Japan's transformation into a modern state began shortly after the middle of the nineteenth century when she was forcibly opened to international trade. In the ensuing years, the old social, economic, and political structure was overhauled to the end that Japan might become a powerful nation able to stand on an equal footing with the more advanced Western nations. Early attention was given to land reform and peasant emancipation since the country was predominantly agricultural, with about four fifths of the population engaged in cultivating the soil. In the early 1870's the prevailing system of servile land tenure was swept away and replaced by a system of private ownership of land. Henceforth, the peasants, who had formerly held land from feudal nobles in return for certain dues and services, were given title to land on which they, as owners, paid a land tax.

In this article, I investigate the effect of landholding inequalities on the democratization process in nineteenth-century France. I focus on the 1849 election, which followed the establishment of the Second Republic (1848–1851), and on the first six elections of the Third Republic (1870–1940), which took place between 1876 and 1893. I find that stronger landholding inequalities were associated to a lower support for the Republicans, and therefore constituted a threat to the consolidation of democracy. I provide evidence that large landowners resisted the establishment of democracy by influencing the electoral behavior of economically dependent agricultural workers.

In 1966, after more than 700 years, the irrigation community in Mula (Spain) switched from auctions to quotas to allocate water from its river. This change happened in the absence of either political or technological change. Quotas were more efficient, but required that farmers own water property rights. I develop a model in which poor farmers cannot credibly commit to purchase water rights. I show that empirical evidence on savings and prices is consistent with this interpretation. A temporary increase in output prices in the 1950s and better financial institutions allowed farmers to accumulate savings and solve the commitment problem.

Religious communities are important providers of social insurance. We show that risk associated with oil dependence facilitated the proliferation of religious communities throughout the U.S. South during the twentieth century. Known oil abundance predicts higher rates of church membership, which are not driven by selective migration or local economic development. Consistent with a social insurance channel, greater oil price volatility increases effects, while greater access to credit, state-level social insurance, and private insurance crowd out effects. Religious communities limit spillovers of oil price shocks across sectors, reducing increases in unemployment following a negative shock by about 30 percent.

The 1944 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (the “G.I. Bill”) provided returning WWII veterans with educational benefits sufficient to cover tuition, fees, and living expenses at almost any U.S. university or college. While several studies examine subsequent educational attainment and earnings for male veterans, little is known about how the G.I. Bill affected the 330,000 American females who served in WWII. Using data from the 1980 5 percent Census Public-use Microdata Sample, I find that female WWII veteran status is associated with a 19 percentage point increase in the proportion who report any college attendance, a 7.8 percentage point increase in college completion, and earnings that are 19.8 percent greater relative to comparable females who are not veterans. Because service was entirely voluntary for females, I use service eligibility requirements, enlistment records, 1940 Census data, and the G.I. Bill’s retroactive nature to establish a causal relationship among veteran status, educational attainment via the G.I. Bill, and increased earnings. To help separate the effect of the G.I. Bill from the effect of military service itself, and because benefits increased with longer service, I instrument for female veterans’ educational attainment using age at the time of the G.I. Bill’s announcement. My instrumental variables estimates imply that female veterans’ earnings increase by $1,350 (11.6 percent) per year of G.I. Bill-induced education, explaining 73 percent of the overall difference between veteran and non-veteran females’ earnings in 1980.

That the ruling samurai class suffered increasing poverty during the Tokugawa period is accepted, without dissent, by all students of Japanese history. However, this view is based primarily on contemporary descriptions of the financial distress felt by the samurai class and has never been established empirically through the use of quantitative data. Most of the literature supporting this long accepted view is highly impressionistic and fails even to define precisely what is meant by increasing poverty. Thus, the writers on this subject use the phrase “increasing poverty” to mean variously a decline in real income, a lagging increase in real income vis-a-vis that of other classes (merchants, artisans, and peasants), or increasing “psychological poverty” experienced due to increasing expectations while real income was rising less rapidly. Authors not infrequently use these different concepts of “increasing poverty” interchangeably.

A notable difference of opinion exists among economic historians as to the effect of harvest fluctuations on general economic conditions. The question has arisen, specifically, in the interpretation of European experience in the eighteenth century. T. S. Ashton has suggested that good harvests, both by cheapening food and thus setting free purchasing power for others forms of expenditure, and by providing ampler supplies of agricultural products used as industrial raw materials, had a stimulating effect on the economy. J. D. Chambers and G. E. Mingay have taken the opposite view. According to them, bad harvests may have had the more beneficial effect, for the incomes of landowners and farmers were higher in lean years, and their prosperity or distress was of greater consequence than the dearth or cheapness of provisions.

