This article examines the economic costs to the British nation of the Seven Years War. Drawing upon manuscript records and secondary studies, the author analyzes in detail the diversion of resources to the Navy and the effect of increased debts on the economy. Finding that the burden was great but the impact apparently slight, the author suggests that the English may have drawn substantially upon extra-national sources of capital, labor and materials.

This response offers a critical appraisal of the claim of Albrecht Ritschl to have found a possible resolution to what he calls the Anglo-German industrial productivity puzzle, which arose as the result of a new industrial production index produced in an earlier paper by the same author. Projection back from a widely accepted 1935/36 benchmark using the Ritschl index showed German industrial labor productivity in 1907 substantially higher than in Britain. This presented a puzzle for at least two reasons. First, other comparative information from the pre—World War I period, such as wages, seems difficult to square with much higher German labor productivity at this time. Second, a direct benchmark estimate produced by Stephen Broadberry and Carsten Burhop, using production census information for Britain and industrial survey material of similar quality for Germany, suggested broadly equal labor productivity in 1907. Broadberry and Burhop also showed that if Walther Hoffmann's industrial output index was used instead of the Ritschl index for Germany, the puzzle largely disappeared.

What was the return to education in the United States at mid-century? In 1940, the correlation between years of schooling and earnings was relatively low. In this article, we estimate the causal return to schooling in 1940, constructing a large linked sample of twin brothers to account for differences in unobserved ability and family background. We find that each additional year of schooling increased labor earnings by approximately 4 percent, about half the return found for more recent cohorts in twins studies. These returns were evident both within and across occupations and were higher for sons from lower socio-economic status families.

Economic historians have traced the origin of the uniform property tax in the United States to the insertion of uniformity clauses into state constitutions in the Northwest and to efforts to tax commercial wealth. This article shows that the tax was created by legislation in the Northeast and that the first constitutional clauses were adopted in the South to protect slaveholders. It is time for historians of the U.S. political economy to abandon the dated paradigms of the “progressive history” tradition.

That the modernization of Japanese political and economic institutions during the Meiji period was spearheaded by the government and the samurai class that manned the government is a widely accepted view. One could, with little effort, assemble numerous quotations (in English or Japanese) reiterating this theme with little or no variation. Government-samurai endeavors such as pioneering in modern technology, subsidy programs (tangible and intangible), dissemination of new knowledge (to include modern business practices), and other aspects of “community-centered entrepreneurship” all support the theme. The purpose of this article is to question this well-entrenched view by submitting the findings of a close examination of the emergence of modern banking in Japan. Although this is only one aspect of the general theme, few students of Japanese economic history would deny that it has been often cited as one of the most typical examples of samurai leadership and of government initiative in the modernization of Japan. Eiichi Shibusawa, a former samurai, has invariably been linked with this development, in an attempt to stress that modern banking was a creation of the samurai class.

The economic development of the American colonies is one of the least explored areas in American economic history. Since the several regions in the colonies followed somewhat different paths of development, the colonial puzzle can be gradually pieced together through research which concentrates on particular regions. The subject of this study is an important aspect of the development of the tobacco colonies during approximately the thirty years preceding 1770. George Rogers Taylor and Jacob M. Price have suggested that the second and third quarters of the eighteenth century brought “rapid economic growth” to the tobacco colonies and a “marked resumption of growth” in tobacco exports. The findings of this study will suggest some reservations concerning the leading role of tobacco during this time. The series on American tobacco exports to Great Britain suggests that there was virtual stagnation in the first quarter of the eighteenth century followed by perhaps a doubling of exports in the second quarter and then near stagnation in the third quarter until the year 1771. The reason for the leap in tobacco exports in 1771 to a high plateau of approximately 100 million pounds annually during 1771–1775 is unknown. What is important for analysis of the growth and development of the tobacco colonies, however, is that the exceptionally high exports in the last five years of the colonial period tend to mask what was apparently a slow and erratic growth in world demand for American tobacco exports in the immediately preceding decades. The assumption that tobacco was a booming sector in the economy of the upper South at this time is open to question.

The rapid industrialization of pre-war Japan depended upon extensive use of mechanical power. This dependence is studied quantitatively based on historical statistics of power for the years from 1890 to 1940. The introduction of engines (the change from human to mechanical power) and shifts in the kinds of engines (from water wheels to steam engines to electric motors) are clarified by industry group. The impact of these changes on technological progress in manufacturing is revealed.

C P. Kindleberger once described economic history as “great fun” but not very useful for understanding what happens in the real world. W. N. Parker, on the other hand, doesn't regard it as at all amusing, but terribly important. Within that range, surely, each of us can locate his own ratio of practicality to enjoyment inherent in the pursuit of economic history. I myself was drawn to the study of economic history, even before I was aware of its existence—in fact, it was my youthful intention to invent the discipline—by two distinct motives. On the one hand, I wanted to enter (or create) a profession in which the work itself would yield intellectual pleasure. At the same time, having just lived through the longest depression in modern times and the most destructive war in history, I wanted to do something that would be useful to society. History, I knew, was interesting. Economics, I assumed, was important. I therefore resolved to give up the study of engineering, which had occupied me briefly before the war, and to create the new discipline of economic history. I was mildly surprised to discover upon enrolling in the Yale Studies for Returning Servicemen that the discipline did, indeed, already exist, and was, furthermore, ably represented at Yale by none other than Harold F. Williamson.

