If during the 1960s the coup d'état emerged as the most visible and recurrent characteristic of the African political experience, by the 1980s quasi-permanent military rule, of whatever ideological hue, had become the norm for much of the continent. At any moment in time, up to 65 per cent of all Africa's inhabitants and well over half its states are governed by military administrators. Civilian rule is but a distant memory in some countries. Few at some stage or another have not been run by an armed-forces junta, and fewer still have not been rocked at least once by an attempted coup, putsch, or military-sponsored plot. According to one tabulation, ‘only six states have not witnessed some form of extra-legal armed involvement in national politics since 1958’.1 The phenomenon has even reached the non-state Homelands of Bophuthatswana, Transkei, and Ciskei in South Africa. Rule by civilians is very much the statistical ‘deviation’ from the continental norm, as military leaders lay a permanent claim to the political throne in much of Africa

This paper examines Ghana's struggle to create a pluralistic nationality that guarantees universal rights to all citizens, including people of foreign origin. A major recipient of colonial labour migrants who considered themselves citizens of Ghana at the time of independence, Ghana provides an excellent case study for exploring the ambiguities and malleability of post-colonial citizenship. Analysing the various ways in which Ghanaian politicians have struggled to redefine the nationality status of descendants of migrants from other parts of West Africa since independence, I argue that the politicisation of Ghana's post-colonial citizenship stems not only from the country's colonial legacy, but also from struggles over diminishing economic resources between the late 1960s and early 1980s that led some indigenous Ghanaians to declare the non-autochthonous population as ‘aliens’ who should be excluded from the benefits of citizenship. Constitutional provisions that recognised citizenship by birth were contested by popular perceptions that only the autochthonous are ‘true’ citizens and are thus the only legitimate beneficiaries of political and economic rights.

The ‘discovery’ of third-world women and their situation followed in the wake of research by feminists in western societies. In the late 1960s, Ester Boserup documented that especially African rural women had experienced a major increase in their workload during this century; they had become the main producers not only of subsistence food but also of cash crops.

An idea which has recently gained acceptance is that peasant cultivators do in fact act in an economically ‘rational’ manner to maximise profits. It can be shown that ‘rational’ economic behaviour is characteristic of traders also. But not all the shibboleths associated with beliefs to the contrary have been swept away. In a well-known textbook on economic development Everett Hagen stated that, in order to make the shift from ‘bazaar’ to ‘fixed- price’ retailing, traders ‘must adopt a set of techniques and risks new to [them] ‘2 Here it will be evident that some of the business techniques long familiar to Accra market women have equal utility for petty retailing or wholesale dealing based on a fixed place of business. The difference between ‘bazaar’ and ‘fixed-price’ retailing is not clearly definable in terms of techniques employed. Also, education in Ghana in its present form does not ‘increase the ability of [traders] to receive information concerning improved methods and improved opportunities’, as Hagen would have it.3 Rather, the disadvantages of illiteracy are more than offset by techniques imbued by a long-established apprenticeship system for women traders.

During the 1960s, Nigeria's stability was so severely threatened by such factors as reckless politics, military coups d'etat, refugee problems, and secessionist movements that foreign observers predicted the failure of a hitherto glorified model of a newly independent, democratic, multinational state in West Africa. In February 1966 pessimism about Nigeria's political future was so great that some observers inside and outside Nigeria believed that such a British-created federation as Nigeria's could not survive after the failure of the similarly launched Central African Federation, the West Indian Federation, and Malaysia (after Singapore's separation) 1.

The struggle for African independence was waged under the banner of the right of self-determination, and today African states and the Organisation of African Unity give financial and diplomatic support to the liberation movements of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique. Yet the same African states and the O.A.U. denounced Biafra's attempted withdrawal from Nigeria and similar struggles in Southern Sudan, Chad, and Eritrea, without reference to the possible merits of their peoples' claims to the right of self-determination. Biafran secession, in particular, was condemned as a priori detrimental to African interests: it was incompatible with the goal of African unity and would set a precedent that could lead to the further balkanisation of the continent.

In one party dominant democracies, political parties often lose vitality. Interviews with ANC branch members reveal a more encouraging picture of the party's inner life. Members engage voluntarily in a range of party-sponsored activities. The ANC's organisational deployment is directed at the mobilisation of a militant activist community. Its commitment to consultative decision-making has declined, however, though under certain conditions the rank and file can challenge leadership successfully. The ANC's internal electoral arrangements promote consensus rather than competition, despite the interest they evoke from members. In general, despite the ANC's hegemonic aspirations, increasingly it conforms to the behaviour of an electorally oriented party in a liberal democracy.

