In this paper I shall limit myself to various comments on integration narrowly conceived, that is, within the discipline of economic history itself, and to a few historical cases used to illustrate the possibilities and limitations of comparative method as a means to this end. Comparative study, as Miss Thrupp has stressed, scarcely represents a new departure in economic thought. The novelty seems to be rather in the almost universal appeal it now has for those who would explore the mysteries of change. This interest appears to be a consequence of the impact of recent developments in backward-area studies and the closely related pursuit of a general theory of growth; these tend to focus attention on different kinds and rates of growth and comparison becomes inevitable. In turn, accumulations of knowledge about economic change in very different contexts lead to the need for some means of correlating diese, partly for aesthetic reasons but also because a synoptic view of the landscape of change has its very practical use. Unless the whole field can be surveyed from a single point of view, and by this I do not mean the same point of view, it is very difficult to know where the need for more intensive exploration is greatest.

Any advance in our knowledge about the growth and development of the American colonial economy must first start with a balance-of-payments study. The trade of the thirteen colonies with other areas— principally Great Britain, Ireland, southern Europe, the Wine Islands, the West Indies, and Africa—certainly must have formed, together with the coastal trade between the colonies, a large share of the total market activity. My conclusions from such a study are that the description given of commodity trade by colonial historians has been accurate but that once services as well as goods are considered the picture changes to one where there are only small positive or negative balances remaining on current account for the various regions. As a result, I would conclude that long-term capital flows from Great Britain to the colonies were either small or nil during this period.

In the eighteenth century, Haiti was the world’s leading sugar producer, but when cane surged in the Caribbean in the early twentieth century, Haiti produced none. Instead, the land sat idle while workers emigrated to work on sugar plantations. I examine the hypothesis that historical property rights institutions created high transaction costs for converting land to cane production. I collect new data on land-use from 1928–1950 and a proxy for transaction costs. The evidence suggests transaction costs impeded the land market from responding to the sugar boom.

The turning point in the history of the Genoese merchants in Spain was the discovery of America and the subsequent opening of trading relations with the new continent. From then on, their ascent to economic predominance in Spain paralleled that nation's emergence as the dominant power of the sixteenth-century world. Fortune gave Spain two empires simultaneously, one in the Old World, the other in the New. Spain's unpreparedness for imperial responsibilities, particularly in the economic sphere, was the springboard for Genoese advancement. Strengthening and enlarging their colony in Seville —after 1503 the “door and port of the Indies” —the Genoese prepared to move across the Atlantic in the wake of Columbus.

Two ideas contrary to those of the existing literature are advanced. First, the early years of the Hudson's Bay Company/Northwest Company duopoly were characterized by passive rather than by predatory competition. Second, the Hudson's Bay Company initiated the changes that eventually led to predatory competition. The Company's financial crisis of 1809–1810 brought about by the decline in demand due to the Napoleonic Wars shocked it out of complacency and into aggressive competition.

Our task here is to inquire into the relations between two familiar sets of phenomena—the economic development of the Western Hemisphere and the involvement of British investors, financiers, engineers, contractors, and financial groups in railways in that area. As a matter of convenience we shall look chiefly at the United States and Argentina, and at the time span of three quarters of a century preceding the First World War. It is no secret that during that period both countries underwent rapid development, whose contours included such matters as the effective occupation of new areas of vast extent; the growth of population, partly fed by immigration; the effective application of technological improvements to the exploitation of natural resources; an increasing complexity of the division of labor; and a rise in productivity and real income per capita, participated in by large segments of the population. During the same period, the Western Hemisphere was normally the outlet for from 40 to 60 per cent of British foreign investment, the United States and the Argentine being two of the countries chiefly affected. We are familiar with estimates that British investments in the United States, on the eve of the First World War, amounted to over 4 billion dollars, approximately 3 billion of which were in railway securities, and that something like half as much was invested in Argentina, with a somewhat smaller percentage directly in rails.

During the two decades prior to 1900, electrical manufacturing companies grew from small, single-plant firms, producing only a few items and employing several hundred workers, to large, multiplant organizations, with hundreds of products and thousands of employees. This change in the scale of operations required the invention and application of new organizational forms and new administrative procedures. The men who were responsible for these developments were among the first to recognize and solve the administrative problems of large industrial corporations. The work of these men is the subject of this paper.

Every economist must be pleased to start some hares; it can become embarrassing, however, when they begin to breed like rabbits. In the ten years since we first tried our slavery model in public, in Professor Gerschenkron's history seminar, more than thirty published arguments addressed to that model have come to our attention. We don't pretend to know whether that represents an increased output over preceding decades. Besides, in our youthful enthusiasm we gave the impression that we were disposing, once and for all, of a piece of intellectual game that was already rather high. In any event, the apparent egocentricity that turned up all those papers and articles may be explained, if not justified, by Ralph Barton Perry's dictum that every reader looks up two references in an index: sex, and his own name.

