This article summarizes recent research on the agrarian depression in seventeenth-century Spain, relying primarily upon data from the provinces of Segovia and Toledo. Both regions suffered sustained losses of population and stagnation of production and failed to develop a permanent interior market structure. Due to its reliance upon sheepherding, the Segovian rural economy recovered slightly by the end of the century, but in Toledo, an economy almost entirely dependent upon grain production, demographic and economic indices were negative throughout the entire period.

During the last four years before the outbreak of war in 1914 the people of England experienced an unprecedented combination of political strife and labor unrest. The struggle over the budget of 1909 had led to a constitutional crisis over the powers of the House of Lords in 1910–1911; suffragettes were resorting to obstructive and exasperating tactics to win the vote for women; the question of home rule almost resulted in civil war in North Ireland and brought what amounted to a threat of dereliction of duty by high military officers, who could not contemplate the use of force against the opponents of home rule; while the restlessness of labor brought a series of massive strikes in which the rank and file of workers often broke from the discipline of their leaders.

The failure of French Canadians to settle the Canadian west before 1900, when substantial numbers of anglophones and Europeans were migrating, is a long-standing puzzle. Historians have relied mainly on cultural explanations. Using new data, we demonstrate that anglophones and francophones had very different personal characteristics, so that movement to the west was rarely economically attractive for francophones. However, large-scale migration into New England fitted French Canadians' demographic and human capital profile. Even if the United States had imposed immigration restrictions by the 1880s, this would not likely have diverted many French Canadians westward.

Intuition tells us that the scarcity of space on the earth's surface should be closely tied both to population growth and to economic growth. Population growth should make land more scarce by raising the demand for food and private space and by raising the supply of labor, a factor of production that must cooperate with land. Intuition says that economic growth should tend to do the same, all things considered. The demand for food, a prime land-using product, would be expanded little by a rise in per capita incomes, but the rent on land should be bid up somewhat by the growth of other inputs into production, such as skills and man-made equipment. Intuition also suggests that land scarity should in turn retard the growth of population and per capita incomes. If space, privacy, and food are expensive, children should seem relatively costly. At the same time, higher space rents should mean slower economic growth than would be experienced if man could manufacture extra land cheaply.

Investigation of Florentine legislation concerning the practice of usury in the fourteenth century leads the researcher to the conclusion that a general theory cannot be constructed unless more facts are made known. It is to be hoped that an exposition of factual data will lead to an inquiry into those “shades and nuances” of meaning that are symptomatic of historical change. I do not believe that the present state of knowledge on this problem allows more than a descriptive historical approach, followed by a suggestion of possible levels of understanding and strategies of further inquiry. There are many reasons for taking this position. First, the documents available to the researcher are less than adequate for the formulation of a general theory. To cite only one instance, the judicial records of the period before 1343 were burned in the revolution of that year. Second, case histories of those individuals cited by the court or the councils as usurers have not been written. Finally, the Consulte, which contain the opinions of the advisory councils of the Priorate, do not aid the researcher in understanding the motives that animated the passage of legislation. With these limitations firmly in mind, I should like to present certain facts that I suspect can be understood only dimly within die framework of our present knowledge of Florentine life in the Trecento. One further disclaimer must be made: this paper does not purport to consider the state of juridical consciousness nor the legalistic matrix that provided the framework in which the events narrated took place.

Empirical evidence from the Third World on the impact of early industrialization on welfare has produced new ideas on relations between growth, distribution, and the quality of life. Historical welfare must also be reassessed with less emphasis on material living standards. Distribution should be more systematically analyzed, and quality of life indicators considered. By adopting the approach, historians will revitalize old debates and make these more relevant to issues in modern development studies. Historians also need to investigate welfare themes in recent and comparative history to a greater extent than hitherto, which requires closer integration between economic, social, and political history.

On the basis of published accounts, internal rates of return and present values are computed for capital in general and for particular investors (French shareholders and the British and Egyptian governments) from construction to nationalization of the canal. Terminal values at the nationalization had to be imputed. Rates of return are compared with opportunity costs represented by the return on alternative investments. For capital generally, French shareholders, and the British government, rates of return were 8–9 percent against opportunity costs of 3–4 percent. For the Egyptian government, corresponding figures were 2–5 and 11 percent. American investment would not have been profitable.

The revolutionary technological changes that have come to typify our modern industrial society were first felt in the New England textile industry. The American zeal for useful improvements that greeted the industrial revolution was counterbalanced by a patriotic fear that the ill consequences of European manufacturing would be repeated here. The textile manufacturers who introduced the factory system into the United States early in the nineteenth century found it necessary, in order to win a full measure of public support and secure workers in a land where labor was dear, to demonstrate that “the moral standards of the community would not be impaired.”

In a recent Journal article Professors Ransom and Sutch (R & S) suggest “debt peonage” as a broad explanation for the course of southern economic development after the Civil War. They summarize their general thesis in the following three statements:

“(1) That because of the readjustments in agriculture and the difficulties in forming new banks under the banking laws, the South was unable to re-establish a viable network of commercial banks to serve her agricultural economy.

Nearly seventy-five years have elapsed since Henry Carey complained that the term laissez faire had become a meaningless symbol, an object, as he put it, of “word-worship.” If the task of definition seemed imposing in his time, it is not less so in ours. The concept has been used with abandon on various levels of political and economic discussion. It belongs to a whole category of catchwords in our social thought whose connotations, if they ever were precise, have become blurred through constant and polemical usage. They are dangerous labels for the historian. This paper seeks to analyze the ideas developed in Pennsylvania to oppose governmental action in economic life during the period from the Revolution to the Civil War. For the present purpose it is not a matter of significance whether one chooses to believe that any of these ideas are genuinely laissezfaire in character or not.

This note presents some statistical evidence on the growth and geographic distribution of membership in the Economic History Association. The interpretation suggests that, despite a reasonable growth of membership on a national basis, particular areas of the country are under-represented in the Association, relative to the probable extent of their interest in economic history. An attempt is made to identify the areas of under-representation and thereby to provide some guidance for missionary work.

Since the end of World War II Americans interested in international economic affairs have faced a painful dilemma. Almost every set of international policies advanced during this period has called for the widespread use of American capital to assist in the development of underdeveloped areas in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. The United States government has furnished much of this capital during the last decade, but private capital has borne a share of the effort in the past and may well be called upon for a larger share in the future. Unfortunately, in a period of frequent small wars, revolutions, and expropriations, American investors naturally hesitate to send their capital abroad if they can invest it profitably at home. One of the most vexing problems in modern international economic relations is that of predicting or assuring regular returns from American investments abroad.

The phenomenon of change lies at the core of economic and business history. Otherwise, in common with other branches of economics, we would be engaged in the dull task of describing and explaining the static state of the classical and neoclassical theorists. The historical economist deals with the field of dynamic economics on the largest possible scale. Furthermore, unlike the theorists of dynamic economics, he is under obligation to deal with actual situations as they have arisen, and to reach judgments in the light of all-important observable factors. This is a difficult assignment.

The British Workmen's Compensation Acts of 1897 and 1899 were “astonishing” to contemporaries and have not been adequately explained by historians. Although passed under a Conservative-Liberal Unionist Cabinet, these acts put heavy burdens upon industry and agriculture, interests that were very influential in both of these parties. “It was no wonder that Tories asked themselves what they were coming to, nor that the usual answer to the question was that they were being swallowed by Mr. Chamberlain.”