Recent research indicates the joint stock form was not a superior type of business organization in many countries historically. In Japan, however, its role was more pervasive. From 1896 to 1939 joint stock enterprises accounted for 44 percent of registered businesses and 80 percent of total capital. From 1922 to 1939 these enterprises outperformed other forms and generated 94 percent of aggregate profits. External finance factors, Japan's development phase, industrial structure, public policy, and culture led to high joint stock usage. The private limited liability company, introduced in 1938, did not displace the joint stock form.

The American tradition emphasizes the importance of sea power, especially the great age of sea power which began with Columbus and led first to the expansion of Spain and Portugal and then to the empire building of England, Holland, and France, and the development of North America. In America itself we are also familiar with the epic march across the continent to the Pacific, and the way in which the expanding frontier shaped, or at least strongly influenced, our society and our institutions, as expounded by Turner. Even our continental history, however, was initiated by the crossing of the Atlantic; and from then on even our period of most active continental expansion was never free of the influences and effects of sea power, sea-borne commerce, the investment of European capital, and acceleration of population growth by the immigration of Europeans.

This article uses the records of the Dow Chemical Company to analyze the role of distributors in facilitating collusion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It compares collusion in three closely related markets: salt, bromine, and bleach. Where national distributors with well-established reputations had facilitated the entry of small producers into integrated markets, distributors could also facilitate collusion. Mass-producing entrants, like Dow, joined collusive distribution arrangements while improving their innovative production processes. In the longer run, they integrated forward to escape the output restrictions and arms-length relationship with customers imposed by collusive agreements.

Until the 1790s marine insurance in the United States was organized by brokers and underwritten by private individuals. Beginning in 1792, however, the private underwriters had to compete with newly formed marine insurance corporations. Each organizational form had advantages and disadvantages. This article uses archival data from a private underwriter and a corporation to study how the competition between these different organizational forms was affected by a powerful exogenous shock which substantially increased the risks to American merchant shipping in the late 1790s: the “Quasi-War” between the United States and France.

This paper attempts to explain the reasons for the shift of labor from agriculture in the United States from 1869 to 1899. It focuses on the effects of productivity growth in agriculture and industry, and of increases in the supply of land (safety-valve theory). A two-sector general equilibrium model is used in the analysis. Many of the results hinge on whether the economy is assumed to be open or closed to foreign trade. In order to determine the appropriate specification, each issue is analyzed in terms of its equivalent counterfactual-conditional proposition. An important conclusion is that increases in agricultural productivity and the level of supply of land likely reduced the proportion of workers in agriculture even though the United States economy was open.

Integration in the American foreign-exchange market under the nineteenthcentury specie standard is examined using a newly developed series of the dollar- sterling exchange rate and estimates of specie-point spreads. A distinction is made between internal and external integration. The latter is much more important over the entire 1791 to 1900 time span, but by 1881–1900 the market is tightly integrated in both senses. The long-term trend of improved integration is interrupted only by wartime.

Of the millions of Indians who migrated internationally in the long nineteenth century, over one million went as indentured servants in a massive South-South migration. I test how price volatility in origin markets in India affected out-migration under indentureship contracts from 1873–1916 to four major destinations around the world. Using new, unique district-level flows calculated from roughly 250,000 individual records, I show that indentureship take-up is consistent with migrating to escape local price volatility.

Amuch neglected topic in the economic history of Uganda is the contribution of fiscal policy to the inequality of income. While generalizations have been made about the heavy burden of taxation on Uganda's Africans and the bias in the distribution of government expenditure, no systematic analysis of these issues has been undertaken. It is my objective to rectify this shortcoming, and to provide estimates of the incidence of taxation on different races and sectors of the economy at different periods. This study should be of parallel interest to my earlier article, demonstrating the extent of inequality in Uganda, since it shows that the government's tax policy had a major effect on the distribution of income in the country. The present paper focuses particularly on the farmers, who have always been at the bottom of the distribution ladder, and attempts to answer the following questions. 1.) What were the major sources of tax revenue in Uganda, and what proportion of the revenue was derived from the farmers? 2.) What was the farmers' rate of taxation compared to that of other sections of the population? 3.) How was expenditure out of government revenue distributed?

The immediate future of economic history is here. As I look over the program of our sessions, it seems plain that all of us are bound to be thinking about the nature of that future. Our president will speak on this subject with an authority that the rest of us cannot command. But it is up to each of us, however humble, to make such a contribution as the means at our disposal permit. Creative discussion always helps men to edge a little closer toward the truth. Let us hope there will be much of it during the next two days. Professor Innis has asked me to open the formal part of this session by some brief remarks on the relation of economic history to American civilization. I thank him for his confidence, but wish that he had placed the task in more competent hands. The subject I have selected is a vast and complicated one, and all I can hope to offer are a few rough and general suggestions. What I have to say is intended to provoke discussion.

During the period 1910–1940 some changes were occurring in the production practices of the Corn Belt. Three of the most important were the substitution of the tractor for horse power, the introduction of hybrid seed corn, and the development of viable mechanical picker-huskers for harvesting corn. This paper examines the background of those innovations, evaluates current assumptions about them, presents data concerning the relative per acre savings or additional income involved in adoption, and notes the possibility that assumptions about the economic rationality involved in corn improvement research, as well as the implications of the “dry hole effect,” may require some revision.

