We exploit the information content of option prices to construct a novel measure of bank tail risk. We document a persistent increase in tail risk for the U.S. banking industry following the global financial crisis, except for banks designated as systemically important by the Dodd–Frank Act. We show that this post-crisis difference in tail risk for large and small banks is consistent with the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) status of large banks being reinforced by the Dodd–Frank designation: Naming the banks whose failure could threaten the financial stability of the U.S. gave investors a list of banks the government deemed as TBTF.

This article studies how industry peers’ stock prices respond when another firm in the industry is acquired by a foreign firm. The average stock price reactions of industry peers in horizontal foreign acquisitions around deal announcements are significantly negative. Peers’ returns are more negative in growing, less specialized, and competitive industries. Moreover, the negative stock price reactions of industry peers are related to future decreases in their operating performance. Overall, these results suggest that foreign acquisitions have strong competitive effects for the industry peers of U.S. target companies.

We exploit the arrival of industry-wide synergistic merger waves to identify whether classified boards deter takeover bids. In a stylized model, we show that when target classified boards are costly to bidders, their negative effect on takeover likelihood should be more pronounced during merger waves. Using a sample of takeover bids in the United States between 1990 and 2016, we find strong evidence supporting this prediction. The results are robust to accounting for the benefits of classified boards and controlling for other antitakeover provisions. Our findings suggest that classified boards effectively reduce a firm’s exposure to the takeover market.

We solve a flexible model that captures transactions costs and infrequencies of trading opportunities for illiquid assets to better understand the shadow costs of illiquidity for different origins of asset illiquidity and heterogeneous investor types. We show that illiquidity that results in suboptimal asset allocation carries low shadow costs, whereas these costs are high when illiquidity restricts consumption. As a result, the shadow costs are high for short-term investors, investors who face substantial liquidity shocks, and investors who desire to allocate a large fraction of their wealth to illiquid assets.