I examine the origin and development of institutions that assign and enforce rights to hard rock minerals located on federal lands in the United States. Hard rock mining gives a prime example of the ‘artificial selection’ of settled customs or working rules by jurists and legislators. The evolving structure of the industry, conditioned by technological and market factors, produced a parallel shift in the locus and control of sovereignty. In the early days sovereignty vested in the mining clubs. The enlarging scale and complexity of mining catalysed a change in both the uses and location of sovereignty. With the transition from prospecting to large-scale industrial mining, the ‘right to use’ mineral deposits obtained through patents became contingent on the cooperation of labour. At this stage, the capture of the state's monopoly on legitimate violence to protect the right to use became a crucial dimension of property. Mining companies have also enjoyed liberties with respect to the externalization of environmental costs. The emergent structure of rights, duties, capacities and exposures was instrumental in bringing forth a quantum increase in the mining of hard rock minerals necessary for industrial expansion. There is, however, an urgent need for reform of the mineral patent system.

The sharing economy has raised hopes that online platforms will usher in a new era of sharing, even though economic theory suggests that income growth may reduce sharing in the long run. This paper presents evidence that that high-income people are less likely than low-income people to use traditional institutions for sharing goods, including carpools, multi-person households, and garage sales. While it first appears that high-income people are equally likely to use new institutions, such as Craigslist, Airbnb, and Zipcar, this partly reflects the fact that many low-income households in the US still lack an internet connection. Conditional on having internet access, this paper finds that online sharing platforms are also disproportionately used by the poor. The future of sharing likely depends on countervailing forces. Economic growth may continue to dampen incentives to share goods, but this effect could be offset by the proliferation of institutions, norms, and preferences that facilitate sharing.

The Hayek–Friedman hypothesis states that economic freedom is causally associated with stable democracy. I test a particular element of the hypothesis focusing on press freedom, which is arguably a necessary component of any democratic polity. Combining the Freedom House index of press freedom and the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom yields a large annual panel dataset between 1993 and 2011. Estimates show that improvements in economic freedom are associated with subsequent improvements of press freedom. The overall association is mainly driven by changes in market openness.

Blockchains are a new digital technology that combines peer-to-peer network computing and cryptography to create an immutable decentralised public ledger. Where the ledger records money, a blockchain is a cryptocurrency, such as Bitcoin; but ledger entries can record any data structure, including property titles, identity and certification, contracts, and so on. We argue that the economics of blockchains extend beyond analysis of a new general purpose technology and its disruptive Schumpeterian consequences to the broader idea that blockchains are an institutional technology. We consider several examples of blockchain-based economic coordination and governance. We claim that blockchains are an instance of institutional evolution.

This work empirically investigates the effect of the interaction between the rule of law and legal central bank independence (CBI) on price stability (the level of inflation and inflation volatility), employing a panel dataset that covers up to 124 countries over the period from 1970 to 2013. A new, largely complete legal CBI dataset, covering 182 countries was used for the work. The results indicate that the effect of legal CBI on price stability depends on the strength of the rule of law. Moreover, the results reveal that legal CBI has no significant effect on price stability when the rule of law is weak. The findings also show that 67% of advanced countries possess a rule of law that is strong enough to maintain price stability by increasing central bank autonomy, while only 4.5% of developing countries possess it.

This paper offers an increasing returns model of the evolution of exchange institutions building on Smith's dictum that ‘the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market’. Exchange institutions are characterized by a tradeoff between fixed and marginal costs: the effort necessary to execute an exchange may be economized by up-front ‘investment’ in strategies to facilitate the publication and accounting of trading histories. Increases in the size of the exchange network select for higher-fixed-cost exchange institutions, beginning with autarky, through various intermediate stages, and finally to mass monetary exchange. By identifying the relevant fixed costs of money and its institutional substitutes across time, the paper both accounts for the persistence of pre-monetary exchange institutions, despite the ‘inevitability’ of monetary exchange that seems to be a feature of traditional models of the origin of money, and illuminates the forces driving the transition from one to another.

A rough balance of political power between monarchs and a militarized landed aristocracy characterized medieval Western Europe. Scholars have argued that this balance of power contributed to a tradition of limited government and constitutional bargaining. I argue that 5th- and 6th-century barbarian settlements created a foundation for this balance of power. The settlements provided barbarians with allotments of lands or taxes due from the lands. The allotments served to align the incentives of barbarian warriors and Roman landowners, and realign the incentives of barbarian warriors and their leadership elite. Barbarian military forces became decentralized and the warriors became political powerful shareholders of the realm.

In this paper, we revisit the relationship between economic freedom and growth across 407 German districts (Kreise). We build six indicators of economic freedom and cluster them into categories reflecting tax rates and size of the government and public sector. Exploiting the variation in the constructed indices of economic freedom, the evidence suggests less indebted districts with a lower share of taxes and a relatively smaller public sector achieve consistently higher growth rates and income levels. The beneficial effect of economic freedom on growth is robust to the variety of specification checks and does not appear to be driven by sample selection. The evidence does not indicate a lower level of economic freedom in former East German districts or greater economic freedom in West German districts but unveils a persistent north–south divide in the post-unification period. In the counterfactual scenario, a transition to the 90th percentile of economic freedom is associated with large income and growth gains. Such a transition would yield higher income levels and growth rates with a notable decrease in regional economic inequality within Germany.

Robert Neild (born 1924) has made a major contribution to economics and to peace studies. This paper provides a brief sketch of Neild's life and work. While noting his research in economic policy and peace studies, this essay devotes more attention to his largely unnoticed contributions to institutional and evolutionary economics since 1984. These are important in their own right, but they are especially notable because Cambridge heterodox economists have been devoted mainly to other approaches, including Marxism and post-Keynesianism. Neild's distinctive contribution is partly explained by his closeness to both Nicholas Kaldor and Gunnar Myrdal. Myrdal made explicit his adherence to the original American institutionalism: Neild extended that link to Cambridge.