This paper develops a hypothesis regarding the factors which influence the average maturity of corporate debt, and the hypothesis is tested with a cross-sectional sample of large industrial firms. The sample consists of 159 companies from the Fortune 500 list of the largest industrial firms as of 1971. A linear regression model is developed with the firm's average debt maturity expressed as a function of the firm's asset maturity, size, variability of income, growth, and the proportion of debt in the firm's capital structure.

Current conditions in the money and credit markets, along with the memory of the “crunch” of late 1966, have caused both the managers of financial institutions and their regulators to reconsider their concepts of “liquidity.” Both Minsky and Ritter have argued forcefully that traditional attention paid to balance sheet proportions should be abandoned in favor of an intertemporal analysis of cash flows [6], [7], and [8]. Ritter states that: “With a multidimensional cash flow forecast extending several years into the future, probability estimates can be made regarding potential liquidity needs over time” [8]. The purpose of this paper is to suggest a forecasting method which explicitly deals with the problem of uncertainty. The method is specifically designed for a mutual savings bank, but it could easily be adapted for a savings and loan association and, with perhaps greater effort, a commercial bank.2 In Section I, components of cash inflows and outflows are examined with the general objective of classification according to: (1) degree of uncertainty and (2) degree of management control. A risk analysis simulation model which permits explicit consideration of uncertainty is presented in Section II. Problems of implementing the model are discussed in Section III, while the implications of the analysis for future research are considered in Section IV.

Prior research has suggested that sitting on the board of a poorly performing firm (PPF) can be undesirable to directors. Still, almost 60% of such firms are able to appoint new directors following director departures. Contrary to a quality matching explanation, we do not find that only poorly performing directors join these firms. Upon joining PPFs, directors are more likely to fill leadership positions without necessarily receiving higher pay. These directors subsequently receive career benefits, especially those who are relatively junior in the pool. As such, the evidence is consistent with the leadership positions providing a certification effect.

We document that firms that expect their CEOs’ compensation to exceed the median CEO compensation of their Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) peers influence ISS to revise these peer sets. Controlling for changes in firm characteristics that ISS uses to select peers, we find that ISS applies an abnormally high turnover rate in the members of these peer sets and increases the representation of focal firms’ chosen peers. This turnover results in increases in the medians of the ISS peers’ CEO compensation and size. We find that these firms underperform and conclude that they attempt to camouflage high CEO pay to mitigate outrage costs.

We study how the scarcity of committed capital affects the equilibrium distribution of net alphas in the asset management industry. We propose a model of active portfolio management with different sales fee structures where committed capital is in short supply. In the model, a portfolio’s excess return is not fully appropriated by the money manager but shared with long-term investors. Empirically, we show that capital commitment allows funds to hold shares longer and take advantage of slow-moving arbitrage opportunities. Consistent with the model, funds with more committed capital generate higher value added, which, net of fees, accrues to long-term investors.

This paper is a pioneering effort in the examination of the workings of rationality and efficiency in capital markets. The central theme of the paper is the notion of informational efficiency in markets for durable assets. In its broadest terms this imposes a behavioral constraint on the intertemporal development of the asset markets; in a perfect market the development of the equilibrium over time must not be self-contradictory. Individual agents' anticipations of future developments determine their current actions and these, in turn, determine equilibrium prices. But, tomorrow the process will be repeated and it is at this second step that the possibility of conflict enters. The future development need not fulfill precisely people's previous anticipations, but in a perfectly functioning market it would be difficult to accept a blatant contradiction. To believe that prices are lognormally distributed, for example, and to have that belief generate the same equilibrium price period after period is such a contradiction.

For some time there has been disagreement among financial economists as to the effect of dividend policy on the valuation of a firm under conditions of uncertainty. On one side of the debate Miller and Modigliani (MM) [11] argue that the capitalization rate on shares is independent of the dividend policy of the firm. Gordon [6], [7], [8], and others, on the other hand, reject this proposition and present theories of valuation where share prices and capitalization rates are very much dependent upon the dividend policies of firms.

First, let me say that I enjoyed Professor Edmister's paper and found his Inquiry into ratio analysis and multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) for small business financing decisions quite interesting.

