We document a substantial customer complaint gap between stock and mutual financial firms. To assess whether this 21% per year complaint gap stems from complaint-prone customers in stock insurers, we examine state-adjudicated complaint success. To further delineate between customer selection or treatment explanations, we exploit within insurer complaints around random claims (natural disasters) and attention shocks (media scrutiny). Further tests reveal the complaint gap widens with greater competition, near insolvency thresholds, and with more price regulation. Overall, the results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that mutual financial firms exhibit low customer satisfaction, suggesting customers find this a beneficial organizational structure.

We show that political contributions are associated with reduced civil and criminal sanctions for fraudulent executives. These managers benefit more from contributions if their firm also gained from the fraud, if they occupy top positions in firms with weak boards, or if they contribute to powerful politicians. Political contributions reduce budgetary resources for government enforcers and lengthen the Securities and Exchange Commission’s case time-to-resolution. They also facilitate penalty transfer from fraudulent managers to the firm, resulting in their entrenchment and long-term destruction of shareholder value. Our findings highlight an agency cost of political contributions and a mechanism undermining the disciplining effect of regulations.

Does proprietary knowledge protection (PKP) spur or hinder the product-market performance of new firms? Exploiting the staggered adoptions of the inevitable disclosure doctrine by U.S. State Courts, which enhance PKP, we show that treated firms increase industry-adjusted sales growth by 2% compared to control firms. The effect is concentrated among small and young firms and increases with the scope of proprietary knowledge and rivals’ access to external finance. PKP encourages firms to develop new products and stimulates initial public offering activity. Our results suggest that PKP alleviates predation risk associated with “deep-pocket” rivals by allowing firms to maintain competitive advantages.

We use a random forest model to classify firms’ financial constraints using only financial variables. Our methodology expands the range of classified firms compared to text-based measures while maintaining similar levels of informativeness. We construct two versions of our constraint measures, one using many firm characteristics and the other using a small set of more primitive characteristics. Using our measures, we find that institutional investors hold a lower percentage of shares in equity-focused constrained firms, while retail investors show a preference for them. Equity issuance and investment of constrained firms also increases during periods of high investor sentiment.

The purpose of this comment is to make a comparison between the sufficient conditions of Soper [3] and of Norstrøm [2] for a unique internal rate of return (IRR). Such a condition is crucial for the implementation of a computer program, as for instance the one presented by Mao and Knoll [1] which makes use of Soper's condition. Therefore, it seems appropriate to investigate if one of the mentioned conditions is superior to the other, so that we could rely only on the more efficient one.

We study the theoretical implications of cointegrated stock prices on the profitability of pairs-trading strategies. If stock returns are fairly weakly correlated across time, cointegration implies very high Sharpe ratios. To the extent that the theoretical Sharpe ratios are “too large,” our results suggest that either i) cointegration does not exist pairwise among stocks, and pairs-trading profits are a result of a weaker or less stable dependency structure among stock pairs, or ii) the serial correlation in stock returns stretches over considerably longer horizons than is usually assumed. Empirically, there is little evidence of cointegration, favoring the first explanation.

A set of theorems was derived based on the following set of axioms: (1) financial management seeks to maximize the wealth of existing shareholders; (2) all projects being considered at period 0 are of one period duration and possess the attribute that their adoption or rejection by the firm will not affect the business risk of the firm's asset portfolio; and (3) the ratio of debt to total book capital is given as α, and r and k reflect the firm's business and financial risk however perceived by investors.

It was shown that the NPV of any project satisfying the above conditions could be evaluated for accept-reject purposes with a CC involving book weights. This CC yielded an NPV numerically equal to the NPV using market value weights under special circumstances, namely, when k = r (1 − λ) or when M0/V0 = 1 − α, a special case of which is M0 = (1 −α)c0, i.e., if the firm were at its investment margin. After determining the book value CC, which is denoted as β, it was shown that it can be applied repeatedly for testing period 0 projects satisfying our axioms, even if these projects are unknown to management at the outset of the period. A market value CC, denoted as γ, was derived which gives identical accept-reject signals as the procedure.

This paper examines the effect of risk differences on the oft-documented negative relationship between stock returns and inflation. We find risk-related patterns of coefficients on our estimates of the level and change in expected inflation and on unexpected inflation. These patterns are consistent with the hypothesis developed in Fama [2] and in Geske and Roll [7] that future real output growth simultaneously helps to determine current stock returns and various measures of inflation.

Among the elements of value reflected in the prices of corporate securities are the taxtiming options associated with the opportunities for investors to tax manage their portfolios by deferring gains and taking losses. We show that the aggregate value of these taxtiming options for the securityholders of a firm will be enhanced when the firm has multiple classes of tradeable securities outstanding. For that reason, the inclusion of debt as well as equity in a firm's capital structure should raise the total market value of the firm. We further show that, under most likely circumstances, there will be an interior optimal degree of leverage that will maximize tax-timing option values.

Throughout the finance and economics literature, it is widely recognized that taxation can significantly alter individual behavior and market equilibrium conditions. Yet, in the area of bonds, the impacts of taxation upon bond pricing have generally been ignored. The primary purpose of this paper is to trace out the impact of differential taxation of regular income and capital gains upon the pricing of coupon-bearing bonds.

This paper discusses two fundamental issues in capital structure theory and analyzes the recent recapitalizations of Phillips and Unocal. It is shown that a value-maximizing capital structure may be inconsistent with shareholder utility maximization and that the Miller debt and taxes equilibrium may be inconsistent with a complete capital market. In spite of these and other unresolved issues, the markets's reactions to the recent recapitalizations of Phillips and Unocal are consistent with the predictions of capital structure theory. Except for small redistribution effects against bondholders, the recapitalizations per se had no positive impact on common stock values.

