operating in Zambia have made a positive contribution to the country's economy, especially in terms of job creation and revenue generation. However, with the increased investment from China, Zambians – especially Zambian suppliers – have higher expectations of these companies. Zambian companies are concerned about whether Chinese companies are fulfilling their corporate social responsibility obligations and whether they are willing to work closely with Zambian suppliers to help them improve their capacity. For Zambians, this is not simply a matter of business; it is also an ethical issue because it determines whether Chinese engagement is solely motivated by self-interest (former official from the Ministry of Works and Supply 2017 int.).

Corruption

According to our respondents, corruption is a pervasive issue in Zambia, with many claiming that paying bribes is an inherent element of doing business. An official from the Anti-corruption Commission emphasised how corruption has contributed to the erosion of public trust in government institutions. According to the official, foreign companies, including Chinese firms across various sectors, have been involved in bribery and kickbacks to secure political protection, whether passively or actively. Such practices have a detrimental effect on the integrity of politicians and civil servants, and they ultimately lead to the erosion of public trust in government institutions (official from the Anti-Corruption Commission 2023 int.)

However, the attitude of Chinese investors to this phenomenon is more complex than conventional knowledge might suggest. While some Chinese entrepreneurs regard corruption as one of the most significant barriers to foreign investment, they are also to some degree sympathetic, as they are aware that those asking for bribes ‘also have dependents’. One respondent described this situation as ‘not corruption, it is poverty’.

On the other hand, one Chinese investor noted the ‘cost of time’ problem related to government inspections and the need to pay representatives of the same government agency ‘twice’ for a ‘positive inspection result’. Notably, we found that some of the Chinese entrepreneurs we spoke to were involved in high-level corruption. One proudly shared the story of how he financed the presidential election campaigns of both Michael Sata and Rupiah Banda in 2011, while another admitted he had maintained close relations with President Edgar Lungu's family, explaining, ‘this is normal in Africa, otherwise, such a big company like ours cannot survive well. If you don't know the top leaders, the other little soldiers [小兵小将, refers to staff at the lower or junior level] will keep looking for problems and expect you to pay them tips’. A managing director of a large private firm, who had been working in Zambia for over 15 years and claimed to have had close relationships with Edgar Lungu, Michael Sata and Rupiah Banda, shared his ‘tips’ on how to do business in Zambia:

When you want to do business in Africa, you need to maintain close relationships with senior politicians. More senior, the better. This is why I have had good relationship with all the presidents, from Lungu to Banda. Meeting an African president is not difficult, as long as you have money. You can even go to their home to have dinner with them. You need to ‘invest’ in these meetings. Well, you can call it ‘corruption’, but you can also call it ‘public relations’ or lobbying, like what the Americans often do in politics. It depends on how you understand it. Because of my close relationship with senior politicians in the country, it saves me a lot of troubles (Managing director of a Chinese mining company 2019 int.).

The investors' personal relationships with Zambian politicians, who can ‘protect’ them, may make state institutions less effective in fulfilling their statutory obligations. This is because such institutions are held accountable for their effectiveness by politicians rather than ordinary Zambians. Moreover, institutions and politicians belong to the same field.

In contrast to the above, we met a young Chinese businessman who was dismissive of bribes and wanted to follow the formal channels. He claimed he and his companies were ‘victims of corruption’:

Now for Chinese to get a working permit is really expensive. For a working permit, the official price is 18,000 Kwacha, which is about USD 1200. But the immigration officers have become very greedy. They usually require Chinese who apply for working permits to add USD 1000 as ‘tips’. Some Chinese companies I know have to spend USD 3000 or even USD 5000 for one working permit. This is not good. Immigration officers now see Chinese as walking ATM machines. You know that corruption is contagious. When immigration officers see Chinese as walking ATM machines, the police officers, officials who are responsible for collecting tax, also see Chinese as walking ATM machines. For smaller companies like ours, paying extra tips can be really a big burden for us. We always want to follow the formal and lawful procedure, but it takes really long time and patience. I recently applied renewal of working permit three months ago for a colleague, we still did not get it, because we did not pay ‘tips’ (Managing director of a Chinese manufacturing company 2019 int.).

In addition, we formally requested interviews with officials from the Zambian Immigration Agency to address allegations of soliciting tips from foreign citizens. However, these allegations were denied by the officials (officials from the Zambian Immigration Agency 2023 int.). During one of our visits to the Immigration Agency, one of the authors accompanied a Chinese manager who was seeking an extension of work permits. Two immigration officers directly solicited a tip of ‘2500 USD’, telling the Chinese manager that the amount was for their bosses. A Kitwe-based Chinese managing director shared his experience: ‘some of the Zambian officials and civil servants were very direct in their requests for money, while others came with a smile to my company, complaining that they had not been paid by the government for months and that their families had no money to eat. It was clear what they meant: If given some money, they would leave and everything could be resolved smoothly’ (Kitwe-based Chinese managing director 2017 int.).