David Greasley and Les Oxley provide an interesting but ultimately unconvincing chalenge to the perspective on the British Industrial Revolution that we have set out in recent articles1. We believe that the issues that they raise are important and deserve a full response. Thus, we take the opportunity to clarify ideas on growth theory and its implications for growth accounting, to review the econometrics of estimating trend growth in an economy undergoing structural change, and to reconsider the persuasiveness of different views of the nature of technological change in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Although its role has been overlooked by monetary historians, a two-cent tax on bank checks effective from June 1932 through December 1934 appears to have been an important contributing factor to that period's severe monetary contraction. According to the estimates in this article, the currency–demand deposit ratio was about 15 percent higher, and the M1 money stock about 12 percent smaller, ceteris paribus, than each would have been without the tax. The contractionary consequences had in fact been anticipated by many legislators who were, nevertheless, unable to prevent the measure from being included in the Revenue Act of 1932.

The major purpose of this article is to measure factor-saving biases in technical change within the American and British textile sectors during the nineteenth century. This empirical attempt will be made within the context of the historical debate concerning the causes for the superiority of American industrial efficiency as compared with the British.

In 1942 the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve agreed to keep the interest rate on long-term government bonds below a ceiling of 2.5 percent. Assuming rational expectations, the ceiling on long-term interest rates can be viewed as a government commitment to low long-run inflation. The Fed also agreed to buy and sell short-term government bonds at a below-market rate of 3/8 percent. This policy did not result in long-run inflation because it was narrowly confined to 3-month Treasury bills.

Not long ago an authority on dyeing observed that “in the history of the dyeing industry indigo holds a unique place by reason of its irresistible rise to supremacy among dyestuffs and its equally rapid dethronement by the modern chemical colors. …” Among the sources of this once flourishing industry, one that has never been studied adequately is that of colonial Brazil. Commercial indigo production began there in the early 1760's, but after an impressive start the industry disappeared within less than two generations. Its beginnings occurred at a time when Portugal, like other imperial powers of that era, was seeking to diversify the agriculture of her colonies so as to make them more lucrative to the mother country. A study of the industry's brief tenure in Portugal's most important colony reveals some of the problems that confronted its planters, merchants, and royal officials as they attempted, with limited experience and inadequate supporting capital, to develop new sources of income during a period of keen international economic rivalry. The factors involved in the rise and decline of the Brazilian indigo industry can best be appreciated when it is examined as part of the global history of indigo production and trade between the late fifteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Shipping, central to the rise of the Atlantic economies, was an extremely hazardous activity. Between the 1780s and 1820s, a safety revolution occurred that saw shipping losses and insurance rates on oceanic routes almost halved thanks to steady improvements in shipbuilding and navigation. Copper sheathing, iron reinforcing, and flush decks were the major innovations in shipbuilding. Navigation improved, not through chronometers, which remained too expensive and unreliable for general use, but through radically improved charts, accessible manuals of basic navigational techniques, and improved shore-based navigational aids.

“Curse thee, thou quadrant!” dashing it to the deck, “no longer will I guide my earthly way by thee; the level ship’s compass, and the level dead-reckoning, by log and by line; these shall conduct me, and show me my place on the sea.”

Captain Ahab in Moby Dick, Ch. CXIII

Between 1550 and 1730, privileged investors in France—nobles, officers, and wealthy merchants—bought up enormous quantities of land from peasants. The transfer of property has attracted considerable attention from historians, but it has never been satisfactorily explained. The paper invokes the tax exemptions the privileged enjoyed to account for the transfer—an explanation that fits both the chronology of the land sales and the identity of the purchasers. The paper then examines how the tax system throttled growth in the agricultural sector.

Twelve-hour days persisted in British and U.S. iron and steel after most industrial workers worked eight-hour days. When shorter hours finally came, sooner in Britain, they came abruptly. This article presents a model of working hours as public goods; when job attributes are shared there is a collective choice problem. In Britain, a collective bargaining mechanism reconciled the preferences of workers and capital owners and facilitated the move to shorter hours. In the United States immigrants had been willing to work long hours. When immigration was cut off, the government intervened.

The relative stagnation of British industry during what has been called the climacteric of the 1890's did not extend to shipbuilding, though that industry, producing capital goods and depending on a substantial foreign market, shared many of the characteristics of the industries most affected by foreign competition. The purpose of this article is to discuss the comparative success of British shipbuilding. In the first two sections, the conditions of shipbuilding in Britain and in the countries that rivaled her are briefly described, and in the remainder of the paper the factors influencing comparative costs are examined.

The different rates of technical progress in Western Europe and the United States, exemplified by the motor industry, created a problem of adjustment in international payments by the 1920s. American direct investment in manufacturing in Europe was a manifestation of technological superiority and a partial solution to the payments problem. The scale of their operations gave the American motor vehicle firms an advantage even in foreign production. An alternative way of closing the technological gap, the transfer of machine tools and trained men from America to Europe, allowed the European motor vehicle producers to compete without becoming entirely American-owned.