Sub-Saharan African (SSA) is negotiating a new trade regime with the European Union (EU), under the threat of increased barriers against its exports if agreement is not reached before 2008. This article examines the potential impact on regional integration of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) being negotiated. Both sides pay lip service to greater regional integration, which is a stated objective of EPAs. But the article provides research evidence suggesting that EPAs will weaken regionalism, and in so doing adds to the literature on what happens when external powers attempt to use leverage to press trade policy change. Based on an analysis of SSA's trade with the EU, the article shows that countries may be encouraged to reinforce rather than eliminate barriers to the free circulation of goods between them, because of the choices they make in the details of their trade regimes with Europe. It also establishes a methodology that can be applied to new data as the negotiations progress.

In recent years, ‘African homophobia’ has become a spectacle on the global stage, making Africa into a pre-modern site of anti-gay sentiment in need of Western intervention. This article suggests that ‘homophobia’ in post-2009 Malawi is an idiom through which multiple actors negotiate anxieties around governance and moral and economic dependency. I illustrate the material conditions that brought about social imaginaries of inclusion and exclusion – partially expressed through homophobic discourse – in Malawi. The article analyses the cascade of events that led to a moment of political and economic crisis in mid-2011, with special focus on how a 2009 sodomy case made homophobia available as a new genre of social commentary. Employing discourse analysis of newspaper articles, political speeches, the proceedings of a sodomy case, and discussions about men who have sex with men (MSM) as an HIV risk group, I show how African homophobia takes form via interested deployments of ‘cultural’ rhetoric toward competing ends. This article lends a comparative case study to a growing literature on the political and social functions of homophobia in sub-Saharan Africa.

In December 2010 Ghana pumped its first oil and a local content law was passed in 2013 to promote local participation in the oil and gas industry. This paper examines Ghanaian entrepreneurial activities and the dynamics of local participation in the emerging oil and gas sector. We explore Ghanaian entrepreneurs' strategies of mobilising networks to acquire information, build trust, raise financial capital and reduce risk with the aim to gain entry, win contracts and participate in the oil and gas industry. We argue that the resources and strategies activated by entrepreneurs embedded in the context of the Ghanaian business environment are inadequate and problematic when deployed in the context of the international oil and gas industry. The international oil companies' cost-intensive standard requirements and state officials' informal interventions further limit local firms' prospects for participation in the oil and gas industry.

The implementation of economic reforms in Africa under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) has undoubtedly produced the kind of social dislocation so well described by Barry Riddell in a recent article in this Journal. The structural adjustment programmes (S.A.P.s) have also in some cases generated growth, as noted by Michel Camdessus, director-general of the I.M.F. in 1991: ‘Soon more than 30 African countries will apply these growth strategies. Where the programmes have been applied rigorously, results have been impressive. ’

Bullets rather than ballots have dominated politics in Uganda since independence, where two governments have been removed by coups, one by a foreign invasion, and another by an armed rebellion. Force has not only dominated the formal political system, but also threatened the economic and social basis on which democratic processes and progressive development depends. For 25 years predatory military rule and civil war have destroyed lives, skills, and assets, undermined institutional competence and accountability, caused widespread per sonal trauma, suppressed autonomous organisations in civil society, and intensified ethnic hostility and conflict. And Uganda is not alone in this – the middle of the twentieth century was dominated by fascism and war, while sectarian or ethnic conflicts in Bosnia, Ulster, Sri Lanka, Somalia, the Sudan, Angola, Liberia, Zaï, Burundi, and Rwanda have inflicted untold damage on people and property.1

This article unravels the world of ethnic associations in Katanga that emerged as a result of rural–urban migration. These associations constitute a multi-tier system reflecting ethnic, provincial and national identity levels. Primarily meant to organise mutual aid and foster cultural values, they have behaved as interest groups since democracy was re-established in the 1990s. Representing ethnic communities, they try to influence the distribution of spoils through lobbying activities, emphasising the right of ‘autochthons’ to be prioritised regarding employment and development. Political and socio-economic changes trigger identity shifts and ethnic associations adapt by inventing alternative ‘autochthony’/‘allochthony’ dichotomies, causing friction between communities. The multi-tier system provides forums where ethnic differences can be negotiated and ethnic communities can integrate. In its current manner of functioning it is only effective at mitigating acute crises. In order to resolve more complex political issues, it would benefit from a preventive approach within a permanent framework of consultation between associations and authorities.

