The recent literature in the field of commercial banking has centered to a considerable extent around the branch banking controversy and bank merger activities, particularly as regards their economic effects on banking structure and performance. Much has been said, moreover, about the effects of branching on the “public interest,” whether such branching is carried out through merger or de novo branching. Public interest is usually defined as including deposit safety, adequate compensation by banks to depositors for the use of their money, availability of credit for borrowers at competitive rates of interest, and, in more general terms, increased competition in banking without sacrificing safety.

This article uses FAS 123R regulation to examine how reduction in CEO compensation incentives affects managerial “playing it safe” behavior. Using proxies reflecting deliberate managerial efforts to change firm risk, difference-in-difference tests show that affected firms drastically reduce both systematic and idiosyncratic risks, leading to an 8% decline in total firm risk. These reductions in risk are achieved by shifting to safer, but low-Q, segments while closing the riskier ones, without significant changes in investment levels. Our findings suggest that decrease in risk-taking incentives provided by option compensation, when not compensated for by alternative incentives or governance mechanisms, exacerbates risk-related agency problem.

We investigate how bankers use information from lending relationships to help borrowers find partners for strategic alliances. Firms that have borrowed from the same banker or share an indirect connection through a network of bankers are significantly more likely to enter an alliance. Consistent with bankers overcoming informational frictions, their ability to facilitate alliances decreases with banker-network distance, and is stronger for opaque borrowers. Firms connected to more potential partners via banker networks enter more alliances. These alliances are associated with positive announcement returns, and brokering banks are more likely to receive future underwriting mandates.

In two previous articles [11] and [12] a family of normative models of the individual's economic decision problem under risk was presented. At the same time, certain implications of these models with respect to individual behavior were deduced for a class of utility functions. This paper will show that these models also give rise to an induced theory of the formation and operation of firms under risk for the same class of utility functions.

The group of issues that falls under the heading of bank capital adequacy has received a great deal of attention from academics, regulators, and bankers in recent years and is likely to continue as a subject for debate for many years to come. Although the traditional questions debated in the literature on capital adequacy are important and remain unresolved, this paper is not directed at them. Instead, the approach here is to examine how bank regulators operating within the existing legal structure of regulation can pursue optimal policies with respect to the regulation of bank capital.

A fundamental statistical test of serial independence developed by Ashley and Patterson (1986) to examine a possible form of serial dependence in daily stock returns is shown to be improperly constructed. As a consequence, the significance probabilities that they obtain are overstated. This paper presents a corrected version of their test. The test statistic obtained after correction is shown to possess the same limiting distribution as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic. Applying the corrected test procedure to data identical to that used by Ashley and Patterson, we find that their original null hypothesis can no longer be rejected at conventional significance levels.

The paper explores the economic value of being able to span market outcomes through the use of options. We model an economy with a single risky asset. Consumption takes place at one date, corresponding to the horizon of all investors. Options on the consumption good are not redundant securities in the economy because volatility is uncertain. The model enables us to examine the benefits to investors of using options to optimize their investments. Within this model, the gains from the use of options appear to be relatively minor.

Do lenders securitize or price loans in response to credit risk? Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk due to foreclosure law differences along U.S. state borders, we find that lenders securitize mortgages that are eligible for sale to the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) rather than price regional credit risk. For non-GSE-eligible mortgages with no GSE buyback provision, lenders increase interest rates as they are unable to shift credit risk to loan purchasers. The results inform the debate surrounding the GSEs’ buyback provisions, the constant interest rate policy, and show that underpricing regional credit risk increases the GSEs’ debt holdings.

This paper explores the optimal consumption and investment behavior of an individual who derives utility from the ratio between his consumption and an endogenous habit. We obtain closed-form policies under general utility functionals and stochastic investment opportunities by developing a nontrivial linearization to the budget constraint. This enables us to explicitly characterize how habit formation affects the marginal propensity to consume and optimal stock–bond investments. We also show that in a setting that combines habit formation with Epstein–Zin utility, consumption no longer grows at unrealistically high rates at high ages and investments in risky assets decrease.

We find that organization capital is negatively related to the cost of bank loans. This finding is robust to additional analyses including those that address omitted variable bias and reverse causality. In addition, we find that organization capital reduces all-in-spread-undrawn. When we decompose the bank loan cost, we find that organization capital increases facility fees due to its risk-engendering characteristics. Finally, we find that organization capital is positively associated with a high likelihood of the presence of inventors and innovation output, consistent with the argument that organization capital is embedded in the key talent within a firm.

Since Bowlin's [4] original article on the topic was published, a considerable literature on corporate bond refunding has developed. Most of that literature has concentrated on the question of how to measure the benefit to a company's shareholders of exercising the call provision associated with an outstanding debt issue (see [3], [12], [21], [26], [27], [29], and [31]). Among the related concerns have been the matters of whether there are valuation advantages to the deliberate issuance of discount—including “zero coupon”—bonds (see [9], [22], and [28]), and whether there can be profitable opportunities for refunding prior to maturity debt instruments that were issued at par but later trade at a discount (see [1], [2], [13], [15], [17], [18], and [23]).

The use of residuals, both mean and mean absolute, was found to be useful in capturing the impact of new quarterly earnings information on share prices. Our results seem to indicate that the market evaluates third quarter and annual earnings reports differentially from the first and second reports. This can perhaps be explained in part because the annual report, which is audited, contains year-end accounting adjustments. Furthermore, the third quarter report may be viewed as a harbinger of the annual report. Our results also indicate that the share prices of high growth companies adjust to earnings information differently than do the shares of medium and low growth firms. In total our results seem to be consistent with the “loose” form of the efficient markets hypothesis. This is because of the difficulty in predicting the signs of the mean residuals. Or alternatively, while we could observe significant changes in the absolute means, it was considerably more difficult to predict the direction of these changes as seen in the mean residuals. While the difficulty of predicting the direction of the residuals and the loss of statistical significance between trading days when days −1 and 0 in the group tests over all reports indicate support of market efficiency, it should be reemphasized that the market appears to take very long to react to the annual report — that is, the reaction seems to start even before the third quarter report.

