After peaking around the mid-eighteenth century, grain market integration in China declined by a colossal 80 percent amid a twofold increase in population and remained at low levels for well over a century. Markets only resumed their growth momentum after the largest peasant revolt—the Taiping Rebellion—wiped out roughly one-sixth of the Chinese population starting 1851. This U-shaped pattern of grain market integration distinguished China from Europe in their trajectories of market development. Using grain prices to divide China into grain-deficit and grainsurplus regions, we find that the negative relationship between population growth and market integration originated from the grain-surplus-cum-exporting regions.

Scholars are gradually piecing together the puzzle of the economic development of the American colonies through quantitative studies designed to clarify and measure economic variables having theoretical relevance for the wider process of economic growth and development. Recently, researchers such as Jones, Land, Shepherd, Walton, and Thomas have been helping others to build a base that one day may permit the writing of a comprehensive study of the process of early American economic development which may even include reliable estimates of economic growth and living standards. The data problems for the colonial period of American economic history are severe, and much of the research has tended to concentrate on the important role of international trade, where the extant data sources are capable of yielding rich lodes of quantitative information. Customs 16/1, entitled the Ledger of Imports and Exports for America, 1768–1772, has been the most valuable source of trade data, since it is the only comprehensive document which shows the trade of the American colonies with all parts of the world and not just with the British Isles. Still yet to be mined are the rich sources of data buried in the naval office lists for the various colonies. These sources also give the trade of each colony with all parts of the world although they are more tedious to work with than the better collated Customs 16/1.

During the seventeenth century the Dutch had possessions in almost every continent, but their main interest was and continued to be the Malay Archipelago, now known as Indonesia. The search for these islands, known to be the source of spices, had launched die Age of Discovery with the explosive effect of opening the whole world to the countries of Western Europe. The Portuguese and Spanish had divided the world between themselves by the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494). Their aim was twofold: exploitation of newly discovered lands and a crusade to spread the Christian faith. England and the Dutch Republic, both Protestant, refused to abide by this arbitrary division, which had been sanctioned by die Pope. Both countries defended the principle that “the sea was as free as the air.”

U.S. military production during World War II increased at an impressive rate and led to large declines in unit costs. However, the literature has focused on elucidating detailed mechanisms behind this relationship, using small datasets on specific products. Here we take a step back and, looking at an unprecedently large collection of data, we show that both exogenous technological progress and endogenous effects from increasing production experience were important, in roughly similar proportions. The demand for military products was largely exogenous, and the correlation between production, cumulative production, and time was weak, limiting issues of reverse causality and multicollinearity.

The Cobden-Chevalier treaty of 1860 eliminated French import prohibitions and lowered tariffs between France and Great Britain. The policy change was largely unexpected and unusually free from direct lobbying. A series of commercial treaties with other nations followed. Post-1860, we find a significant rise in French intra-industry trade. Sectors that liberalized more experienced higher two-way trade. Our findings are consistent with the idea that trade liberalization led to “smooth adjustment” that avoided costly inter-sectoral re-allocations of factors.

A Widespread belief exists that those disequilibrating international capital flows known as “hot money movements” and the associated measures instituted to regulate transactions in foreign exchange were peculiar to the post-1914 era and especially to the epoch of the “Great Depression” that commenced after 1929. It is felt that the “relative” stability of world economic and political conditions associated with the operation of the pre-1914 gold standard precluded “hot money” transfers and obviated the need to control the foreign exchange market.1 The experience of the United States during the depression of the 1890's vitiates the accuracy of this sweeping generalization. To be sure, these phenomena were largely unrecognized before the depression of the 1930's, but they nevertheless existed. The purpose of this article is to examine one such pre-1930 hot money movement, the one that occurred during the American presidential election campaign of 1896. The nomination of William Jennings Bryan as the Democratic candidate on a free silver platform at Chicago in July 1896 gave impetus to a major disequilibrating outflow of short-term funds. This condition, in turn, led to an interesting effort to control the foreign exchange market.