Following a negotiated transition to democracy in South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established to deal with crimes of the past regime. Despite the detail of submissions and the length of the Final Report, this article highlights the partiality of truth recognised by the Commission. The usefulness of acknowledged truth to deal with South Africa's past is shown to have been neutralised by wider concerns of social and criminal justice. In detailing the governmental reticence to provide reparations, the judicial disregard to pursue prosecutions, and the dismissal of responsibility for apartheid at a wider social level, the author argues that opportunities for reconciliation and developmental change are limited. Against the problems of crime, violence and unresolved land issues, the potential of the TRC to build a ‘reconciliatory bridge’ is called into question. The truth offered by the Commission increasingly appears of limited value.

Government and civil society leaders in African transitional states often use rituals and expressions inspired by tradition to facilitate the integration of ex-combatants and displaced people. In Sierra Leone, the expression ‘There's no bad bush to throw away a bad child’, conveys a vision of African society as inherently forgiving and inclusive, and of Africans as needing to be amongst their own people. This ideal was perfectly suited for the needs of an impoverished state seeking to ease the strain on cities, and relying on communities' organic capacities to absorb their own people. This research draws on interviews with diverse Sierra Leoneans to examine the assumptions behind this communitarian ideal. It argues that while ‘There is no bad bush … ’ promotes a form of reconciliation defined as peaceful coexistence, it lacks the elements of justice required for deep reconciliation to occur.

This paper examines inter-ethnic conflict over grazing land previously accessed as common property. It presents results of a study undertaken in Mieso district of eastern Ethiopia where two ethnic groups maintain different production systems – pastoral and agropastoral. The historical change in land use by one of the ethnic groups, resource scarcity, violation of customary norms, power asymmetry and livestock raids are among the factors that have contributed to the recurrence of conflict. Particularly important is the role of raids in triggering conflict and restricting access to grazing areas. Socio-economic and political factors are responsible for power asymmetry and the increasing scale of raids. An increase in the frequency of violence and a decline in the capacity of customary authority in conflict management advance the role of the state in establishing enforceable property rights institutions. This will succeed only if policies and interventions are redirected at suppressing incentives for violence, establishing new institutional structures in consultation with clan elders of both parties, and building internal capacity to monitor conflict-triggering events.

How has the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union helped promote peace, security and stability on the African continent? This article assesses the PSC's activities in light of insights generated by the literature on international security institutions. After providing an overview of the immediate origins of the PSC, it discusses five elements of the Council's institutional design. It then evaluates the PSC's activities during its first five years (2004–9), by examining the Council's political relevance, its efficiency and productivity, and whether it is the institution best placed to deal with the continent's security problems. It concludes that the PSC's future will hinge on whether more of the African Union's members can be persuaded to devote more serious levels of resources (human and financial) to it.

Guinea-Bissau has been regularly described as a ‘narco-state’. Yet, few studies analyse how drug trafficking has evolved here. Based on extensive interviews in Guinea-Bissau over several years, this paper documents the process. It concludes that using the term ‘narco-state’, where much of the state has little or no capacity, is inappropriate. A better approach is to analyse the actions of key players as an elite protection network. In Guinea-Bissau, that network did not act on its own, but relied on a series of ‘entrepreneurs' who operated as an interface between traffickers and the elite. While the military as an institution is often said to be in charge of trafficking, exclusive control by high-ranking military personnel within the elite network only occurred relatively late. Senior soldiers' attempts to provide more than just protection, and to enter the drug market themselves, led to the network's undoing.

Increased attention has recently been paid to the phase of ‘primary resistance’ when Africa first had to confront western intrusion. The arguments of scholars like Terence Ranger for Eastern Africa and Michael Crowder for Western Africa identify those early armed challenges by Africans against colonial rule as the very origins of modern nationalism in the continent. By this argument, Tanzania's ruling party and its function as a liberating force has for its ancestry both the Maji Maji and earlier rebellions against German rule from the 1880s onwards. African struggles against colonial rule did not begin with modern political parties and western trained intellectuals, but originated in those early ‘primary resisters’ with their spears poised against western military technology.1

The failure of a power-sharing attempt at peace in Burundi in 1993 led to the killing of hundreds of thousands of Burundians and played a significant role in feeding tensions leading up to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, in which another 800,000 people lost their lives. A look at the specifics of this power-sharing arrangement in the framework of Arend Lijphart's theory of consociational democracy leads to some interesting conclusions and insights into why the effort at peace failed and how future efforts could be improved. The paper looks at the arrangement in terms of Lijphart's four main pillars for successful consociationalism in deeply divided states: a grand coalition, segmental autonomy, minority overrepresentation or parity, and a minority veto. The extent to which Lijphart's recommendations were implemented is assessed along with the impact of their presence or absence. The analysis leads to some important lessons and further questions which are of particular importance as Burundi heads into its latest attempt at a stable and peaceful society.