Chinese investors' relations with institutions

In order to establish linkages between foreign firms and local companies, particularly in cases where significant disparities exist in technology and market access, it is essential for governments to offer incentives (Schmitz 2007; Jeppesen & Kragelund 2021). Guided by the above claim, we wanted to determine the extent to which Zambian institutions have taken steps to facilitate linkages between Chinese investors and local businesses. In terms of Zambian institutions, while the ZDA was mentioned most often, respondents were unable to name any ZDA activities aimed at creating linkages between their businesses and Zambian companies. Meanwhile, as noted by a Chinese entrepreneur and managing director of a Lusaka-based mining company:

I am not in touch with any Chinese authorities from mainland China and there is no pressure from the Chinese authorities. The Chinese Embassy or the ambassador would encourage us to employ more Zambians, train the locals and contribute to the employment and skills transfer. This kind of encouragement often comes from some meetings or events, or from ambassador's speech (Managing Director of Yasun Investment 2019 int.).

For Chinese private investors, formal and informal associations of Chinese living in Zambia are much more important when it comes to day-to-day business activities (Li & Shi 2020). As demonstrated by Li (2022), WeChat – a Chinese multi-purpose messaging, social media and mobile payment app – has undoubtedly become the most important communication channel for Chinese migrants in Zambia. Through WeChat, Chinese businesspeople in Zambia can communicate online with other Chinese suppliers on a 24/7 basis, with Zambian suppliers usually excluded. Our general observation is that the Chinese-run private companies, at least in Lusaka province, usually function in economic clusters that also include other Chinese-run companies. Whenever there is a need for specific goods or services, Chinese companies turn to Chinese suppliers or import goods from China/Europe/South Africa, as there is a lack of non-Chinese enterprises in Zambia that are capable of meeting their demands in terms of quantity and quality (see e.g. Carmody et al. 2020; Jeppesen & Kragelund 2021). Our interview with the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) corroborates this view, indicating that local companies in Zambia struggle to compete with foreign entities due to factors such as lack of scale, inferior technology and inferior quality and quantity of production (official from the CCPC 2017 int.). It seems that the structural features of the Zambian economy are central to why linkages and spillover effects fail to occur within it, and why Chinese private investors do not expect anything from Zambian state institutions (Li et al. 2022).

The Chinese field

Based on the collected factual material, we argue that Chinese companies in Zambia are operating in a different habitus. This habitus provides a set of unwritten or unconscious rules and codes that help Chinese investors in Zambia navigate their everyday business lives. One of the most apparent features of the habitus is manifested in the social connections (guanxi) established between Chinese businesspeople in Zambia. This process can be understood from two perspectives: namely, how Chinese businesspeople deal with their Chinese counterparts (in particular, other Chinese suppliers), and how they deal with Zambian government officials or civil servants.

While competition among Chinese companies in the same industry can be vicious, they are generally friendly to their upstream and downstream counterparts. This is to a large degree inevitable, as Zambian enterprises are often unable to meet the Chinese companies' demands (in terms of availability, quantity, quality and sometimes urgency). Nevertheless, we argue that the unique Chinese habitus further reduces any likelihood of local suppliers being chosen, even in a context where they can meet Chinese companies' demands. During our fieldwork, we observed many Chinese managers having business dinners with their Chinese business partners, including suppliers or potential suppliers. Many deals were negotiated at the dinner table in a very informal way. Maintaining good relationships with Chinese business partners can help Chinese businesspeople in Zambia accumulate social capital in the Chinese community/field, especially among Chinese associations. Thus, taking care of ‘upstream’ or ‘downstream’ Chinese companies is not simply ‘doing a favour for compatriots’, but a process of acquiring more social capital in the Chinese field – a field that combines business relationships, community and associational relationships.

The vast majority of our Chinese respondents complained about how corrupt and unprofessional Zambian institutions are. As one interviewee pointed out, ‘The Zambian institutions want nothing but money from us’ (Chief Financial Officer of a Chinese manufacturing company 2021 int.). A typical mindset among our Chinese interviewees was that they wanted to ‘avoid troubles’ when dealing with Zambian institutions, and so approached the issue from the point of view of efficiency and pragmatism (Chinese entrepreneurs in Zambia 2017 and 2019 int.). As an interviewee pointed out, ‘In Zambia, problems that can be solved with money are not problems’ (Chinese businessman 2019 int.).

According to our respondents, the institutions that Chinese companies are most often forced to interact with are the most ‘authoritative’ departments, such as the Zambia Immigration Office, Zambia Revenue Authority and the Police. One interviewee, the managing director of a Chinese steel factory, complained that he had to deal with two totally different groups of people from the Zambia Revenue Authority in a day – both had come to his factory asking for ‘tips’. Many of our Chinese interviewees, however, had never even heard of the ZDA, which is supposed to be monitoring the spillover effects of foreign companies. At the policy implementation level, there is no mechanism or incentive to stimulate Chinese companies into working with local suppliers.

Overall, the functioning of an established and organised class of Chinese private investors in Zambia supports the conclusion that there will be no exodus from Zambia to China when official loans from China are halted, as was in the case of Angola.