Recent economic research efforts in rate of return regulation of public utilities have for the most part been couched in a static, steady-state framework, “Averch-Johnson” hypotheses being the most obvious examples [3]. Nevertheless, standard classical microeconomic analysis of rate of return regulation seems to have two important drawbacks: first, it does not address itself to multiperiod relationships; and secondly, it cannot be represented in current-practice financial terms. This paper first outlines rate of return regulation as typically practiced. It then describes the essential features of a model designed to examine intertemporally the financial and capital expansion decision tradeoffs a public utility faces given corporate, institutional, and regulatory constraints. Decision tradeoff questions have assumed substantial policy importance in recent years not only because of the ambiguities in rate of return regulation effects conceptualized in the Averch-Johnson literature but because of the behavioral (occasionally legal) importance of purely financial constraints, such as interest coverage requirements, on corporate investment and financing choices.

We exploit the arrival of industry-wide synergistic merger waves to identify whether classified boards deter takeover bids. In a stylized model, we show that when target classified boards are costly to bidders, their negative effect on takeover likelihood should be more pronounced during merger waves. Using a sample of takeover bids in the United States between 1990 and 2016, we find strong evidence supporting this prediction. The results are robust to accounting for the benefits of classified boards and controlling for other antitakeover provisions. Our findings suggest that classified boards effectively reduce a firm’s exposure to the takeover market.

We find the financial condition of states impacts bank credit supply through their municipal bond holdings. In particular, we treat sudden political and statutory actions during the 2011 union bargaining rights debates in Wisconsin and Ohio as exogenous shocks to state solvency. We show bank valuations and municipal bond spreads adjust to the announcements, and, over longer horizons, a new lending channel linked to state solvency emerges, whereby banks supply credit as municipal bond appreciations free up capital.

The speed of stock price reaction to news exhibits substantial time variation. Higher risk-bearing capacity of financial intermediaries, lower passive ownership of stocks, and more informative news increase price responses to contemporaneous news; surprisingly, these interaction variables also increase price responses to lagged news (underreaction). A simple model with limited attention and three investor types (institutional, noninstitutional, and passive) predicts the observed variation in news responses. A long–short trading strategy based on news sentiment earns high returns, which increase when conditioning on the interaction variables. The interactions we document are robust to the choice of news source.

We study how the U.S. government’s anti-counterfeiting enforcement actions through Special 301 Reports influence U.S. businesses. We show that anti-counterfeiting enforcement in foreign countries improves U.S. firms’ sales, profitability, and valuations. Firms significantly reduce capital and research and development investments when their brands and products are protected from counterfeiting activities. Anti-counterfeiting enforcement measures also improve brand asset value, brand profitability, brand inventiveness, market penetration, and customer loyalty.

We study when CEOs with legal expertise are valuable for firms. In general, lawyer CEOs are negatively associated with frequency and severity in employment civil rights, contract, labor, personal injury, and securities litigation. This effect is partly induced by the CEO’s management of litigation risk and reduction in other risky policies. Lawyer CEOs are further associated with an increase in gatekeepers providing additional legal oversight and a decrease in innovative activities with high litigation risk. Lawyer CEOs are more valuable during periods of enhanced compliance requirements and regulatory pressure and in industries with high litigation risk or better growth opportunities.

This article investigates spillovers from foreign economies to the U.S. through changes in long-term Treasury yields. We document a decline in the contribution of U.S. domestic news to the variance of long-term Treasury yields and an increased importance of overnight yield changes, a proxy for foreign shocks’ contribution to U.S. yields. A model that identifies U.S., Euro area, and U.K. shocks that move global yields suggests that foreign shocks account for at least 20% of the daily variation in long-term U.S. yields in recent years. We also document the predictability of long-term U.S. yields by the U.S.–foreign yield spread.

Executives in a wide variety of formal organizations frequently face decisions involving changes in capacity of service capabilities. Usually these changes mean increases in manpower and/or capital expenditures for new facilities, but due to seasonality, or a decline in business, a decision may also involve the determination of whether to reduce the available capacity. These decisions generally are made by comparing the cost (or savings, which is a negative cost) of changing the service capability with the corresponding costs or risks of not being able to properly meet service requirements. In this paper, the problem described is one in which services are provided, and the cost, or risk, of not being able to meet service requirements is expressed by means of a queuing equation.