The assumption that investors can borrow and lend at a riskless interest rate reduces the Mean-Variance (M-V) efficient set to only one optimal unlevered portfolio. However, once we realize that the market is generally imperfect and that the borrowing rate is higher than the lending rate, we can no longer use the mean-variance Separation Theorem. Instead, a number of unlevered portfolios must be included in the efficient set, while the optimal unlevered portfolio is selected on the basis of the investor's preference. The size of the efficient set of unlevered portfolios is a function of the type of empirical data used and of the disparity between the borrowing and lending interest rates.

This paper derives and numerically simulates maximum likelihood estimators for the drift in several important diffusion price models. The time series convergence properties of these estimators are compared to those of standard estimators including the geometric and arithmetic means. Merton (1980) demonstrated that it is difficult to efficiently estimate the drift in a log-normal diffusion model. We qualify and strengthen his result by noting that his estimator is the maximum likelihood estimator and by applying our simulation results. However, we also demonstrate that it is possible to efficiently estimate the drift in other useful diffusion price models. In particular, by asking just how much time is needed in order for the maximum likelihood estimators of the drift in different diffusion processes to converge, these results qualify and quantify Black's (1993) statement that “we need such a long period to estimate the average that we have little hope of seeing changes in expected return."

We analyze the profitability of government-owned banks’ lending to their owners, using a unique data set of relatively homogeneous government-owned banks; the banks are all owned by similarly structured local governments in a single country. Making use of a natural experiment that altered the regulatory and competitive environment, we find evidence that such lending was used to transfer revenues from the banks to the governments. Some of the evidence is particularly pronounced in localities where the incumbent politicians face significant competition for reelection.

Traders can reduce search costs in dealership markets by entering relationships with dealers. However, dealers draw little informational benefit from these relationships in Treasury markets, due to low risk and information asymmetry. We investigate the extent, duration, effects on pricing, and potential benefits of client–dealer relationships. We find that relationship strength leads to higher execution costs for clients, more so during stressed market conditions but less so in the presence of information asymmetry and when trading in corporate bonds. Relationship traders are compensated with immediacy at times when search is costly.

A convertible bond is a hybrid financial instrument that incorporates features of a bond (fixed income security) and an equity claim (usually common stock). In most instances the convertible can be exchanged, at the holder's option, for the common shares of the corporation issuing the convertible. The conversion value, or stock value, is the market value of the common shares for which the convertible can be exchanged. The bond value or floor price is the market value of an equivalent bond that does not include a conversion feature. The market price of a convertible will be the conversion value or the bond value, whichever is higher, plus a premium. The purpose of this paper is to develop and test a model which estimates the premium. The premium estimated is defined as the difference between the market price of the convertible and the bond value or conversion value, whichever is larger. No consideration will be given to convertible preferreds.

In 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission enacted significant reforms in U.S. markets. Several studies document that the new order handling rules increased competition for Nasdaq stocks, but the reforms were designed with an additional goal in mind—to increase quote competition for the trading of NYSE-listed securities on Nasdaq (i.e., third market trading). An evaluation of the reforms in the third market indicates that they did not achieve this objective. Instead, both quote quality and quoting frequency were diminished, due primarily to elimination of the excess spread rule. This suggests that more significant changes are needed to increase inter-exchange competition.

This article empirically examines the interaction between entrepreneurial plaintiff firm litigation and venture capital (VC). The data indicate that, relative to nonplaintiffs, firms that litigate prior to (after) obtaining VC i) receive financing from less (more) reputable venture capitalists (VCs), ii) are subject to greater (similar) oversight by VCs, iii) receive less (more) VC funding, iv) are more likely to exit through an initial public offering than through an acquisition, and v) are less likely to be liquidated when litigation occurs after VC financing. The results are robust to different specifications, methodologies, and endogeneity checks.

The origins of the application of quantitative methods to the determination of optimum solutions to managerial problems can be traced back at least as far as 50 years when calculus techniques were first suggested for solution of economic lot size problems. However, the great increase in applications of optimizing techniques occurred after the Second World War with the popularization of the operations research concept and development of a wide variety of mathematical tools — among them linear programming, queuing theory, dynamic programming, and network flow theory. The development of digital computers in the late 1940's substantially reduced computational problems associated with the use of many mathematical methods and also made possible the use of simulation techniques which, without digital computers, are not ordinarily practical because of the large amount of computation involved.

This paper develops a credit-analysis model encompassing the accuracy of analytical methods, quality of applicants, cost of acquisition and analysis, profit from good loans, and losses from bad loans. Information generally available to the lending institution and subjective estimates can then be used to select from among alternative credit-granting systems the system with the greatest expected net present value. Each institution is thus able to find the credit granting system most appropriate for its particular market and analytical abilities.

The model's profit maximizing objective and broad scope make it useful for setting credit department standards of performance. Costs can be compared with theoretical values of performance computed from loss rates, acceptance rates, and market information. The conditional probabilities, the chances of making the correct decision, can also be estimated for use in comparing methods of analysis or individual analysts. Unlike the loss rate, the conditional probability is an independent, unbiased measure of a method's accuracy.

The example presented dealt with consumer installment loans, but the formulation is applicable to direct lending of any type. It provides the means for comparing loans with differing initial costs as well as widely varying risk classes and maturities. Financial institutions making direct loans add substantial values to capital supplied by the money and capital markets. The model is a theoretical formulation of the relationship between the cost and output of credit analysis.