ZAMBIAN INSTITUTIONS

We also conducted interviews with a number of key institutions in Zambia (see Table 2). Our primary aim was to understand the position of these institutions within their respective fields: Do they have their own institutional habiti, or do they function within the Zambian habitus? Moreover, what dispositions for action are dominant within a given habitus?

The vast majority of Zambian civil servants believe that the legal frameworks that condition their institutions' operations are of a high quality. During Lungu's term, Minister of Labour Joyce Nonde went so far as to claim ‘Zambia has one of the best labour laws in the region’ (Nonde-Simukoko 2019 int.). However, respondents cited understaffing and under-financing as significant challenges. The Minister of Labour confirmed that while a Special Skills programme for skills transfer exists, it has not produced the expected results and spillover effects. In the most promising areas such as engineering, manufacturing and architecture, the skills gap is simply too large. Moreover, according to her estimates, in 2019 the Ministry of Labour ‘had 110 inspectors, there should be at least 1,000’ to fulfil its monitoring functions (Nonde-Simukoko 2019 int.). The minister added that, ‘We are caught up by the situation and we don't know what to do’ (Nonde-Simukoko 2019 int.).

The problem of meeting statutory objectives when face with a low budget and understaffing was even more visible in the case of the ZDA, with representatives admitting that the agency is unable to fulfil its mandate due to its very low budget (around 3 million kwachas in 2019⁷) and lack of presence outside Lusaka in the wake of its offices in Solwezi, Ndola, Kitwe and Livingstone all having been closed down (ZDA 2019 int.). Moreover, the ZDA only gives certificates to (and monitors) investment projects that exceed the USD 250,000 threshold, meaning that many small private investments fall under its radar. Additionally, while after-care visits should in theory monitor the creation of linkages between a given foreign investment and the local economy, in 2019 the ZDA only had three people monitoring the entire country, and none of the Chinese companies we visited were even aware of the existence of ‘after-care visits’ in Zambia. Our additional interviews in 2021 indicated that nothing had changed in terms of the relationship between the ZDA and Chinese investors. This does not, though, mean that ZDA employees themselves would not like to work in an institution that works effectively.

The promotion of economic growth in Zambia has been hindered not only by the challenges mentioned above but also by the ‘fragmented and incoherent’ nature of the key policies and programmes aimed at achieving this goal (Jeppesen & Kragelund 2021: 602). This observation has been echoed by an official from the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, who explained that while there are some policies and programmes in place, they are generally too broad and lack specificity. The official explained:

During Lungu's term, short-term planning was prioritized due to the election, which has had a negative impact on the ability of the ministry [the Ministry of Finance and National Planning] to engage in proper, long-term planning. As for HH [president Hichilema], he has made significant personnel changes, and there is a lack of trust between the current administration and officials who worked for Lungu. This has further hampered efforts to achieve coherency and continuity in economic policies across different administrations. So, it is very challenging to discern a clear and cohesive economic policy framework that spans both the Lungu and Hichilema administrations (official from the Ministry of Finance and National Planning 2023 int.).

CONCLUSION

The concept of habitus, as developed by Bourdieu, has proven useful in development studies and constitutes an important addition to the existing literature on FDI in sub-Saharan states. Drawing on over 75 in-depth interviews with Chinese investors and Zambian politicians, civil servants and intellectuals, along with observations of how state institutions are working, we argue that three separate habiti exist in Zambia: one inhabited by the Zambian political class, one inhabited by Chinese investors and one inhabited by ‘ordinary’ Zambians. These three habiti rarely intersect, and essentially correspond to three separate fields that do not in any substantial way overlap. The ordinary Zambians and Zambian political class fields meet primarily at the time of elections, while interactions between ordinary Zambians and Chinese investors have remained very limited (predominantly employee–employer relations), creating an ideational structure of hostility. The root causes of the increasingly negative perception of Chinese FDI in Zambia can be traced back to the politicisation of the Chinese presence in the country by Michael Sata. By contrast, the Chinese investor field and the Zambian political class field crosscut. Every politician, despite having has criticised Chinese investors while in opposition, establishes relatively cosy relations after coming to power.

Political capital enables Chinese investors to accumulate economic capital, which is then exchanged for concessions that facilitate business activities in Zambia. On the other side of the equation, the shrinking economic capital available within the Zambian political system means that the political class is desperate to find new sources of such capital. As such, they seek to obtain economic capital by exchanging their political capital, thereby enabling foreign investors to do business in Zambia. Strikingly enough, a member of the research team was approached by the Zambian ministers ‘to do business with them’, which may point towards the desperation of a political class that is constantly on the lookout for new spoils and economic capital in order to maintain the neo-patrimonial political system.

Zambian institutions operate within the habitus of the political class and are dependent on the resources provided by the government. The ruling elite, meanwhile, is guided by short-term, profit-oriented logic. Taking into consideration Zambia's current economic situation, the likelihood of strengthening the county's institutions to a level where they can adequately perform their statutory functions remains limited.