This study empirically tests contingent claims pricing models for American currency spot and futures options. Numerical analysis indicates that the difference in the model prices of spot and futures put (call) options (with the same exercise price and maturity) is, for a premium (discount) currency, positive and an increasing function of (a) the absolute difference in the prices of the underlying spot and futures contracts and (b) the maturity of the options. Tests on British pound, Deutsche mark, and Swiss franc options indicate many violations of the ordinal pricing relationships noted above. Additional tests indicate that option prices are inconsistent with functional relationship (b) above. Most of the observed violations are sufficiently large to provide arbitrage profits net of transaction costs, assuming interest rates are constant and the Interest Rate Parity theorem holds continuously. Alternatively, both the violations and the inconsistent functional relationship may be due to violation of the assumption of constant interest rates.

Traditional models of portfolio selection assume that all assets are traded in competitive markets, so that rates of return to any individual investor are fixed. This paper represents an extension of portfolio theory to the case in which asset markets are not perfectly competitive and rates of return cannot be taken as given. Klein [10] has noted that, when asset markets are imperfect, the separation theorem no longer holds but does not solve explicitly for the relationship between risk and return. Here for simplicity we shall consider the case of the investor who has a monopoly in an asset he creates, so that its risk and return characteristics are determined by the decisions of the portfolio selector and hence are endogenous. It will be shown that even if the market for an asset in the portfolio is imperfectly competitive, as long as the demand curve for the asset is well behaved, the locus of efficient portfolios facing the investor, which is composed of combinations of the riskless asset and the optimal combination of risky assets, will be a concave function, as opposed to a linear function in the competitive case. In other words, the introduction of capital market imperfections does not affect the positive slope of the efficient set of portfolios. Moreover, the expected return on the imperfectly competitive asset will be shown to be easily decomposable into the standard risk premium and a monopoly premium.

This paper presents the results of a study which sought to determine whether the status of large member banks as owner-controlled or management-controlled has borne a significant relation to bank profit rates during recent years. The impetus for the study was provided by the view, encountered frequently in the literature, that management-controlled firms may place less emphasis on profit rate than owner-controlled firms, sacrificing it for performance goals regarded as more consistent with management interest. W. Baumo.1 [1, p. 4 and pp. 101–104], for example, has argued that management-controlled firms may sacrifice profit rate in order to achieve higher growth rate and reduced risk acceptance. R. Monsen and A. Downs [11] suggest that such firms may sacrifice both profit rate and growth rate for reduced risk acceptance. K. Cohen and S. Reid, in their study of bank merger activity during 1952–1961 [5], argue that bank managers, as compared to bank owners, place more emphasis on growth rate and less emphasis on profit-associated variables. Other possibilities present themselves. Management-controlled firms may sacrifice profit rate directly for management salaries, bonuses, and fringe benefits, including benefits associated with management prestige. The management-controlled firms may simply pursue efficiency less vigorously.

This paper shows how a derivative security can be duplicated by a forward strategy, and, hence, priced by arbitrage in terms of the forward price.

When measures such as the average or the midrange are used to report a typical value for the price series in each interval, the stochastic character of the underlying price process is subtly transformed. Fortunately, the spurious serial dependence introduced by averaging measures is sufficiently well understood to allow direct tests of many hypotheses to be made from averaged data. Moreover, a simple autoregressive transformation of the averaged data can be used to unscramble the effects of averaging on the lower-frequency components of the spectrum of the underlying process. These statistical devices are presented and are then illustrated by applications to the Cowles Commission Common- Stock Indexes, a massive collection of New York Stock Exchange price indexes tabulated in the form of monthly midranges.

Intermediation in private equity involves illiquid investments, professional investors, and high information asymmetry. We use this unique setting to empirically evaluate theoretical predictions regarding intermediation. Using placement agents has become nearly ubiquitous, but agents are associated with significantly lower abnormal returns in venture and real estate funds, consistent with investor capture and influence peddling. However, returns are higher for buyout funds employing a top-tier agent and for first-time real estate and venture funds employing an agent, and are less volatile for agent-affiliated funds, consistent with a certification role. Our results suggest heterogeneous motives for intermediation in the private equity industry.

The market for underwriting services provides a valuable opportunity to test two competing hypotheses in monopsony theory. When applied to the area of investment banking, the theory implies that spread behavior ought to be influenced not only by the average costs of providing underwriting services, but also by the extent of vigorous competition. In competitive markets the prices of products and services tend to reflect minimum average costs in the long run. When competition declines, spreads can be expected to widen. A number of empirical studies have established that spread behavior is in fact dependent on the extent of bidding competition [5, 8, 9, 2]. “The intensity of competition in underwriting new issues of tax exempts has the expected effect on underwriters' spreads, that is, the difference between buying and selling prices; spreads decrease as the degree of competition increases” [2, p. 707].

In “Valuation Under Uncertainty,” which recently appeared in this Journal (September 1967), Houng-Yhi Chen argues [1, pp. 313–314] that “Robichek and Myers' criticism [2, 3] of the use of the risk-adjusted discount rate is unfounded,” and suggests that our “conclusions must be based in part on a misunderstanding of the risk-adjusted discount rate method.” These charges are without foundation, as we will show here.