Hollywood converted to sound in three years. In comparison, Hollywood's conversion to color required more than three decades, and included a three-year period in which the share of color movies declined from 58 to 31percent. We investigate this puzzling adoption profile using detailed data on 7,022 movies between 1940 and 1959. These data indicate differences in studio size and complementarity between genre and color impeded the rapid diffusion of color. These data also indicate that disadoption followed weak returns to a wave of color releases that were encouraged by the introductionof a low-cost color process.

We study the effect of railroads, the single largest public investment in colonial India, on human capital. Using district-level data on literacy and two different identification strategies, we find railroads had positive effects on literacy, in particular on male and English literacy. We show that railroads increased literacy by raising secondary and elite primary schooling, rather than vernacular primary schooling. Our mediation analysis suggests that non-agricultural income, urbanization, and opportunities for skilled employment are important mechanisms, while agricultural income is not.

In a recent issue of this Journal Peter Temin has offered a challenging analysis of American labor scarcity and the choice of technology. He deserves our gratitude for attempting to increase the analytical rigor in discussions of this matter, but his analysis is puzzling and, I think, profoundly misleading. This note is meant as a comment upon certain of its oddities.

It is one of the ironies of economic historiography that the country which gave birth to the Historical School of Economics should have come to play such a relatively minor role in the field of modern economic history. The irony lies in the fact that the Historical School, although it emphasized historical studies at the expense of theory, did see economic history as an integral part of economics. Its founders recognized that the main purpose of economic history is to elucidate the problem of economic development, to search for “development laws,” and in attempting to accomplish that mission, they made use of economic theory. From around the 1870's, however, interest in these ties to mainstream economics began to recede; emphasis on institutional and legal studies, collection of sources, and sheer antiquarianism grew ever more important. Since then, German economic historians, increasingly producing economic history without economics, have been playing Hamlet without the Prince. The present character of the field in Germany is reflected in the fact that German economic historians are de facto and de jure social historians as well. Indeed, many university chairs, the principal West German journal (Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte—hereafter cited as VSWG), and the German counterpart to our Economic History Association (Gesellschaft für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte) do grant formal priority to social history.

The origin of the land-equalizing community, the most important system of tenure in the nineteenth-century Levant, has never been explained. The evidence of language and the dynamics of factor relationships concur with the historical record: there was no scarcity of land. On the basis of a systematic comparison with the land-equalizing commune in Russia, the answer to the puzzle looms as the need to equalize a heavy burden of impositions. Indeed, villages whoselocation or political strength helped them resist taxation did not equalize holdings.Equalization was an adaptation to external demands, not a static vestigialinstitution.

From the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, the papermakers of Ambert (Auvergne, France) remained the leading producers of quality printing paper in Europe. During the second half of the eighteenth century, they expanded greatly their production in response to a dynamic market. This success was achieved not through the adoption of new methods or the expansion of enterprises but through subcontracting practices. This article explores the conditions that fostered such strategies. It confirms the multiplicity of options available to early modern manufacturers but suggests that the socioeconomic characteristics of each community of producers conditioned their choices.

The work of H. J. Habakkuk, Peter Temin, Robert Fogel, and Nathan Rosenberg on the effect of relative factor price differentials between America and England in the nineteenth century on the course of technological development has generated considerable interest in providing some empirical evidence on the labor scarcity hypothesis. Briefly stated, the hypothesis claims that relatively higher wages in America brought about the invention and use in production of a relatively capital intensive technology, and since “technical possibilities were richest at the capital intensive end of the spectrum,” this phenomenon was somehow responsible for the unique characteristics of American technology, that is, interchangeable parts, certain machine tool developments, and the proliferation of self-acting mechanisms.

In a recent article in this Journal, Howard Bodenhorn made a remarkable suggestion: “Antebellum financial markets may have outperformed those of the post–Civil War period.” According to Bodenhorn, antebellum capital markets displayed notable integration, as indicated by movements in short-term (60–day) interest rate data for important commercial centers east of the Mississippi. When considered in light of Lance Davis's work, suggesting poor integration of credit markets immediately after the Civil War and only gradual integration thereafter, we believe economic historians will find Bodenhorn's hypothesis provocative—even startling. We found the hypothesis so suggestive that we attempted to replicate Bodenhorn's analysis—a process that generated both “bad news” and “good news.” The “bad news” is that we believe the evidence Bodenhorn provided for his hypothesis is weak or irrelevant. The “good news” is that the data Bodenhorn generated support the integration hypothesis more strongly than even Bodenhorn suggested.