The article tests a variant of Lars G. Sandberg's “financial sophistication hypothesis.” Sandberg argues that Sweden had an unusually large stock of financial capital in 1850 which, along with a highly literate populace, was paramount in the subsequent economic explosion. Unable to test the hypothesis directly, we use a variant—that the financial sector was a leading sector in Swedish development—amenable to time-series tests of the Granger-causality form. These tests on data from 1861 to 1910 do not show causality from financial variables to real; indeed, the converse holds.

The United State has experienced tremendous improvements in its standard of living over the past hundred years, as have most nations in the developed world.This dissertation was completed at Ohio State University under the supervision of Richard Steckel. We now accept as necessities many things that our grandparents would have considered to be luxuries; we also enjoy countless goods, devices, and services completely unknown a century ago. Far fewer workers are required to produce the necessities of life that we now consume, and therefore an increasing number of us have time to devote to leisure activities, such as entertainment and recreation.

When labor markets are subject to large demand or supply shocks, as was the case in the late nineteenth-century United States, geographic wage differentials may not be an accurate index of market integration. This article uses a conceptually more appealing measure—the elasticity of local labor supply—to compare the integration of urban labor markets for a variety of occupations in 1890. According to this measure, markets, for unskilled labor and skilled metal-working trades appear relatively well integrated in comparison to those for the skilled building trades.

Contrary to earlier assertions, the historical data for Britain do confirm a (lagged) crowding-out effect during the Industrial Revolution. Heavy government borrowing after 1793 for the wars with France raised interest rates. These results are confirmed with nominal-interest-rate equations rather than with real-rate equations, which impose restrictive assumptions about the adjustment of nominal rates to inflation expectations. We see no reason to abandon the neoclassical, factor- allocation model of saving and investment in favor of a theory asserting that firms accumulate capital for investment independently of household saving decisions.

Modern writers have usually dated die composition of Mun's work about the period 1630-1635. My article (pages 121-33 above) establishes diat much of die argument was the outcome of die trade crisis of 1620-1624, and die quotations and references there given prove that some of die most important sections of die work were first written, diough probably not as part of a book, during diat period. In addition, there are four pieces of internal evidence which help to date die complete work with some certainty.

Japanese historians have characterized the Tokugawa period (1600–1868) as an “early modern feudal system” (kinsei hòken seido). While there is disagreement on the nature of feudalism in general, and the form of feudalism in the Tokugawa period in particular, I believe that Tokugawa society does include the essential elements of a feudal system so as to justify this label. What is particularly conspicuous is that Japan, like Europe, experienced feudalism before the birth of the modern age. In the case of Japan, as Professor E. O. Reischauer has pointed out, feudalism permitted the development of a goal-oriented ethic, rather than a status-oriented ethic, a strong sense of duty and obligation, and excluded the non warrior class from political power. Professor R. N. Bellah has differentiated the social values of Japan's feudalism from those of European feudalism by stressing the element of “loyalty” in the former and identifying this value as a key to the modernization of Japan. Whatever the special characteristics of feudalism in Japan may be, all analysts agree that the term “feudalism” is appropriate as a description of Tokugawa society.

This paper, as presented at the Fourth Congress of the International Economic History Association, is the first of four concerned with economic growth in England before the industrial revolution, in what, for purposes of brevity and analytical distinction, I propose to call “preindustrial England.” It might be prudent for this period to talk of “economic change” (“the movement of economic processes over time”) rather than “economic growth” (“the growth of output per head of population”), because change does not necessarily imply growth, and because, for the thousand years which preceded English industrialization, the historians are uncertain about the direction and duration of the secular trend of the economy over long periods, although they seem to have identified some periods of growth as well as some periods of decline.

Japan's transformation into a modern state began shortly after the middle of the nineteenth century when she was forcibly opened to international trade. In the ensuing years, the old social, economic, and political structure was overhauled to the end that Japan might become a powerful nation able to stand on an equal footing with the more advanced Western nations. Early attention was given to land reform and peasant emancipation since the country was predominantly agricultural, with about four fifths of the population engaged in cultivating the soil. In the early 1870's the prevailing system of servile land tenure was swept away and replaced by a system of private ownership of land. Henceforth, the peasants, who had formerly held land from feudal nobles in return for certain dues and services, were given title to land on which they, as owners, paid a land tax.