Some recent critics of Russian industrial policy argue that the costs of the Witte System may have been excessive relative to its benefits and that similar rates (or perhaps higher rates) of industrial growth could have been attained if alternate fiscal and monetary policies had been adopted. Once differential rates of growth of prices and real national income are considered, it appears that the Russian money supply was not unduly constrained. The authors also demonstrate that foreign capital inflows made a substantial contribution to Russian economic development, as did the decision to adhere to the international gold standard.

One of the major centrifugal forces in American economic history is the industrial revolution which has been taking place for the past 150 years. Corollary to it are the agricultural revolution and the transportation revolution. Most of the investment capital and working capital for the expanding enterprises involved in these revolutions came from plowing back profits, but a sizable amount had to be borrowed or obtained from outside investors. Mobilizing this capital was a major undertaking, especially in a new nation in which capital was relatively scarce. Its successful accomplishment involved a financial revolution.

This article presents evidence that cultural proximity between the exporting and the receiving countries positively affects the adoption of new institutions and the resulting long-term economic outcomes. We obtain this result by combining new information on pre-Napoleonic principalities with county-level census data from nineteenth-century Prussia. We exploit a quasi-natural experiment generated by radical Napoleonic institutional reforms and the deeply rooted cultural heterogeneity across Prussian counties. We show that institutional reforms in counties that are culturally more similar to France, in terms of religious affiliation, generate better long-term economic performance.

The conduct of the British government's financial affairs during the Duke of Newcastle's tenure as First Lord of the Treasury has never to my knowledge been specifically investigated. This gap in our understanding of the eighteenth century is doubly puzzling: the period itself, during which Britain won a war and an empire, is pivotal in the kingdom's history; moreover, the sources for such a study are uncommonly rich for precisely those years in which the duke held the office. The lack of such an analysis, however, has not prevented several authorities from passing severe judgments on the duke's handling of financial affairs, and while these authorities speak from extensive knowledge of the Treasury and its complexities, I have come to conclude that their assessments are too harsh—a view I shall elaborate at the end of this essay. But even if the reader should conclude at that point that my flirtation with revisionism is itself ill-founded, there is yet another value in examining the Treasury under Newcastle: as in perhaps no other period we can sometimes see decisions at the Treasury actually being made, ideas being transmitted, and problems being analyzed. And above all we can see in some detail how Britain's remarkably successful governmental financial machine operated.

Japan vigorously enforced wide-ranging developmental policies in colonial Korea, including a “green revolution” and an industrialization drive. Why did then colonial per capita food availability decline? Simulations using a dynamic general equilibrium model indicate that tax raises, which financed expanding public investment, did not lower, but raised consumption levels over time by accelerating accumulation. Food consumption fell because these policy efforts were inadequate to defeat population explosion initiated by a health campaign. The interwar agricultural depression exacerbated this Malthusian situation. Nevertheless, interwar Korean consumption trend compares favorably with most other rice producers, where the level of government intervention appeared suboptimal.

Two financial missions to Colombia headed by Edwin W. Kemmerer are examined to determine their impact on Colombia's financial system and on the flow of American investment to Colombia. The 1923 and 1930 missions established a central bank and completely reorganized the Colombian financial and fiscal system. These reforms served to provide enough stability to encourage American investment, which helped to develop a financial and economic infrastructure in Colombia.

This article considers how and why American industry has supported research and development during the last century. It examines the differences in methods and results of Thomas Edison (inventor-entrepreneur), William Coolidge (General Electric engineer-scientist), and Irving Langmuir (General Electric Nobel Prize winner). The article concludes that Edison's effective use of organized research and development paved the way for scientifically trained people to use varied methodologies to advance science, technology, and commercial interests together.

Societies usually do not define explicitly the criteria of the legitimacy of the penetration of the price-system into different areas, and I suppose that, as social scientists, we should be grateful for this omission, since this is the kind of thing that forms the basis of our livelihood.

In Presenting this paper to an audience of historians I find myself in a painfully ambiguous position. I am not qualified to talk to you as a historian; therefore what I am going to say will lack the richness of empirical detail that usually characterizes historical papers. On the other hand, in order to qualify as “comparative analysis” this paper ought to have a firm theoretical foundation for its analysis, and accepted standards of reference for its comparisons. Unfortunately, the development economists are still at the beginning of their difficult attempts to isolate the factors that make for economic development, and the complex interaction of these factors has so far eluded systematic analysis and presentation.

This article compares the development of the workers' right to organize and bargain collectively in England, France, and the U.S. Starting with a common repressive policy, each country followed a different path toward establishing the workers' rights. The main ultimate difference lies in the extent to which the state became involved in industrial relations. In England the state remained aloof after securing very broad legal rights of collective action. The workers were left to do their own battling. In France the state came to look upon collective agreements as an aspect of public policy and became the dominant partner in labor negotiations. The American pattern lies in between: state protection extends to procedural but not to substantive issues.