Distinct diffusion curves are identified by model type and significant differences in regional motor car ownership in the interwar U.K. economy. We assess the viability of applying mass production strategies such as Ford and General Motors pursued in America. Given the demand-side constraints present in the U.K. market, the price reductions made possible by the exploitation of economies of scale were insufficient to create a mass market. Hence, the relatively low levels of ownership achieved can be seen as a rational response to the constraints perceived by firms.

New England experienced a significant economic transformation after the Revolutionary War. Despite an extensive literature on American development, little is known about the precise role of banks in this process. This article exploits a detailed dataset from Plymouth County, Massachusetts to show that the first bank during its early stage was far more selective in lending than the pre-existing personal credit market. Thus the mere introduction of a single bank did not broaden access to credit. Following the liberalization of chartering policy in the 1820s, however, freer entry and competition drove banks to extend credit to farmers and artisans.

British investment in Argentina in the period 1880–1914 amounted to some 8 percent of total British overseas investment; it exhibited long swings which were roughly similar to long swings in total British overseas investment but opposite to British domestic investment, although the bursts of lending to Argentina were particularly concentrated. These swings have attracted the attention of economists and some (notably Brinley Thomas) have pointed out that emigration from Europe to North America and American investment in construction and transportation and other series in the American economy exhibited 18–20 year swings similar to those in British overseas investment, and that these were all in opposite phase to swings in British home investment and the building cycle in Britain. They have then gone on to explain these inverse British patterns in terms of emigration and the growth rhythm of the Atlantic economy, with heavy stress being laid on North American effects. The analysis of movements of both labor and capital can then be conducted in terms of the varying intensities of the pull of opportunities at home and abroad, and the push of home conditions and prospects, and how these interacted with each other to produce these inverse patterns.

Casual perusal could easily lead one to conclude that “the government” represents one of the most thoroughly researched areas in American economic history; however, there is something quite unsettling about a more careful scrutiny of its historiography. While the list of historians who have made their reputations by studying the importance of government through its impact on land policy, transportation, business, etc., etc., etc., is almost too long to enumerate, those authors who have attempted to measure the dollar value of these contributions have come to the conclusion that they must have been quite small. This paper provides no final resolution to this apparent paradox, but it does suggest at least one possible solution. It examines the spatial distribution of governmental activity and indicates that while, in total, that activity was almost always small, there were significant differences between the level of activity in different regions, and these differences may have contributed to differentials in regional growth patterns.

I take it as a truism that for at least the past half century the relations between government and private enterprise in Europe have irregularly evolved in such a manner as to expand the role of government policy and action. Leaving aside the European countries which now have Communist governments and almost wholly socialized economies, this trend has been, in only small part, a matter of conscious or ideological development. Primarily, it has been the consequence of piecemeal adaptation of societies to the specific pressures and problems with which they have been confronted, latterly the problems of world depression, of war, and now of postwar adjustment.

I utilize data from the Civil War income tax to calculate the income shares of the top 1 and 0.1 percent of the population in the United States in the late 1860s—extending Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez's series back in time. As we will see, income inequality during this period represents a low comparable to the late 1970s.

Germany introduced compulsory industrial accident insurance in 1884. The accident-insurance system compensated injured workers and survivors for losses, but initially failed to limit the growth of accident rates. We trace this failure to the 1884 law's faulty incentives and to an initial unwillingness to use the tools built into the law. The government regulator increasingly stressed rules that forced firms to adopt specific safety-enhancing innovations and practices. Econometric analysis shows that more consistent use of the rules and the limited incentives available under the law would have reduced industrial accidents earlier and more extensively.

Systematic demographic analysis of early America has been neglected until quite recently. As the interest in and need for demographic data on pre-1800 America have increased during the last five years, efforts have been made to remedy this situation.The most recent studies are utilizing such new techniques as family reconstitution to avoid the problems created by the lack of reliable census data and vital statistics. But these techniques yield results very slowly, and in any case their results are subject to methodological limitations that make it necessary to check them against larger aggregates. For these reasons we need to reexamine the usefulness and accuracy of earlier studies on colonial population that were based on aggregate data. Unfortunately, this latter task has not been adequately carried out during the recent burst of activity among demographers of early America.

Why did the United States subsidize American multinationals' entry into countries treated as informal colonies? We study a classic case of American imperialism, the 1903 U.S. support of Panama's secession from Colombia and subsequent U.S. payment of the 1921 reparations that opened Colombia's oil fields to Standard Oil. We test Noel Maurer's (2013) empire trap hypothesis quantitatively. Archival and econometric evidence documents Colombia's threat to Standard Oil's sunk investment, which induced the multinational to build a supermajority coalition in the U.S. Senate to back a reparations treaty. Results support the empire trap hypothesis but point out important qualifications.

This article examines the forces that appear to have driven long-term trends in American urban inequality. The changing structure of consumer goods' prices is shown to have played a significant—but not dominant—role in every phase of increasing and decreasing nominal inequality from 1820 to 1929. The revealed symmetry in movement between the urban price and income structure suggests that a successful macro-distribution model must explain both historical phenomena. Finally, the article concludes that technological imbalance was a crucial element in shaping peacetime patterns of income distribution.

This paper studies the average and heterogeneous effects of railway access on parish-level population, income, and industrialization in Württemberg during the Industrial Revolution. We show that the growth-enhancing effect of the railway was much greater in parishes that were larger and more industrial at the outset. However, such early industrial parishes were rare in the relatively poor German state. This might explain why we find small average growth effects, which only increase at the end of the nineteenth century. Heterogeneity in the impact of the railway thus increased economic disparities within Württemberg and contributed to the state’s relatively sluggish growth.